PART I CHILDHOOD AND SCHOOL YEARS

PART I

CHILDHOOD AND SCHOOL YEARS

  1. 1 Ancestors and Family. Röcken (1844-50)

For much of his life Friedrich Nietzsche was pleased to regard himself as descended on his father’s side from Polish aristocrats. At boarding-school in the 1860’s he took an interest in Slavic music and composed ‘Polish dances’ which he dedicated to his supposed forebears. In a letter to a school friend in 1862 he signed himself ‘Nietzky’. In 1882 he wrote in a notebook: ‘I have been taught to trace my descent and name to Polish aristocrats called Niëtzky who gave up their homeland and titles more than a hundred years ago, escaping from unbearable religious oppression, for they were Protestants. As a boy I was proud of my Polish descent. Whatever German blood is in me comes solely from my mother, from the Oehler family, and from the family of my father’s mother, the Krauses, but it seems that in all essentials I have nevertheless remained a Pole.’[1] In his 1888 autobiography Ecce Homo Nietzsche claims without qualification that ‘my ancestors were Polish noblemen’.[2] His sister Elisabeth tells of a ‘family tradition’ passed down by their aunts that in the early eighteenth century a Polish nobleman named Niëtzky fled Poland with his wife and newborn child after being sentenced to death for conspiring against King Stanislaus Leszcynski in favour of Saxony and the Protestants, and that their great grandfather Gotthilf Engelbert Nietzsche (1714-1804) was the child of this fleeing couple.[3] However Elisabeth calls this story ‘mythical’.[4] Towards the end of her life Franziska Nietzsche, mother of Friedrich and Elisabeth, said that she had heard nothing about Polish ancestors from her husband or mother-in-law.[5] And in reminiscences published in 1906 Nietzsche’s close friend Franz Overbeck wrote: ‘In reality Nietzsche was German through and through. He was a Slav only in his fantasy.’[6]

A century of genealogical research has failed to uncover convincing evidence for Nietzsche’s Polish ancestry.[7] His paternal grandfather Friedrich August Ludwig Nietzsche, Church Superintendent in Eilenburg when Nietzsche’s father Carl Ludwig was born, was himself born in the Saxon town of Bibra in 1756, the seventh child of the tax inspector Gotthilf Engelbert Nietzsche. Gotthilf Engelbert’s own father, Christoph Andreas Nitzsche, was likewise a tax inspector in Bibra, and his father, also named Christoph, was a butcher in Burkau in Oberlausitz (eastern Saxony) where he was baptised in 1662. The missing link in birth records is Christoph Andreas Nitzsche, recorded as marrying a Johanna Büttner in Eckartsberga near Bibra in 1707 and as dying in Bibra in 1739. That this Christoph Andreas was the son of the Burkau couple Christoph and Anna Nitzsche is very likely because the official register for his marriage gives his father as ‘Christoph Nitzsche, citizen and butcher in Burkau’, and records from Burkau show two other children of this couple baptised in 1686 and 1692. While no birth record for Christoph Andreas has been found it appears he was born not in Burkau but around 1682 in the Saxon village of Weitzschen south of Meißen (about sixty kilometres west of Burkau) and attended, like his son Gotthilf Engelbert and grandson Friedrich August Ludwig, the University of Leipzig. There is no evidence to suggest that either parent of Christoph Andreas was Polish. Nietzsche and cognate forms like Nitzsche, Nitsche and Nitzke are not uncommon names for Germans, although all may have a Slavic origin.[8] It would have been somewhat unusual for the son of a butcher to undertake the legal studies for the career of tax-inspector, but the University of Leipzig had a reputation for catering to students from the lower classes; this step up in the world by Christoph Andreas was in any case an important link for the line of descent to the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

The mother of his paternal grandfather Friedrich August Ludwig, Nietzsche claimed in a letter of 1882, was ‘also’ a Pole.[9] In fact she was German, being the daughter Johanna Amalia of Pastor Johann Herold of Reinsdorf in Saxony; the Herolds had been pastors for five generations. The Polish ancestry story is a mystery. Its attraction for Nietzsche grew as he became more averse to Germany and Germans. Whether he believed the story completely, or half-believed it, or just wanted to believe it, can only be guessed, and perhaps he wavered between these attitudes. It remains true that Nietzsche’s facial features suggest some possible admixture of Slavic stock. Many who met him thought he did not look German. Whether Nietzsche’s father, from the few portraits of him we possess, looks noticeably Slavic, is hard to say.

Irrespective of whether Nietzsche possessed some traces of Polish blood his lineage was overwhelmingly Saxon, and the scenes of his early life, and of the lives of nearly all his ancestors for more than a century, took place within the relatively small radius of greater Saxony. Not only were many of Nietzsche’s relatives Protestant pastors but his roots were in the heartland of German Protestantism. As for his national identity, the village of his birth, Röcken, became part of the Prussian province of Saxony after the Napoleonic Wars. The same is true of the town of Naumburg where he spent his later childhood and where his mother lived until her death. Leipzig, on the other hand, the nearest major city to Naumburg and Röcken and the only large German city where Nietzsche came to feel comparatively at home, remained after 1815 part of the nominally independent but truncated Kingdom of Saxony. Thus Nietzsche was born a citizen of Prussia, and although he relinquished his citizenship in 1869 upon moving to Switzerland, the following year he joined the Prussian army as a volunteer in the war against France. For the rest of his life he was officially stateless, emotionally homeless, and philosophically, as he liked to say, ‘a good European’. As he recognized, however, his Saxon and Protestant roots never ceased exerting a strong influence on his mind and character.

The philosopher’s paternal grandfather Friedrich August Ludwig Nietzsche, grandson of the original tax-inspector, was the only author among his ancestors and also the first to pursue a career in the church. In 1776 he began a degree in theology at the University of Leipzig. Evidently a man of considerable energy and intellectual ability, he published at least nine theological and religious books between 1785 and his death in 1826; his robust literary style is tantalizingly suggestive of his grandson.[10] He belonged to the rationalist wing of German Protestant theology, rooted in the German Enlightenment and especially the thought of Christian Wolff (1679-1754). At the age of sixty-one he received an honorary doctorate of theology from the University of Königsberg but he was never a university teacher. For twenty years he was Pastor in  Wohlmirstedt near his home town of Bibra. In 1803 he moved to Eilenburg near Leipzig to become Head Pastor of the Church of St. Nicholai and Church Superintendent, posts he held until his death. Friedrich August was married twice. His first wife Johanna Richter, whom he married in Bibra before moving to Wohlmirstedt, bore him nine children, two dying in infancy, the others reaching at least middle age. A few years after transferring to Eilenberg with his family Johanna died. When he remarried in 1809 the new Frau Superintendent was the widow Erdmuthe Krüger (née Krause) of the Weimar court lawyer Carl Krüger, who had died in 1806.

At the time of his second marriage Friedrich August was fifty-three years of age, his wife thirty-one with no surviving children. Born in the Saxon city of Reichenbach in 1778, Erdmuthe’s parents were Archdeacon Christoph Krause and his wife Johanna Stauss. One brother was Johann Krause, Head Pastor at Naumburg Cathedral since 1801, who in 1810 became professor of theology in Königsberg, then in 1819-20 served briefly (before his death) as General Superintendent in Weimar, a post once held by the philosopher J. G. Herder. After her first husband’s death Erdmuthe lived in Naumburg with her brother Pastor Krause, through whom she met Superintendent Nietzsche.[11] Their wedding took place in Naumburg Cathedral, where seven years earlier Erdmuthe had married her first husband. Three children resulted: Rosalie (1811), Carl Ludwig (1813), and Auguste (1815). On the sixteenth of March 1826, when Carl Ludwig was twelve, Erdmuthe was again widowed, this time at the age of forty-seven. Nietzsche never knew his father’s father, who died eighteen years before he was born. But his father’s mother Erdmuthe did not die until 1856 when Nietzsche was eleven. Since Erdmuthe lived with her grandson (her only grandson in fact) from his birth until her own death she was an important person in the life of the boy.

Nietzsche’s father Carl Ludwig Nietzsche was born in Eilenburg near Leipzig on the tenth of October 1813, a few days before the great Battle of Leipzig. Since his own father was a senior churchman it was natural that Carl Ludwig should follow the same profession. At elementary school in Eilenburg he distinguished himself in literary and musical exercises.[12] At thirteen, soon after the death of his father, he composed a trial sermon which showed a literary ability and religious consciousness unusual for his age. From 1828 to 1833 he attended the prestigious Rossleben School in northern Thuringia. This was followed by four years of theological studies at the University of Halle. After graduation his first position was as a house-tutor in Altenburg, seat of the Court of the Duchy of Saxe-Altenburg. Carl Ludwig also took up preaching in Altenburg, with such success that he caught the attention of Duke Joseph, who offered him the post of tutor to his three daughters, the princesses Theresa, Elisabeth and Alexandra. This was the decisive stroke of fortune in Carl Ludwig’s life. Between 1838 and 1841 he lived in the palace at Altenburg enjoying daily contact with the Duke and Duchess. As his period of employment drew to an end, the Duke, who wished to do something for his tutor’s future, wrote to the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV requesting that a living be found for him. This led to a visit by Carl Ludwig to Berlin and a short personal meeting with His Majesty. Carl Ludwig could not obtain what he wanted most, which was a living in his home town of Eilenburg, but was offered what was in any case satisfactory, a quiet rural pastorate in the village of Röcken some twenty kilometres south-west of Leipzig, with duties extending to surrounding villages and hamlets. At this point he was twenty-eight years of age.

On his mother’s side Nietzsche’s grandparents were David Ernst Oehler (1787-1859), pastor in the village of Pobles not far from Röcken, and his wife Johanna Wilhelmine Hahn (1794-1876). David Oehler, son of the master weaver Christian Oehler and his wife Johanne Martin of Zeitz in the south of Saxony-Anhalt, was an individual of impressive character and intellect.[13] Like Nietzsche’s paternal grandfather he studied theology at the University of Leipzig. His grandson Adalbert Oehler reported a story that in 1813 (probably in Eilenburg) Russian troops broke into a house where he was employed as a tutor and were threatening the mistress when he interposed himself in his robes, shaming them into withdrawing and apologizing.[14] In 1815 he became pastor in rural Pobles where he remained until his death. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of David Oehler’s Christian convictions he possessed a practical humanistic mentality which looked for reconciliation between reason and faith. He was a Freemason, not unusual in German Protestantism, and took a keen interest in the intellectual currents of the day. Adalbert Oehler remembered that ‘despite all bonhomie he was a keen-sighted observer of human beings and human relationships […] His study was particularly impressive. Books he had been reading and which he wanted to use again lay open, sheets on which he had been making notes had to be left where they were.’[15] This study, with its library, was one of Nietzsche’s favourite places as a child.

The social station of David Oehler’s wife was well above his own. Wilhelmine, as she was called, was born in Zeitz to the landowner and finance commissioner Johann Hahn and his wife Dorothea Pfeiffer, daughter of a lawyer. Upon her marriage in 1816 Wilhelmine brought a dowry including a carriage, horses, a coachman, a cook and a maid, exceptional for a rural German parsonage.[16] After the Napoleonic Wars Wilhelmine’s father lost much of his fortune but remained affluent; Franziska Nietzsche, who was just five when he died, remembered visiting his stately house in Wählitz.[17] Wilhelmine Oehler was a  tough woman who had to bear with the physical handicaps of blindness in one eye (from smallpox) and one leg shorter than the other. She was not especially indulgent towards her children but tried to instil in them her own hard-headedness. She was ‘temperamental’: her son Oscar stated that ‘she could be like a powder-keg which easily explodes, but after the explosion felt relieved and everything was calm again.’[18] As their own brood grew in Pobles the Oehlers found that the modest emoluments of a village parson had to be supplemented by farming, at which all members of the family were expected to help. Wilhelmine managed the finances, while her husband saw to the early education of the children. Between 1817 and 1839 there were five girls and six boys, all of whom survived into adulthood. The sixth child, Nietzsche’s mother Franziska, was born on the second of February 1826 and lived to the age of seventy-one. Both maternal grandparents played an important role in the young Friedrich Nietzsche’s life, Pastor Oehler dying when Nietzsche was fifteen, the Frau Pastor when he was thirty-one.

In January 1842 Carl Ludwig Nietzsche moved into the parsonage at Röcken with his widowed mother Erdmuthe and his younger sister Auguste; his older sister Rosalie followed in 1843 (neither of the sisters ever married). On the lookout for a wife, Carl Ludwig soon became a regular visitor at the Oehlers’ in Pobles, about an hour’s journey from Röcken. Here he made a favourable impression by his unusually elegant attire, intelligence, education, personal charm, courtly manners, and facility at the piano. Pastor Oehler, it turned out, already knew Carl Ludwig’s mother Erdmuthe, then Frau Superintendent Nietzsche, from the time he had been a house-tutor in Eilenburg. In 1842 the Oehlers had three daughters of realistic marriageable age, all elder sisters of the sixteen year old Franziska. But it was Franziska (‘Fränzchen’ as she was called inside the family) who attracted the attentions of Pastor Nietzsche. Once on a visit to Pobles Carl Ludwig remarked to Frau Oehler that Franziska reminded him of one of his former royal pupils, Princess Elisabeth of Altenburg; this was a compliment that Franziska never forgot. Owing to Franziska’s youth, Pastor Nietzsche hesitated for nearly a year before proposing. At last he submitted to his inclinations and obtained his mother’s blessing. Carl Ludwig’s letter of proposal, addressed to Pastor Oehler, was duly read out to Franziska by her sober-minded father (the females in the family, especially Frau Oehler and Franziska, were in tears) and she had no hesitatation in accepting.[19] This was in July 1843. The marriage took place on Carl Ludwig’s thirtieth birthday, the tenth of October 1843.

When the newly married Franziska Nietzsche moved to Röcken she was not yet eighteen years old. She entered a household presided over by her sixty-five year old mother-in-law Erdmuthe and her two sisters-in-law Rosalie (thirty-one) and Auguste (twenty-eight). Franziska was somewhat of a tomboy, having spent more time as a child with her younger brothers than her older sisters, and had thought herself too young to marry. The outgoing personality of Franziska was very different to that of the hypersensitive and introverted Carl Ludwig; another difference was that she possessed the robust physical constitution typical of the Oehlers. In Röcken, Franziska was expected to adapt to the established hierarchy and order of business in the pastor’s house: mother-in-law Erdmuthe, who had the most spacious and desirable quarters, was the effective head of the household, while Auguste and Rosalie, with the help of a maid, looked after domestic affairs. Auguste, whose sweet temperament made her everybody’s favourite (unfortunately there is no extant portrait of her) was in charge of the kitchen; the more severe theologically-minded Rosalie kept abreast of church affairs and general politics (Elisabeth remembers her reading newspapers), and was active in charitable societies. The difference between the Oehler and Nietzsche temperaments, exacerbated by Franziska’s youth, often resulted in arguments, particularly between Franziska and her new female relatives. Although the titular mistress of the house, in practice Franziska was subordinate to her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law, and until her first child was born there was little to occupy her in Röcken, a stark change from the bustling life at Pobles. The elderly Erdmuthe wanted quiet, Auguste was seriously ailing, and Rosalie suffered frightfully from ‘nerves’.[20] It was natural for Franziska to seek refuge from this cold and restrictive environment by frequent visits to her family at Pobles, but this habit too became a source of tension in Röcken. Pastor Nietzsche, like his mother and sisters, wanted peace above all else. Elisabeth writes: ‘He was an extraordinarily sensitive man, or, as was said of him at the time, he took everything so much to heart. Any sign of discord either in the parish or in his own family was so painful to him that he would withdraw to his study and refuse to eat or drink, or speak with anybody. If any trifling dispute chanced to occur in his presence between the sister-in-law in question and our fiery young mother, he would lean back in his chair, close his eyes, and become absorbed in very different thoughts, so that he might hear and see nothing of the quarrel.’[21]

The first child of the Nietzsche couple, a boy, was born about ten o’clock in the morning on the fifteenth of October 1844. Carl Ludwig Nietzsche felt it particularly auspicious that this was also the birthday of his royal benefactor Friedrich Wilhelm IV, so it was fitting that the child should be named after the Prussian king. An additional benefit of the name, as Carl Ludwig wrote to his friend Emil Julius Schenk two weeks after the birth, was that the only child of his mother’s first marriage, a boy who had died at the age of two, ‘was also called Fritz’.[22] Until Friedrich Wilhelm IV died in 1861 the church-bells rang on the birthday of young ‘Fritz’, as he was always called by family and friends. A second child, born on the tenth of July 1846, was named Elisabeth Therese Alexandra after all three of Carl Ludwig’s princesses. Another boy, Joseph, born on the twenty-seventh of February 1848, was named after the Duke of Altenburg.

Pastor Nietzsche had been at Röcken for eight years and seven months when on the thirtieth of July 1849, at the age of thirty-five, he died. One account of events is given by Elisabeth: ‘At the end of August 1848 a terrible misfortune overtook us. Our father was accompanying a friend home one evening, and on his return to the parsonage our little dog, which he did not see owing to his shortsightedness, ran between his legs just as he reached the door. He stumbled and fell backwards down a flight of seven stone steps on to the paving stones of the courtyard, and as a result of his fall was laid up with concussion of the brain. At first it was taken for granted that after a week’s rest in bed no evil consequences would remain. After a few weeks, however, he began to get ill. The trouble started with a loss of appetite and severe headaches, which he had never had in his life before. Neither his sisters nor his parents had ever suffered in this way, for the delicate organ in the Nietzsche family was the stomach. When in spite of the doctors and the homoeopathic treatment in which the Nietzsche family firmly believed, the headaches continued, the famous physician Professor Oppolzer, of Leipzig, was summoned. He realized at once that the trouble was cerebral and not gastric, as the family maintained. At first Professor Oppolzer gave us good ground for hope, as neither the patient’s intellect nor his consciousness were affected, and the doctor believed that the injured spot in the brain would heal, “and leave a cicatrice there”, as he told us. And as a matter of fact there were periods of improvement, days on which my father suffered no pain and was able to write his sermons and take confirmation classes. In the spring of 1849 he began to give Fritz a few lessons, for the boy showed exceptional interest in books, reading and writing. In June, 1849, however, my father’s trouble became steadily worse, and, in his heart of hearts, he was convinced that his end was at hand. He certainly did not fear death, but the thought of leaving behind him without protection the young wife he loved so dearly, and her three children, filled him with anguish. He made his will, appointed a relative, named Dächsel, who was afterwards a counsellor of justice, the guardian of his children, and begged his mother, our beloved grandmother Nietzsche, in the most touching terms, to take his dear Fränzchen and his children under her care. His last words were, “Mother, remember Fränzchen”. He died on the 30th July, 1849, eleven months after his terrible fall, and was deeply mourned, not only by his family and his nearest friends, but, above all, by his parishioners, who during his illness had not been able to do enough to show the love and reverence they felt for him.’[23]

This account contains elements of truth but on the most essential issue, the cause of Pastor Nietzsche’s illness, it is a deliberate falsification, one of many which Elisabeth allowed herself in her copious writings on her brother. Owing to the vexed questions around Friedrich Nietzsche’s own illness and eventual collapse into insanity it would be of great interest if the cause of his father’s death could be known with confidence. Although on available evidence certainty on this matter cannot be obtained, there is at any rate sufficient information to conclude that Pastor Nietzsche did not die of the after-effects of any fall. The young Friedrich Nietzsche, in several autobiographical sketches between 1858 and 1863, wrote of his father’s illness with no mention of a fall. The 1995 Colli-Montinari edition of the 1858 piece gives Nietzsche saying that ‘in September my dear father suddenly became ill’, flagging a textual gap between ‘father’ and ‘ill’ which the editors fill by the words ‘suddenly became’.[24] By noteworthy contrast, when Elisabeth incorporated her brother’s early autobiographical fragments in the first volume of her own Life of Friedrich Nietzsche (1895), she gave this passage as ‘my dear father as a result of a fall became very ill’.[25] According to the Colli-Montinari editor Hans Gerald Hödl, the gap in the manuscript is from a burn, and is not large enough to accommodate the words ‘as a result of a fall’.[26] Earlier editors had speculated that the missing partial word was ‘gemüths’, so that Nietzsche was saying ‘my father suddenly became gemüthskrank [mentally ill]’.[27] In fragments from 1861 Nietzsche writes that his father suffered from ‘inflammation of the brain’ or ‘softening of the brain’.[28] Similarly in a fragment from 1863, ‘softening of the brain’ alone is given as the cause of his father’s illness.[29]  After her brother became insane at the beginning of 1889, Elisabeth, who was living in Paraguay at the time, decided that it was imperative to counter any suggestion of an inherited condition: ‘Please do not say such odd things about dear Papa’, she wrote to her mother in April; ‘if he hadn’t fallen down the stone steps he would probably be alive today.’[30] For the rest of her life she never deviated from the story of the fall.

It may be that Carl Ludwig did suffer a fall but if it had any connection with his illness it was as effect, not cause. Contrary to Elisabeth’s declarations her father was by no means robust but of a decidedly sickly and delicate constitution. The extant correspondence between Carl Ludwig and his mother from his schooldays in Rossleben testifies to constant ill health. There were instances of stumbling and falling while at school, but this was put down to a deformation in his spine and for a time he wore a corset in an effort to rectify the problem. He did not take part in sport and physical games like other boys. In addition he suffered from recurring severe headaches usually accompanied by pressure around the ears, rheumatic pains, sensations of numbness, and cramps in his arms and legs which sometimes led to falls. Although he excelled at his schoolwork he was not a self-confident boy but was always longing for his mother. He was given to bouts of depression and nervous anxiety.[31] This pattern of complaints continued through his years in Halle and Altenburg. He was twice declared unfit for military service on grounds of poor health. Perhaps it testifies to a depressive condition associated with his illness that Carl Ludwig does not seem to have developed a love of literature or of any branch of learning other than theology, so that music remained his only interest outside his profession. Having made his mark at school, university, and the Altenburg Court, his friends and family hoped for a distinguished future for him. He was probably aware himself that this was not to be.

In November 1841, just before he took up his post in Röcken, Carl Ludwig confessed to his friend Emil Schenk that he was highly nervous about the responsibilities he was about to assume.[32] In the first part of 1842, letters from Rosalie Nietzsche in Plauen to her mother Erdmuthe in Röcken frequently revert to the health of Carl Ludwig, and on one occasion she reports a rumour in Plauen that Carl Ludwig had died.[33] Pastor Nietzsche, evidently, could carry out his duties in Röcken only at the cost of exhaustion. At the end of November 1845 he wrote to Schenk that ‘overall I feel so poorly that I am glad to be just a country pastor. I have long given up high-flown thoughts of going to a big city.’[34] In early 1846 he broke into tears during a service and had to hurry from the church, although he returned a short time later.[35] In May of the same year he reported to Schenk that he had been spending much time in the open air for the sake of his health, and that ‘every Sunday is a sick-day for me’.[36] Around this time he began on occasion to sink into a chair and stare speechlessly into space, apparently unaware of his surroundings and later being unable to recall the episode.[37] Then in August 1848 his condition deteriorated dramatically. In November (his final sermon and letter date from September) he spent two weeks in Naumburg consulting a specialist, but nothing could stop the further worsening of his health. His headaches, which were accompanied by vomiting, became more severe. He lost his appetite, could not sleep, the slightest noise would be unendurable to him, and he was unable to finish sentences. Ultimately he became blind and completely lost the power of speech. When he died on the thirtieth of July his wife was twenty-three, his eldest son Fritz was two and a half months short of his fifth birthday, his daughter Elisabeth had recently turned three, and his infant son Joseph was just five months old.

Carl Ludwig’s doctors at the time put his death down to ‘softening of the brain’, without any more precise explanation. His half-sister Friederike Dächsel, with whom he had stayed while undergoing medical treatment in Naumburg, wrote to her stepson Bernhard that ‘his head was opened up and it was confirmed that he had died of softening of the brain, which already had taken up a quarter of his head’.[38] It may be that Nietzsche’s father died of a brain tumour, although cerebral tuberculosis and cerebral syphilis are among other possibilities that have been suggested. It cannot be ruled out that Nietzsche inherited from his father at least a predisposition to some serious illness of the brain and nervous system. From time to time he was worried about a brain tumour, but most medical experts who have examined the available evidence do not favour this diagnosis. Unlike his father more than fifty years earlier, after Friedrich Nietzsche’s death in 1900 he was not subjected to an autopsy, a decision made by Elisabeth and for which she had ulterior motives.

In Ecce Homo, written late in 1888 just prior to his mental collapse, Nietzsche describes his father as ‘tender, loveable and morbid, like a being fated merely to pass by – more a gracious memory of life than life itself.’ He continues: ‘I regard it as a great privilege to have had such a father: indeed it seems to me that this explains whatever else I have of privilege, not including life, the great Yes to life. Above all, that it requires no intention on my part, but simply biding my time, for me to enter quite involuntarily into a world of high and delicate things.’[39] For his whole life Nietzsche held on to an idealized bond with his father. ‘I can well remember’, wrote the thirteen year old, ‘how one day I was travelling with my father from Lützen to Röcken when the bells rang out in the sublime tones of the Easter Festival. This sound often resonates in me and in melancholy carries me back to the dear and distant house of my father’.[40] He remembered travelling with Carl Ludwig as he went about his pastoral duties in the district; he recalled too his father’s book-lined study, the old church with its ‘superhuman image of Saint George’ in the sacristy, the garden, the ponds, and the meadow behind the house.[41] Another image in his memory was of the rowdy flag-waving supporters of the March 1848 uprising in Berlin passing by in wagons on the road between Leipzig and Weißenfels. Carl Ludwig was deeply upset by the disturbances in Berlin which for a short period threatened to topple his beloved Friedrich Wilhelm IV (Duke Joseph of Altenburg was forced to abdicate in 1848). By this time, however, he was about to enter the final stage of his illness and for Fritz normal interaction with his father became impossible. In another autobiographical fragment from 1861 Nietzsche wrote: ‘His image still stands before my soul in all liveliness: a frail noble form with fine features and a benevolent friendliness. He was loved and greeted with pleasure everywhere, as much for his intelligent conversation as for his kindness.’ For many years Nietzsche kept a portrait of his father on his desk.

After Carl Ludwig died the Nietzsche family stayed in Röcken for another eight months until the new pastor arrived. On the ninth of January 1850, however, catastrophe struck again: the death of Joseph Nietzsche, aged twenty-two months, of ‘teething convulsions’. The thirteen year old autobiographer ‘remembered’: ‘I dreamt that I heard the sound of the church organ playing a requiem. When I looked to see what the cause of it was, a grave suddenly opened and my father in his shroud arose out of it. He hurried into the church and in a moment or two reappeared with a small child in his arms. The grave opened, he stepped into it and the gravestone fell once more over the opening. The sound of the organ immediately ceased and I awoke. In the morning I related the dream to my dear mother; very shortly afterwards little Joseph became unwell, fell into convulsions, and died a few hours later. Our sorrow was beyond description. My dream had been completely fulfilled.’[42] Finally in early April the family moved. The thirteen year-old wrote: ‘I can still remember the last day and the last night in Röcken. In the evening I played with some of the children, with the thought that it was for the last time. The evening bell resounded over the fields with a melancholy tone, a thick darkness spread over the earth, in the heavens there shone the moon and the twinkling stars. I could not sleep for long; already at half past twelve I returned to the courtyard. Several wagons were standing there, loaded up, while the dim light of the lanterns gave a gloomy illumination to the yard. I thought it would be completely impossible to feel at home anywhere else. To leave a village where one has experienced joy and suffering, where the precious graves of my father and little brother are located, where the people always showed me love and kindness, how painful it was!’[43]

Carl Ludwig’s widow could have returned to her parents in Pobles, but she accepted her mother-in-law’s offer to come with her children to nearby Naumburg and live in the same extended family as in Röcken. Erdmuthe Nietzsche, who possessed some money of her own, was still well-connected in the town where four decades earlier she had lived for several years and married both her husbands. Franziska’s own income consisted of a widow’s pension of forty-six thalers annually, plus the interest on some money left to her late husband by his half-brother Ferdinand (1791-1838) the capital of which lay in trust for Fritz and Elisabeth. In later years Franziska received contributions from the Altenburg princesses. The habit of thrift, inherited from her parents, was a life-long virtue of Franziska, which with mixed success she attempted to impart to her children. In the early Naumburg years, however, she was not so much needy as dependent. Erdmuthe’s resources protected Franziska from serious want and secured for her a social position which would otherwise have been out of her reach.

If Friedrich Nietzsche inherited his sensitive soul from his father, it was from his mother that he inherited his strength and will-to-life. Her many preserved letters, often long, rambling, and almost devoid of punctuation, reveal her makeshift education (provided mostly by her father) but also a spiritual energy and ardent desire to communicate. As the daughter of well-educated parents and the wife of Carl Ludwig she had respect for intellectual accomplishments, but she never understood the minds of her son or daughter. She remained a pious Christian until the end of her life, but her faith was non-demonstrative. Her prominent traits included forgiveness, loyalty and pragmatism, while the touch of vanity in her was limited to her husband’s connections with royalty and her son’s academic achievements. So young at the time of her marriage, she came to maturity when both her children were well past childhood. It says a lot about her that, widowed at the age of twenty-three, this socially well-placed and attractive woman never remarried. Her nephew Adalbert Oehler reports that until late in life she spoke of her long-departed husband in a calm natural way that suggested a mystical unity beyond the grave. As Oehler puts it, Carl Ludwig lived on for the widow Franziska ‘not only because she was a pious Christian but because in her vital nature loyalty became a creative force: she, who was created to be a mother, saw her destiny in her children.’[44] For years Franziska made diary entries in which she addressed her deceased husband directly.[45] She longed for reunion with her Carl Ludwig but felt she could only hope for this if she lived by the laws of God, especially in regard to the children. Although it is not easy to vividly apprehend Carl Ludwig Nietzsche, the fact that he could command this posthumous loyalty from a wife so different to him, so much younger than him, and after such a short period of marriage, is of obvious relevance to an assessment of his character. This loyalty could not fail to make an impression on the son. When many years later, in the midst of a quarrel about an ‘immoral woman’, Frau Nietzsche told her son he was ‘a disgrace to your father’s grave’, Nietzsche walked out of her house and for months was unable to forget this outrage ‘for a single hour’.[46]

There are more than three hundred surviving letters from Nietzsche to his mother, along with more than two hundred and fifty addressed jointly to her and his sister. Hundreds of letters in the other direction have also been preserved. While a university student in Bonn and Leipzig, and then as professor in Basel, Nietzsche visited his mother in Naumburg as often as he could. After retiring from his professorship at Basel he planned to live in Naumburg near to his mother for part of every year. This did not eventuate, and over the next ten years, due to his intensified sense of mission in relation to which he felt a profound aversion to ‘Naumburg virtue’, his relationship with both Frau Nietzsche and Elisabeth became clouded. There was also a souring of relations arising from the hostility of his mother and sister towards Lou Salomé in 1882. Nevertheless, Franziska Nietzsche remained solicitous for her son’s welfare in every particular (climate, accommodation, clothing, diet) until his mental collapse in the first days of 1889, thereafter taking him back into her care at the same house in Naumburg where he had lived as a schoolboy. The young Nietzsche had a strong attachment to family life, a feeling which never left him. But to say that Nietzsche and his mother were ‘close’ would be beside the point, and even not true. Nietzsche and his sister Elisabeth were known during his Basel period as ‘the inseparable ones’. She would come to Basel every year for an extended visit, while in 1875-76 and 1877-78 the two would live together full-time. They would often go on holiday together. Apart from a few years of tension in the 1880’s Elisabeth idolized her brother for her whole life, and it is largely due to her that so much is preserved from Nietzsche’s notebooks and correspondence. Beginning in 1894, for over forty years she presided over the Nietzsche Archive, and after Franziska’s death in 1897 she took over the care of her sick brother.

A father who died before he had a real chance to know him, otherwise a family of women, all devout Protestants, a young mother prematurely married and widowed, a brother who died in infancy, a three year old sister, his lately departed father a pastor, both grandfathers pastors, his paternal grandmother’s father and brother pastors, his father’s sole surviving half-brother a pastor, on his mother’s side three out of six uncles who would become pastors and three out of four aunts who would marry pastors, he himself expected to become a pastor: these were the structural elements in Nietzsche’s life when at five and a half years of age he left the village of his birth.[47] As for Röcken, although it was left behind at this early date, Franziska was ultimately buried in the village churchyard next to her husband and the infant Joseph; in 1900 the son was placed alongside them, and in 1935 the daughter was lowered into her plot, having lived to the age of eighty-nine.

  1. 2 Naumburg (1850-58)

At the time the Nietzsche family moved there in 1850 the population of Naumburg, situated on the Saale River sixty kilometres southwest of Leipzig, was about 15,000. With its magnificent Cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul (built between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries) and late Gothic St. Wenceslas Church, Naumburg had long been important in clerical affairs, but since its incorporation into Prussian Saxony in 1815 the town had also become a judicial centre. It was from these two communities, the clergy and the lawyers, that the new friends of Franziska and her children would come. Two half-sisters of Carl Ludwig, Friederike Dächsel and the unmarried Lina Nietzsche, lived in the town. The Naumburg lawyer Bernhard Dächsel, step-son of Friederike, was young Fritz’s guardian.

In April 1850 Erdmuthe Nietzsche and her two daughters, together with Franziska Nietzsche, the children Fritz and Elisabeth, and the family maid Wilhelmine Arnold (‘Mine’), moved into a house on the Neugasse. The grandmother took the comfortable front rooms, leaving Franziska and the children with the cramped and gloomy back quarters. These were bleak times for the young widow. After preparing Fritz and later Elisabeth for school Franziska would sit at her sewing until the children returned, or would read aloud for her mother-in-law, or would write in her diary, sometimes conversing therein with her deceased husband. In a letter to her son from March 1877, Franziska provides a glimpse of herself and her family in the early 1850’s: ‘My education was very deficient and my mind was directed, as was natural enough with eleven children, modest means, and a willing spirit, to practical and useful work. After I married at seventeen-and-three-quarter years I learned everything from my so very talented dear husband, then came my Fritz and Lisbeth and Joseph, who took up all my energy and time. Then came the shattering eleven-month sickness of my beloved husband, followed a half-year later by the loss of my precious infant, and my bodily strength was broken by these storms, so that, for example, when I climbed the stairs I had to rest on the top level for a long while before I could continue, and my dearest thought at that time, as a twenty-three year old, was to be soon united with my beloved. But God’s will was otherwise. He gave me strength again, to dedicate to the education of my children, so that my main goal was to have you learn what I had missed out on.’

In Friedrich Nietzsche and the Women of his Time (1935) Elisabeth expressly claims that grandmother Erdmuthe was the strongest female influence on young Fritz; also in the first volume of her biography, which appeared in 1895 when Franziska was still alive to read it, she gives priority to the grandmother.[48] Franziska had a greater role in the daily care of the children, but Erdmuthe was – and had been when Carl Ludwig was alive – the authority figure in the household. The grandmother was also a source of fascinating tales from her youth, particularly about events during the Napoleonic Wars, tales which made a lasting impression on her grandson. She had twice been caught up in the tides of war. In 1806 she was living in Weimar with her seriously ill first husband Carl Krüger when French troops occupied the town after the Battle of Jena. Unruly soldiers camped in their house, forced Krüger out of his bed in search of valuables, and damaged precious household items, before the couple were helped by a kindly French officer to flee to a nearby castle and then Naumburg. In October 1813 Erdmuthe was in Eilenburg with her second husband Superintendent Nietzsche when German and Allied troops passed through the town in preparation for the great Battle of Leipzig. Barely a week before the main battle began she gave birth to her only son Carl Ludwig.

As a Saxon, and having been young when Saxony was allied to France, Erdmuthe remained to the end of her days an admirer of Napoleon, which was unpatriotic in contemporary Prussian Naumburg. Elisabeth writes: ‘Unwittingly our admiration for Napoleon’s greatness was instilled into us from our earliest childhood, a fact which fills me with surprise to this day, for at that time the children in school were always taught to regard him as the Beast of the Apocalypse.’[49] Nietzsche himself says in a letter from 1887 that as a boy he had often heard Erdmuthe declare that Napoleon ‘was not only a great spirit, but a most kindly man’, while in Ecce Homo he records that Erdmuthe was ‘a great admirer of Napoleon’.[50] In fact Napoleon is one of the few historical figures whom Nietzsche consistently acknowledged as ‘great’. Nietzsche’s paternal grandmother’s influence seems to have extended to the sphere of religion. Sharing the rationalistic view of Christianity of her late husband she softened the impact on Fritz of the Neo-Pietism which at this time was strong in Naumburg. Elisabeth remembers that on one occasion her grandmother returned from a social event, saying with exasperation: ‘I don’t know what people want these days. Earlier we took pleasure in our own and others’ virtues, but now we take pleasure in our own and others’ sins; the more sinful, the better.’[51] More than thirty years later, a few months before his mental collapse, Erdmuthe’s grandson would write: ‘It has completely escaped me in what way I am supposed to be “sinful”.’[52] Aunt Rosalie, and probably Auguste, followed the same tendency in religion as Erdmuthe, and it stands to reason that these older women would have had an impact on Fritz. It was Erdmuthe and not Franziska who knew the important people in Naumburg and who brought Fritz into the Pinder-Krug circle which would be so important for his intellectual development. A few references to Erdmuthe in Nietzsche’s letters and writings from the 1880’s testify to a definite pride in his grandmother, partly because at one time she lived in Weimar and had loose contact with Goethe’s circle. Nietzsche’s onetime claim, however, that Erdmuthe’s mother is the ‘Muthgen’ mentioned as a friend in the young Goethe’s diary, has no foundation.[53]

Before the family moved from Röcken Fritz had received some basic instruction in reading and writing at the village school. In Naumburg, at the age of five, he was sent to a municipal elementary school where, according to Elisabeth, his serious nature set him apart from the other children: ‘Despite proper morals, a loud and coarse tone prevailed, he felt completely isolated. The earnest, reflective child, with the dignified courtly manners, was so strange to the other boys that friendly relations could not develop […] The pupils called him “the little pastor”, and in truth his way of speaking remained somewhat pastoral throughout his childhood.’ Elisabeth is also the source of an anecdote: ‘One day, just as school had finished, there was a heavy shower of rain, and we looked out along the Priestergasse for our Fritz. All the boys were running like mad towards their homes. At last little Fritz also appeared, walking slowly along with his cap covering his slate and his handkerchief spread over the whole. Mamma waved and called out to him when he was some way off: “Run, child, run!” The sheets of rain prevented us from catching his reply. When our mother remonstrated with him for coming home soaked to the skin, he replied earnestly: “Mamma, the rules of the school say that on leaving school, boys are forbidden to jump and run about in the street, but must walk quietly and decorously to their homes”.’[54] Young Fritz was not like other boys of his age. This sometimes worried his mother, but she received welcome reassurance from her own father. Elisabeth records: ‘A conversation not meant for my ears has remained stamped on my memory. Our mother was complaining to her father that Fritz was so different from other boys and had difficulty in making friends. Otherwise, she said, he was good and obedient; but in everything he had his own opinions, which did not always coincide with those of other people. My elders had forgotten that I was in a far corner of the room playing with my dolls, and my grandfather replied rather hotly: “My dear child, you don’t know what you possess in this boy of yours! He is the most extraordinary and the most talented child I have ever seen in my life. Leave him to his own devices!”’[55]

Fritz remained in the municipal school for three years. After Easter 1853, now aged eight and a half, he moved to the ‘Institute’ (private school) of a candidate clergyman named Weber. In this establishment, as well as receiving instruction in religion he began the study of Latin and Greek in preparation for the Cathedral Gymasium. It was a cosier atmosphere, shared by boys from wealthier homes, and Fritz felt altogether more comfortable. But his sensation of difference remained. ‘In my young life’, wrote the thirteen year old, ‘I had already experienced much grief and sadness, and so I was not so cheerful and wild as children typically are. My fellow pupils used to tease me on account of my seriousness; this happened not just in the elementary school, but also in the Institute and even at the gymnasium. Ever since childhood I sought out solitude and felt happiest when left undisturbed to myself. I usually found the greatest joy in the free temple of nature. Storms always made the finest impression upon me; the cracking thunder and flashes of lightning only increased my reverence for God.’[56] Much later, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche would say that ‘at an absurdly early age, at seven, I already knew that no human word would ever reach me’.[57] At Weber’s Institute, nevertheless, he formed long-lasting friendships with two fellow-pupils he already knew outside of school.

Wilhelm Pinder was three months older, and his cousin Gustav Krug one month younger, than Nietzsche. Wilhelm’s father Eduard Pinder, a lawyer at the Naumburg Court of Appeals, was the son of the still-living Caroline Pinder, a close friend of Erdmuthe during her few years in Naumburg nearly five decades earlier. Privy Counsellor Gustav Adolf Krug, father of young Gustav, was married to Eduard Pinder’s sister Clementine. The Pinder and Krug families lived together with Caroline in one of the great houses of the town located in the main square. When Erdmuthe returned to Naumburg she resumed contact with her old friend, which led to Franziska and the children gaining admission to leading circles of the town. Over the next ten years, until Nietzsche began university studies in Bonn, his friendship with the Krug and Pinder boys remained one of the most important elements in his life.

It was through Wilhelm’s father that Nietzsche made his first acquaintance with classical German literature, especially Goethe. Erdmuthe thought that Goethe was not strictly suitable for young children, but Eduard Pinder had a different attitude, and would give readings, from Goethe and other German writers, that were attended by Fritz and Elisabeth. While reading Herr Pinder would provide a commentary on the work. At the same time Eduard Pinder was an active lay churchman, which confirmed to the boy (he already had the example of grandfather David Oehler) that Christianity and interest in higher culture could go hand in hand. Gustav Krug the elder was a leading figure in the musical life of the city. An accomplished musician with prize-winning compositions to his name and the possessor of a magnificent grand piano, his house had long been frequented by eminent musicians, including Felix Mendelssohn (now dead, he had been a godfather to young Gustav), Robert and Clara Schumann, and the Müller Brothers (whom Fritz himself had the pleasure of hearing in 1855). Gustav Junior played the violin, and as Fritz developed his own facility at the piano the boys spent much time together in musical pleasures. The Pinder-Krug house was worlds away from the experience and knowledge of the pastor’s widow Franziska, who at first felt nervous moving in such exalted company. But with Erdmuthe easing the way Franziska came to enjoy her newfound status and knew it meant social advancement for her children.

Already in Röcken young Fritz had displayed a keen responsiveness to music. He would always listen attentively when his father was at the piano, to such an extent that Franziska, to obtain relief from the rowdiness of her son, would ask her husband to play.[58] This must have been when Fritz was three or younger, since by the time he was four his sick father was no longer capable of playing. Piano lessons began in Naumburg in 1852-53, Franziska buying a piano and engaging the services of an old choirmaster; she also took lessons herself to assist her son. The Krug-Pinder house was a major source of musical stimulation. Others were Naumburg Cathedral, which Fritz would regularly visit to hear the choir’s rehearsals, and the St. Wenceslas Church. Handel’s Messiah and Judas Maccabaeus, Mozart’s Requiem, Haydn’s Creation, and Mendelssohn’s Summer Dream, are among the memorable musical experiences recorded by the thirteen-year-old autobiographer, to which he adds some reflections on the nature of music and his relationship to it: ‘God has given us music, so that first through it we can be led upwards. Music unifies all qualities within itself: it can elevate, it can dally with us, it can cheer us, and it is capable, through its soft melancholy tones, of breaking the roughest spirit. But the main thing is that it lifts our thoughts to a higher level, that it elevates, even stirs us. This is especially the aim of church music […] But everything God gives to us can be a blessing only if it is used wisely and correctly. If music is used for entertainment or to show off in front of others then it is sinful and damaging. Yet this happens very often, indeed the whole of modern music shows the marks of it […] People who have contempt for music must be seen as spiritless creatures similar to the animals. May this magnificent gift of God always be my companion on my journey through life.’[59] In this same document the young Fritz testifies: ‘I developed a thorough detestation of all modern music and of all that was not classical. Mozart and Haydn, Schubert and Mendelssohn, Beethoven and Bach are for me the pillars of German music.’[60] This negative opinion of ‘modern music’ (Wagner, Liszt and Berlioz) was probably influenced by Gustav Krug Senior.

Nietzsche’s earliest musical compositions date from 1854, soon after he had heard Handel’s Messiah in the cathedral, and were prompted by that experience.[61] They are immature pieces of course, mainly in the nature of exercises, but he was making good progress in piano playing. By 1856 he was able to play a few Beethoven sonatas. In November of the same year he composed two sonatas dedicated to his mother, followed in 1857-58 by, among other things, a ‘birthday symphony’ for piano and violin, an overture in G minor for string orchestra, and piano pieces for two and four hands. There is no evidence that Nietzsche ever seriously contemplated becoming a professional musician; in all probability he did not possess the requisite talent for it, and neither did he undertake the necessary studies. On the other hand he was always more than a dabbler or music-lover. Like his father he had a gift for improvisation on the piano. Above all, music was an emotional need for Nietzsche, as the best medium for mastering his moods. Music would always be for him exploration and discovery of realities ‘knowable’ in no other way. It was the ‘spirit of music’ that moved him.

After years of ill health Auguste Nietzsche died on the second of August 1855. She was forty. Elisabeth recalls: ‘She suffered from exceedingly painful gastric troubles, which she bore with great sweetness and patience. In spite of her affliction, she did not cease managing the affairs of the household in a truly admirable manner. “Leave me this one solace”, she would say, when she was entreated to spare herself.’[62] Erdmuthe was much grieved by the death of her youngest child, from whom she had never been separated. Her own death, at age seventy-seven, followed eight months later on the third of April 1856. As befitted her status in Naumburg her funeral was in grand style. ‘The Heavenly Father knows how I cried’, wrote the thirteen year old Nietzsche. And he observed: ‘It is a strange feature of the human heart that when we have experienced a great loss we do not try to forget it, but bring it before our soul as often as possible. It is as if by frequent recounting we create a true consolation for our sorrow.’[63]

Before Fritz had reached the age of twelve three of the five adults with whom he had grown up were dead. Of course he and his sister continued to have regular contact with their numerous aunts and uncles, especially Rosalie, Friederike and Lina in Naumburg. Their favourite holiday destination was the parsonage at Pobles, but Fritz and Elisabeth also visited their aunts (Carl Ludwig’s other half-sisters) in Plauen, their uncle Pastor August Nietzsche (the oldest and sole surviving half-brother of Carl Ludwig) in the tiny Thuringian village of Nirmsdorf, and also Franziska’s friends in Altschönefeld, from where the eleven year old Fritz in summer 1856 made his first acquaintance with nearby Leipzig, including its bookshops and music shops. It was during this stay in Altschönefeld that Nietzsche, aged eleven, wrote his first extant letter to Gustav Krug, reporting that a little earlier in Pobles his grandfather David Oehler had played for him several Beethoven sonatas, and adding: ‘In Leipzig I purchased Beethoven’s G Major Sonata op. 49. How are you faring with the arrangement of your overture?’ The trips to Pobles had the added significance of allowing the family to revisit nearby Röcken and the graves of Carl Ludwig and little Joseph. After grandfather Oehler died in December 1859, aged seventy-two, the Pobles holidays came to an end. Franziska’s mother Wilhelmine moved to relatives and died in Mersburg in November 1876 at the age of eighty-two. Rosalie, constantly ailing, lived on in Naumburg where, aged fifty-five, she died in 1867. Uncle August Nietzsche died in 1858 at the age of seventy-three, having been pastor of Nirmsdorf for fifty years, but Fritz remained in contact with August’s daughter Mathilde and son-in-law Emil Schenk (not the friend of the late Carl Ludwig) in Jena, whom he visited in the summer of 1859.

Soon after Erdmuthe’s death Franziska moved with the children into a more spacious house near the Marientor, Rosalie taking separate lodgings. At thirty, for the first time in her life Franziska was mistress of her household, while Fritz now had his own bedroom instead of having to share with Elisabeth. In October 1858 the family moved again, to Weingarten 18, which became Franziska’s residence until her death in 1897 (she was able to purchase the property after her mother died in 1876). This was the house where she nursed her insane son in the 1890’s. Naumburg alone can qualify as Friedrich Nietzsche’s ‘home town’: it is where he had his early schooling between 1850 and 1858, and when he attended Schulpforta boarding school between 1858 and 1864 Naumburg was just a few kilometres away. Nevertheless, Nietzsche never had tender feelings for the town. In a letter to his mother and sister in 1885 he would say of Naumburg that ‘there is nothing in my heart which speaks in its favour; I was not “born” there and never became “at home” there.’[64]

In the early Naumburg years Nietzsche formed the strong bond with his sister Elisabeth which was to remain unclouded for many years. Even as a young boy he took it upon himself to educate Elisabeth, who became his first ‘disciple’. As soon as Elisabeth was old enough to understand that her brother produced ‘writings’ she began her life-long practice of collecting and hoarding them; young Fritz, she relates, sometimes used to raid her ‘treasure drawer’ and burn items he regarded as too childish.[65] Elisabeth too attended school in Naumburg, proving herself an able pupil and outstripping Fritz in some subjects, notably French and English. While they were young children Nietzsche gave her the nick-name ‘Llama’ after reading a description of this animal in a book of natural history. What made the name appropriate, Elisabeth later wrote, is that the llama ‘willingly carries the heaviest burdens, but if coerced or treated badly it refuses to take any nourishment and lies down in the dust to die.’[66] Nietzsche never stopped using this nickname to and of his sister; nobody else used it. Elisabeth inherited the Oehler characteristics of strong will and high-spiritedness with little of reflective intellectuality from the Nietzsche side. She was not, admittedly, without intellectual attributes, and her many writings on her brother, beginning with the first volume of her biography in 1895, earned her repeated (albeit unsuccessful) nominations for the Nobel Prize for Literature. But although her prose style is pleasing, clear, and energetic, she possessed neither depth nor independence of mind. While, like Fritz, she was always ‘different’, in her case this was expressed as reverence for her brother. Frau Nietzsche hoped that her daughter would marry as soon as she reached an appropriate age, and as an attractive young woman Elisabeth had no lack of qualified suitors, but Fritz had spoiled her taste to the degree that she found other men too dull to contemplate as husbands. In 1885, however, at the age of thirty-eight and the relationship with her brother having turned sour in the wake of his liaison with the ‘immoral’ Lou Salomé, Elisabeth married the anti-Semitic publicist Bernard Förster. Early the following year the couple moved to Paraguay to establish a German ‘colony’, but in June 1889, just six months after Nietzsche’s mental collapse, Förster, overcome by a self-inflicted financial scandal, committed suicide. Elisabeth returned to Germany permanently in 1893 and as head of the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar spent the rest of her life immortalizing her brother. She wrote her last book at the age of eighty-eight.

The most important single document we possess from Nietzsche’s school years in Naumburg is a nine thousand word autobiography entitled ‘From My Life’. Written shortly before entering Schulpforta, it reveals not only the literary gifts of the boy but a rare reflectiveness which anticipates his later development. Apart from a few diary entries from 1856-57 it is the first of a series of autobiographical fragments from Nietzsche’s school and university years. ‘From My Life’ gives a chronological account beginning with Nietzsche’s birth and moving through to the summer holidays of 1858. It was composed in Plauen and Pobles in the latter part of August, Nietzsche having written from Plauen to his aunt Rosalie in Naumburg asking for information on the lives of his father, his great uncle Krause, and grandmother Erdmuthe. The document describes the deaths of his father and brother, the sorrowful departure from Röcken, the new environment of Naumburg including the difficulties which he and his sister experienced adjusting to a town where most people were strangers to one another, his childish games with his sister, his friends Gustav and Wilhelm together with their families, the musical and literary interests he shared with his friends, and the deaths of Auguste and Erdmuthe. The chronology is interspersed with many reflective passages, including on the nature and method of autobiography. Nietzsche’s above-quoted observations on music belong to this document, as does an analysis of his poetical activity, including a listing of his poems divided into three periods, 1855-56, 1857, and 1858 (the titles of forty-six ‘selected’ poems are given).

The way he describes his friendship with Gustav and Wilhelm presages his life-long yearning for a philosophical meeting of minds: ‘We exchanged ideas over poets and writers, works we had read, new appearances in the field of literature; we made plans together, gave poems to one another and were not content until we had completely opened our hearts. These were my friends, and with age the friendship also grew. Indeed to possess true friends is high and noble, and God lends real beauty to our life when he gives us companions with whom to strive.’[67] One passage reflects on the qualities of good poetry: ‘A poem which is empty of thought and covered over with phrases and images, resembles a rosy-cheeked apple with a worm inside of it. Hackneyed expressions must be completely absent from poetry, since the frequent use of such phrases testifies to a mind incapable of producing anything itself. In composing a work one must above all pay attention to the thoughts; one can excuse negligence of style before one can excuse a confused idea. Goethe’s poems with their deep gold-clear thoughts are a model.’[68] A ‘Retrospect’ at the end of the document contains some formulaic words of piety which, while they do not testify to inward Christianity, demonstrate that the thirteen year-old Nietzsche was still far from any forthright rejection of the religion of his family: ‘I have already experienced so much, joyful and sorrowful things, cheerful and sad things, but in everything God has safely guided me like a father his weak little child. Much that is painful has been laid upon me, but I recognize with reverence the sublime power of God who reigns over everything. May the Good Lord give me power and strength to carry out my intention and protect me on my life-path. Like a child I trust in his grace. He will preserve us all, so that nothing makes us disconsolate.’ The manuscript concludes as follows:

Life is a mirror.

To recognize oneself in it,

I would like to name as the first thing

For which we strive!!

An autobiographical fragment by friend Wilhelm Pinder, also from 1858, includes an appreciative description of ‘Fritz Nietzsche’: ‘The fundamental feature of his character was a certain melancholy, which expressed itself in his whole being. From his earliest childhood he loved solitude and followed his own thoughts. He had an extremely pious inwardly turned sensibility and as a child thought about things that did not occupy other boys of his age. He possessed a steady industriousness which like everything else about him served as a model for me. Many of my inclinations, especially in literature and music, were awakened and nourished through him alone. He had a serious but also friendly and gentle nature. He never did anything without consideration. When we worked together, and he wrote something to which I could not immediately assent, he knew how to discuss the issue with me in a clear objective fashion. Apart from this his main virtues were modesty and gratitude, which he demonstrated in the most pronounced way on all occasions. From this modesty there arose a certain shyness, and particularly among strangers he did not feel at ease.’[69]

The earliest extant literary piece from Nietzsche is a poem composed for the first of January, 1852, when he was seven years old. It opens with the line ‘To the beautiful new year’s morning’ and addresses his mother with reverential thankfulness and the hope that ‘God will let you live a long life’.[70] As a child it was Nietzsche’s habit to present collections of his poems to his mother on her birthday. He would continue this practice through his school years and a little beyond, when in addition to poems and musical compositions dedicated to his mother or Pinder and Krug he occasionally sent collections of songs to girls with whom he was enamoured.

In 1854-55 Fritz passionately sided with the Russians in the Crimean War, filling his exercise books with military drawings and notes on siege warfare. In 1854, at the age of nine, he wrote a play ‘King Squirrel’, based on a character he had created in his childish games and to whom he dedicated poems and musical compositions. Another play, entitled ‘The Gods in Olympus’ and set half on earth, half in the realm of the gods, was performed in the Pinder-Krug house, Nietzsche playing Mars, the god of war.[71] Fragments of these plays survive. The Greek gods and heroes occupied the imagination of the boy even before he left Weber’s Institute; in part this was due to the influence of Herr Pinder, but then, as Elisabeth comments, ‘Graecomania was indeed peculiar to the age, and everything was given a Greek name in those days’.[72] Apart from school exercises, most of Nietzsche’s literary output until he began at Pforta in October 1858 consists of poems. Greek themes with heroic deeds figure prominently, a Christian note being sometimes struck seemingly for the benefit of his mother. The young poet is keenly conscious of his difference from other people (not just children) and in a manner characteristic of his later life usually sees this fatalistically as belonging to his nature and for him as a force for freedom. A poem from early 1856 opens ‘Over there on that cliff top/That is my favourite place to sit’.[73] A startling melancholy sometimes shows through, as in an untitled poem from the first half of 1858:

Oh woe! That I have left

The dear house of my father

The whole world is like a grave

And all joy is gone

I cannot sing with cheer

But must always lament

When with bitter pains

I travel my road

My heart was like the blue day

Now it is barren and empty

The songs of the nightingale and the lark

Rang out all around me

Now it is silent like a grave

White snow all around me

Bitterly do I cry out

Woe! Were I at home![74]

Another conspicuous feature of the early poetry is a preoccupation with storms and dangerous sea voyages; this will remain a favourite field of metaphors for the rest of his life. Some of Nietzsche’s early (pre-Pforta) productions did not survive his raids on Elisabeth’s treasure drawer but the extant material is sufficient in quantity to indicate a powerful creative urge obviously marking him off from the majority of children. Despite formal assent to the religion of his family and fatherland he did not possess a ‘pious’ temperament, a point he would underline in Ecce Homo. He enjoyed contemplating danger and heroism, which is normal for a child, but he also liked to dwell on death, isolation, homelessness and homesickness. Already he was a seeker of a decidedly artistic stamp, without knowing quite what he was seeking. Or perhaps he was searching for happiness, as in some remarkable fragments from 1857. In one fragment entitled ‘The Transitoriness of Happiness’ a ‘wanderer’ lands in Egypt and is struck by the ruin and devastation of a once magnificent land, then moves on to Mesopotamia and has the same experience.[75] In a related set of poems a character named Alfonso sets out to discover the true meaning of happiness:

On the high towers of the castle

Alfonso sits pale and gloomy

Filled with an unnameable yearning

After the meaning of happiness

And he thinks of the old heroes

Who through power and strength

Subjugated peoples

That was not true happiness

Ah! What can beauty be

He thinks this over day and night

And refuses all sustenance

He turns stubbornly inward

He sits and sees

The sun go down

And breaks out in tearful words

Ridden with pain he calls out

Ah sun! You witness of my suffering

Sink down again and leave me behind

Moaning and bitterly tormented by doubt

Would I sink down into the grave like you

Listen! Something sounds so sweet and fine

Beautiful notes from the old monastery

Calling all people to quiet and prayer

For him this gives no rest by day or by night[76]

Having rejected conventional solutions to the problem of happiness Alfonso embarks on a ‘pilgrimage’ in search of an answer, receiving diverse advice without achieving ultimate satisfaction. It is perhaps impossible to ‘explain’ the persistent melancholy and nostalgia, often coupled with an heroic tone, in Nietzsche’s juvenilia. Certainly he had experienced grief during his formative years. Outwardly, however, his family life in Naumburg from 1850, despite the loss of grandmother Erdmuthe and Aunt Auguste, does not seem to have been particularly unhappy. His mother was not of a naturally morose disposition, nor did Elisabeth develop anything like a bleak cast of mind. He had numerous devoted aunts and uncles whom he enjoyed visiting, and the Pinder-Krug house was a constant stimulant. Yet the young Fritz’s sense of existential isolation was the most important element in his psyche, and without it, no doubt, the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche would never have come into being.

Shortly before Fritz began at the Cathedral Gymnasium in October 1855 he was offered a free place at the famous Orphan School at Halle. Grandfather David Oehler (several of whose sons had attended the University of Halle) and grandmother Erdmuthe Nietzsche (whose son Carl Ludwig had studied there) favoured acceptance but Franziska decided otherwise, hoping that within a few years there would be an opening at the equally reputable Schulpforta outside of Naumburg. In fact Franziska and Fritz had been aware of the possibility of a place at Pforta ever since the early years in Naumburg. Doubtless Frau Nietzsche thought that a few years of gymnasium fees were well worth it if a reasonable prospect existed that Fritz would remain in the vicinity of Naumburg for his later schooling. The decision not to uproot her son after six years in Naumburg was probably a wise one for a boy who would always suffer from a sensation of homelessness: not only did it allow him to stay within the circle of his relatives but it permitted the further development of his friendship with Gustav and Wilhelm, both of whom also moved on from Weber’s Institute to the Cathedral Gymnasium. In hindsight it seems fated that Nietzsche did not go the Halle Orphan School, at which, in contrast to the humanistic culture of the gymnasium and later at Schulpforta, there still reigned the Pietist spirit of its seventeenth century founders.

The Cathedral Gymnasium had highly qualified teachers, several of whom, including the headmaster Dr Carl Förtsch, were classical philologists. Nietzsche’s studies now began in earnest, and the materials preserved in his notebooks show how demanding these were. But despite rising early and staying up late at night to study, Nietzsche did not obtain particularly good grades at the gymnasium. Almost half the class-hours in the school were taken up by Latin and Greek, in which subjects young Fritz struggled. Even in German, French, history and geography, he regularly received grades of ‘satisfactory’ or ‘unsatisfactory’ in respect of his ‘knowledge’, while his ‘effort’ usually, and his ‘conduct’ invariably, were awarded full marks.[77] Nietzsche’s Leaving Certificate, dated the twenty-fifth of September 1858, indicates that he had reached the level of ‘good’ in religion, ‘satisfactory’ in German, French, history, geography, science and mathematics, but was still deemed ‘unsatisfactory’ in Latin and Greek.[78] With regard to his conduct Dr Förtsch commented: ‘He has always recommended himself to his teachers by his obedience and well-mannered behaviour in and outside of school. He has been conscientious in attendance, in the lessons attentive and participatory.’ The boy was still ‘the little pastor’, but as yet, in schoolwork, without signs of unusual intellectual prowess. Records for the gymnasium show Gustav Krug at about the same level as Fritz, with Wilhelm Pinder significantly above them both.

In the years 1855-58, by virtue of his gymnasium studies and ongoing contact with the Krug-Pinder house, Nietzsche became familiar with a wide range of literature. From his family and Weber’s Institute he already had a good knowledge of the Bible. To this he added a first acquaintance with the Greek and Latin classics, German classics including Goethe, Herder, and Schiller, also the Nibelungenlied, and of English authors mainly Shakespeare, who soon became a favourite. At the end of 1858 or early 1859 Elisabeth made a list of the books in her brother’s library; along with works by the above-mentioned authors this includes titles from Lessing, literary and musical biographies, historical works, and a collection of sayings from the ancient world. From other evidence it can be established that by the time he entered Pforta or soon afterwards Nietzsche either possessed, or had read, or had examined, or at least wanted to obtain (among other items): the autobiography of Jung-Stilling, a collection of stories by E. T. A. Hoffmann, an Old German Reader edited by Karl Simrock (whose lectures Nietzsche would attend at the University of Bonn), Cervantes’ Don Quixote, and poetical works by Chamisso.[79] Conspicuous is the absence of books of theology, church history, or Christian edification. It seems that as yet (he turned fourteen in October 1858) Nietzsche was not reading any strictly philosophical books, although there was philosophical content in much he did read, for instance Goethe and Lessing.

  1. 3 Schulpforta (1858-64)

In ‘From My Life’, which was completed on the first of September 1858, there is no mention of Schulpforta, probably because at this point Nietzsche expected to return to the Naumburg Gymnasium. But although the offer of a free place at Pforta apparently came suddenly it could not have been altogether unexpected or at least unhoped for. Elisabeth would always maintain that her brother was offered a scholarship at Pforta because of his outstanding academic record at the Naumburg Gymnasium, but this explanation does not tally with his average performance there in most subjects. Nietzsche’s academic deficiencies are confirmed by the fact that as a result of the entrance examination for Pforta he had to repeat in his new school the last term he had completed at the gymnasium; this meant that he would not graduate from Pforta until September 1864, when he was nearly twenty years old. The true reason Nietzsche received a scholarship seems to be that as a pastor his late father had been a servant of the state. In addition the school tended to take children who were orphans or fatherless. Whether there were other factors involved, for example the reputation of Carl Ludwig (the resident physician in Pforta, Carl Zimmermann, had been personally acquainted with Nietzsche’s father), is difficult to judge. In a fragment from 1861 Nietzsche claims that the decision whether to accept the scholarship was left to himself: ‘I already had good feelings towards Pforta, partly because of the reputation of the school and the famous names who had been there in the past, partly because I admired its beautiful grounds and environment. I quickly decided for acceptance and have never regretted it.’[80] The proximity of Naumburg meant that he could meet his family and friends regularly, mostly on Sundays at a coffee-house half-way between the school and Naumburg. Gustav and Wilhelm stayed at the gymnasium, graduating at Easter 1864. Despite the cessation of daily contact Nietzsche’s friendship with these boys not only continued but deepened during his first four years at Pforta.

Nietzsche started at Schulpforta in early October 1858. Located just south of the Saale a few kilometres from Naumburg, for over three centuries it had been one of the most prestigious schools in Germany, numbering among its pupils Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1739-45), J. G. Fichte (1774-80), and Leopold von Ranke (1809-14). A Cistercian monastery under the name ‘Sanctae Mariae ad Portam’ had been founded on the site in 1137, but in 1543 the establishment was turned into a secular school. When Nietzsche arrived it occupied about sixty acres, including a thirteenth century gothic church, residential buildings for the teachers and pupils (the latter sleeping in thirty-bed dormitories), classrooms, cloisters and capacious gardens, all set within high walls. There were about two hundred boys at the school, most of whom were on scholarships, and twelve teachers, eight bearing the title of professor. Each pupil had a tutor among the teachers, who exercised a personal supervisory function, was in contact with the boy’s family, and dispensed money coming from home. Nietzsche’s tutor was Professor Robert Buddensieg, a theologian and instructor in religion. Nietzsche became very fond of Buddensieg and was profoundly grieved when he died in August 1861.

Since 1815 the school had been Prussian, and something of the atmosphere of a Prussian cadet-academy still attached to it. Life in Schulpforta was regimented down to the smallest details. Boys had to rise early for lessons and study sessions which would last ten hours a day, six days a week, with a few hours of freedom on Sunday; there were also compulsory religious services and periods of prayer. But although a Christian school, Pforta had a tradition of humanistic education and openness to modern tendencies of thought. As regards subjects of instruction, the emphasis was on Latin and Greek, the former receiving the greater weight; these two subjects made up nearly fifty percent of class hours. German literature, including middle-high German, was taught by the eminent literary historian Karl August Koberstein. Other subjects were history, geography, religion, Hebrew, and mathematics. Teachers sometimes gave private (optional) classes in modern languages (English, French, Italian). Physical education was not overlooked, Nietzsche proving himself proficient at swimming. In later life Nietzsche’s main regret about the curriculum at Pforta was its neglect, typical of German schools at the time, of the natural sciences. On the other hand he remained grateful for the rigorous training in ‘method’ he received in the course of his language studies. This training in fact, together with the spirit of German classicism reigning at Pforta (Schiller’s one hundredth birthday was celebrated with fanfare in November 1859), tended to subvert the official Christianity of the school.

During six years at Schulpforta Nietzsche not only absorbed a wealth of knowledge but immeasurably strengthened the mental disposition – above all the yearning for truth, understood as inseparable from the drive for autonomy – which would be his for the rest of his life. He was a good student, and recognized as such by his teachers, but again, as in the Naumburg Gymnasium, he did not always excel in his grades. At bottom Nietzsche was too independently-minded to work for the sake of pleasing his teachers, and unless his school-work served some inner urge he did not devote himself to it wholeheartedly. By the same token, once he inwardly embraced a subject he went to the top of the class. He found mathematics boring and consequently was always weak at this subject. And he made little progress in Hebrew, again because he was not interested. Indeed Nietzsche had little talent for languages. He was deficient in Latin and Greek at the Naumburg Gymnasium and only gradually improved at Pforta, and although he had a keen interest in English authors (Shakespeare, Shelley, and especially Byron) whom he wanted to read in the original, he would never apply himself sufficiently to succeed in this. It was the same with French (he obtained some competence in this in later years when he regularly spent time in Nice) and Italian. In his mature life most of his friends were competent in a greater number of languages than was Nietzsche.

In a fragment from 1868 Nietzsche explains how Schulpforta discipline helped him pursue his autonomous path: ‘My father, a Protestant country pastor in Thüringia, died too early, so I lacked the strict superior guidance of a masculine intellect. When as a boy I came to Schulpforta I discovered a surrogate for paternal education in the homogenizing discipline of an orderly school. But precisely this well-nigh military compulsion which, because it is supposed to work upon the masses, treats the individual coolly and superficially, led me back to myself. In the face of a monotonous regimen I rescued my private inclinations and strivings; I practiced a hidden cult of arts and endeavoured through an over-excited thirst for universal knowledge and enjoyment to break the rigidity of the regulated order of time and its use.’[81] But Nietzsche’s most eloquent tribute to Schulpforta is in a notebook fragment twenty years later: ‘I cannot see how somebody who did not at the right time go to a good school can ever make up for this. Such a person does not know himself; he goes through life without having learned to walk, the slack muscles are betrayed by every step […] Under all circumstances what is most desirable is a hard discipline at the right time, at that age when one is proud to see much demanded of one. For this is what differentiates the hard school as the good school from every other: that much is demanded, that it is demanded strictly, that even the good and excellent are demanded as normal, that praise is infrequent, that indulgence is lacking, that reproaches are sharp and objective without regard to talent or origin […] The same discipline makes competent the scholar and the soldier, and strictly speaking there are no competent scholars who do not have within them the instincts of a competent soldier […] What does one learn in a hard school? To obey and to command.’

Nietzsche did not make new friends easily at Pforta. Almost to the end of his school years his best friends remained Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug, whom he saw at every opportunity and with whom he carried on a regular correspondence on matters literary, musical, and philosophical. He continued to write poetry and compose music, often sending his work to his friends in Naumburg, and he was always encouraging Wilhelm and Gustav to their own creative efforts. In a letter to Pinder at the beginning of April 1859 he asks to be sent a topic for an essay, and as a topic for Pinder suggests ‘On Divine and Human Freedom’: ‘Freedom is one of the most important subjects. Just throw out questions. What is freedom? Who is free? What is free will?’ Nietzsche and Pinder often ended their letters to each other with ‘Semper nostra amicitia manet’ (‘May our friendship always endure’).

At the end of April 1859, back in Pforta after spending his Easter vacation in Pobles and Naumburg, he wrote to Pinder detailing the result of his holiday occupations: ‘Firstly an abortive play entitled “Prometheus”, filled with no end of specious ideas on this subject, secondly three poems on the same theme, which I ridicule in the third piece. The latter, by the way, is a queer thing but not yet finished – just six closely written quarto sheets – and is headed “Question marks and notes together with a general exclamation mark over three poems entitled Prometheus”. In this a poet is set against the public, and the whole thing is a mixture of nonsense and stupidity, among other things a sentence which continues for an entire page. There are terribly comical distortions, real stupidities. I do not know how I got such crazy ideas.’[82] In another letter to Pinder soon afterwards Nietzsche invites his friend to join him in a research project: ‘Prometheus has become interesting material for me and I would much like it if we both wrote down our thoughts on this topic. Above all assemble from lexicons and other handbooks of mythology as complete an account of his life as possible together with related myths concerning Japetos, the Titans, Epimetheus, Pandora. You are better able to do this, since I have access to fewer books. Then upon closer examination of this material write down all your thoughts, and I shall do the same.’ Nietzsche follows with suggestions as to the detailed division of tasks. There is no further record of this project, but no doubt Nietzsche continued investigations. It is noteworthy – since Pforta had a well-stocked library – that Nietzsche assumes Pinder to have superior access to books in Naumburg. The Cathedral Gymnasium possessed an impressive library, which Nietzsche would occasionally consult even after leaving Pforta. There was also the private library at the Krug-Pinder residence.

The notion of a research project of the kind Nietzsche mentions is most unusual for a fourteen year old. But by the time he arrived at Pforta Nietzsche was at home in the world of books: he had always loved libraries, beginning (if we are to believe his memories) with his father’s at Röcken, then grandfather Oehler’s at Pobles, then the Naumburg libraries and now Pforta. As for the ‘crazy ideas’ in Nietzsche’s notes on Prometheus, taken as a whole they indeed amount to a chaos, but in parts they reveal a remarkable anticipation of themes which come to the fore in his writings of the early 1870’s. Thus he mocks his play-fragment and poems as follows: ‘Ugh! How awful! One wants to renew the times of Aeschylus, or if there are no more human beings, must one allow Titans to arise again? Unheard of slander against contemporary humanity! Now, where everything is flourishing, are we supposed to return to the primordial origins of culture? Is that not an extraordinary impertinence?’[83] But this ‘extraordinary impertinence’ is just what Nietzsche in 1871 will venture in The Birth of Tragedy, on whose title page will appear a vignette of Prometheus released from his chains.

In a letter to Pinder from mid-February 1859 Nietzsche sent him a short ‘continuation of my autobiography’, consisting of one long paragraph giving his sensations and thoughts upon entering Pforta, together with a poem ‘Song of May’ speaking of nature’s springtime rejuvenation as consolation for sadness. Another characteristic poem ‘In the Distance’ went off to Pinder in June. In part it reads:

In the distance, in the distance

Shine the stars of my life

And with melancholy look

I gaze upon my bygone happiness

Ah so willingly, so willingly

Looking back in delight!

Like a wanderer who stands on the heights

Looking into the distance

This world is too small for the noble spirit

Who flies up upon wings of enthusiasm

High up over this nullity of life

And flees into blessed, better heights

Where the stars beside him wander around suns

Who sees in the universe the infinite

The all-seeing reign supreme

But one feeling checks the tremendous

Wild impulse of the heart

Enriching and filling his life

With love and refreshment –

It is the magnificent feeling of love for home

Oh how happy is he who in the storm of life

Knows a house where he can rest

In August 1859, a few months short of his fifteenth birthday, Nietzsche committed to his notebook one of his most oft-quoted early poems, ‘Without a Homeland’:[84]

Wild steeds carry

Me without fear and hesitation

Through the farthest realms.

And whoever sees me knows me,

And whoever knows me calls me:

The homeless man.

Heidideldi!

Never forsake me!

My happiness, you bright star!

Nobody may dare

To ask me

Where my homeland is:

I am truly not bound

To space and fleeting hours,

I am as free as the eagle!

Heidideldi!

Never forsake me!

My happiness, you beloved May!

That one day I shall die,

Must kiss bitter death,

That I hardly believe:

Shall I sink into the grave

And never again drink

Life’s fragrant froth?

Heidideldi!

Never forsake me!

My happiness, you colourful dream.

Nearly thirty years later, in Book Five of The Gay Science, Nietzsche will refer to himself as one of those who, in the conditions of modern Europe, ‘are entitled to call themselves homeless in a distinctive and honourable sense’.[85]

Other preserved writings from Nietzsche’s first years at Pforta include school essays, extracts from his reading, numerous poems, some diary entries (but he did not keep a steady diary for any length of time) and accounts of his holidays, three short chapters of an unfinished novel ‘Capri and Helgoland’, and a drama ‘Philotas’ running to about thirty pages. In the first chapter of the fragmentary novel, which is set at sea and features a young man contemplating his proper homeland, the following passage occurs: ‘This inward feeling of home is given to all human beings, and it is good if we can preserve in our innermost heart what is dear and precious to us but also become master of this mood. We are pilgrims in this world and have our home everywhere and nowhere.’ And in the second chapter: ‘Before a storm all human beings are beset by an uneasy intimation; one looks at everything in a much more serious and anxious way and sees everywhere an omen. Earnest tension replaces joyful recollection; the same sea that had previously been murmuring so cheerfully now appears uncanny and grim.’[86] Nietzsche’s unfinished drama centres on the conspiracy against Alexander the Great by his general Philotas. He had possibly read Lessing’s play of the same title, but in his own piece Nietzsche is concerned mainly with the authenticity or otherwise of Alexander’s quasi-divine ‘greatness’.

Nietzsche’s notebooks, his letters to Wilhelm and Gustav, and his letters to his family (especially his wish-lists for Christmas and birthdays) give a good idea of his reading at Pforta. Apart from Greek and Latin works he read, to name just some of the more important authors he explicitly mentions during six years at the school: Cervantes, Dante, Machiavelli, Sterne, P. B. Shelley, Byron, Emerson, Longfellow, Shakespeare, Jean Paul, Novalis, Hölderlin, Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Büchner, Platen, Feuerbach, A. W. Schlegel, Alexander von Humboldt, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Chamisso, Petöfi, Guizot, and Rousseau. In addition he made a serious study of the Nibelungenlied, the Edda, and read many biographies and historical works (including literary, cultural, and philosophical histories) from the library at the school. In regard to ancient authors he built on the foundations he had acquired at the Naumburg Gymnasium, so that by the time he left Pforta he had spent nine years immersed in the Greek and Latin classics. Otto Bendorf, a teacher at Pforta from 1862 to 1864, wrote many years later that ‘already at that time his great erudition was astonishing, and no less the deep understanding he brought to things’.[87] The young Nietzsche also monitored his own reading and the development of his interests. In an autobiographical fragment from August 1859 the fourteen year old declares that ‘I am now seized by a powerful drive to knowledge and universal culture; this has been prompted by Humboldt.’ Apparently he had been reading Alexander von Humboldt’s Cosmos (a few months later his Aunt Rosalie would send him for his fifteenth birthday a biography of Humboldt). He goes on in this fragment to list in chronological succession his occupations with theatre, poetry, church music including his own compositions, painting (in which, owing to short-sightedness, he would not show any long-term interest), then literature, geology, astronomy, mythology, and Old German. In closing he gives, as two mottos: ‘Above all religion, the foundation of all knowledge!’, and ‘Great is the domain of knowledge, unending is the search for truth!’[88]

At no time of his life was Nietzsche more intensively occupied with music than during his Schulpforta years. His wish-lists invariably included musical scores, from Handel, Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert and Chopin. Beginning in 1861, encouraged by Gustav Krug, he became increasingly attracted to Robert Schumann, who soon became the greatest influence on his own compositions. For a fee Nietzsche could gain access to a school piano, on which in the evening he would entertain other pupils. He joined the Pforta choir. Although active in composing he never received formal instruction, instead privately studying from a standard treatise by Beethoven’s teacher Johann Georg Albrechtsberger.[89] His productions were mostly fugues, songs and short piano pieces, but also a miserere, parts of a motet, a requiem, a mass, a Christmas oratorio, and an ‘Ermanarich Symphony’ based on a hero from the Edda saga. He continued to work on some of these compositions years after leaving school. On his regular visits to Naumburg he took the opportunity to play and discuss music with Gustav, with whom he carried on an energetic musical correspondence. In 1863 he enjoyed playing the piano at nearby Bad Kösen with an Anna Redtel, sister of a fellow pupil. Nietzsche obviously liked the girl, for he sent her a handsomely bound booklet, with a gold vignette on the cover, containing some of his own songs. A note from Anna, upon leaving Bad Kösen in September, thanks him for the gift, telling him ‘I will always remember with great pleasure the beautiful hours I spent with you.’

In July 1860, when Fritz and Wilhelm were holidaying together at Gorenzen with Uncle Edmund Oehler, the pair decided to form a literary society to give structure to their creative efforts. Gustav was soon included in the project, the ambit of the society being extended to cover music as well. ‘Germania’ was founded on the twenty-fifth of July on the ruins of the Schönburg castle just outside of Naumburg. The statutes, very demanding for schoolboys not yet sixteen, were drafted by Nietzsche: every month each member had to submit either a poem, a musical composition, or an essay; at least six essays were required every year; a ‘chronicler’ would be appointed every quarter to produce a written report on the submissions of the members, which reports would be read out at the quarterly meetings (‘synods’); financial contributions would be made every month to purchase musical scores and books; proposals for acquisitions would be made in rotational order; members would be reimbursed from treasury if their purchases exceeded a prescribed amount; the finances were to be managed by Gustav Krug; at the quarterly meetings each member would deliver a lecture which would count as his contribution for that month.[90] Preserved records for Germania indicate that its first purchases included the scores for Wagner’s Lohengrin and Tristan und Isolde (proposed by Krug) and Liszt’s Dante-Symphony (proposed by Nietzsche), a collection of Hölderlin’s poetry (proposed by Pinder), and a subscription to a Leipzig pro-Wagner journal Anregungen für Kunst, Leben und Wissenschaft.

Germania was an enormous stimulus to Nietzsche’s productivity and for nearly three years he managed to meet the challenging schedule for submissions. Elisabeth, ever an attentive observer of her brother’s activities, relates that ‘we were much amused at the solemn courtly tone which the friends constantly observed between themselves (save in the matter of mutual literary criticism, when each was more or less driven to discourtesy), a tone which prevailed not only at their meetings but also in their private intercourse.’[91] Most of Nietzsche’s significant literary and musical productions from mid-1860 until mid-1863 were contributions to Germania, with some essays doubling as school-work. After the initial period of enthusiasm, however, Wilhelm and Gustav gradually fell behind in their submissions and by the middle of 1862 they had both ceased active participation. Nietzsche attempted to revive the society through an admonishing official report (‘the sanctity of the statutes has been assailed and Germania has gone to the dogs through inner dissolution, dissension and apathy’) in September of that year, but without success.[92] In July 1863 the society was wound up, with the idea of reviving it at university.[93] This did not eventuate, but in later years Nietzsche continued to dream of a small circle of philosophical friends which would function in the same way as Germania.

The discussions within Germania are reflected in the lively correspondence between Nietzsche and his Naumburg friends. Unfortunately Nietzsche’s letters to Krug during these Pforta years are lost but many letters survive from Krug to Nietzsche, from Pinder to Nietzsche, from Nietzsche to Pinder, and a few from Nietzsche to Pinder and Krug jointly. In a long letter from Krug to Nietzsche at the end of November 1860 there occurs the first mention of Richard Wagner in Nietzsche’s correspondence. Krug reports on the impression he has gained of the as-yet-unperformed Tristan und Isolde from an article in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik (another Leipzig magazine supportive of Wagner). In March 1861, while Nietzsche was in Naumburg for the Easter holidays, Krug gave a Germania lecture (the first of several lectures on Wagner by Krug) on ‘Some Scenes from Tristan und Isolde’. By this time Krug had obtained the piano score of Tristan and was able to play to Nietzsche from Act One. However, notwithstanding his response to Tristan, and contrary to his claim in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche did not become an instant convert to Wagner.[94] In a fragment from 1884 Nietzsche recalls that at seventeen he regarded Tannhäuser and Lohengrin as ‘beneath my taste’, while Tristan presented him with a ‘comprehensible world’.[95] It does not appear that any other work of Wagner besides Tristan made a favourable impact on Nietzsche until he heard the overture to the Meistersinger in Leipzig in October 1868, shortly before meeting the composer in person; this positive reaction was reinforced when he attended the full performance a few months later in Dresden. The very first mention of Wagner in an extant letter of Nietzsche does not occur until December 1861, when on a Christmas wish-list to his mother he requests a photograph of Wagner or of Liszt or of some other ‘famous living man’; after this there are no more references to Wagner in his surviving letters until November 1865, when he mentions in passing that some works by Wagner, Liszt and Berlioz are due to be performed in Leipzig.[96]

No doubt Nietzsche had numerous conversations about Wagner with Gustav Krug from late 1860 onwards; it is also certain that he made references to Wagner in lost letters to Gustav between 1861 and 1864. Elisabeth reports there was much playing and ‘howling’ from Tristan by Fritz and Gustav in Frau Nietzsche’s Weingarten house (Gustav’s house being unavailable because of his father’s dislike of Wagner’s music) during the autumn holidays of 1862.[97] For a few weeks in October Nietzsche had the entire score of Tristan in Pforta, before returning it to Gustav. Initially, Nietzsche had reservations not only about Wagner but in relation to opera generally. A letter to Krug and Pinder from the fourteenth of January 1861 is especially revealing in this regard. Since August 1860 Nietzsche had submitted to Germania a number of parts for a Christmas oratorio.[98] Then, over the Christmas holidays in Naumburg, a spirited discussion took place among the boys as to the relative merits as musical forms of opera and oratorio. ‘Although one has believed hitherto’, Nietzsche wrote to his friends, ‘that the oratorio occupies the same place in spiritual music as opera does in worldly music, this seems to me incorrect and a disparagement of the oratorio. In itself the oratorio is of great simplicity, which it must be as elevating and strictly religious music. Thus does the oratorio spurn other means which opera uses for effect; it cannot be regarded as an accompaniment in the way opera still is for the masses. It excites no sense other than hearing. Also the content is infinitely more simple and sublime, and for the most part well-known and readily intelligible even for uneducated people. For this reason I believe oratorio is a higher form of music than opera […] The chief reason oratorio is less popular is that music is often mixed in unholy fashion with that which is worldly. The challenge of oratorio is that in all its parts it displays the holy and divine.’ At this point Nietzsche’s idea of the religious function of music was still Christian, but after rejecting Christianity he nevertheless continued to think of music in metaphysical or ethical terms. This is a major reason he became attracted to Wagner. When at a later date he recoiled from Wagnerianism it was because he saw Wagner as compromising the seriousness of music for base ‘theatricality’.

The year 1861 was a turning point in Nietzsche’s spiritual development. His church confirmation occurred on the tenth of March. Congratulatory letters came from Uncle Edmund and Bernard Dächsel, both of whom assumed that Fritz would follow his late father into the pastorate. In Naumburg there must have been much talk to the same effect from his mother, Aunt Rosalie, and others. Around this time there occurred some unpleasant arguments between Nietzsche and his mother. Details, including the topic of the disputes, are not known, but the discord is mentioned, with profuse apologies, in an April letter from Nietzsche to his mother and sister. It is hard to think of what could have caused serious dissension between Nietzsche and his mother (a thing almost unknown) except the topic of his future career, the sensitivity of which was enhanced by their shared reverence for the late Carl Ludwig. It is likely that Nietzsche, pressed upon from all sides to embrace a path in life to which he did not feel drawn, in frustration told his mother that he did not envisage becoming a pastor, perhaps that he did not consider himself a Christian. There was no point in arguing with his mother on such matters, hence Nietzsche’s apologies. Franziska Nietzsche, indeed, could hardly have failed to notice that Fritz never showed any eagerness for a career in the church. Possibly she believed, especially in view of the reverence in which Fritz held his father, that nonetheless he would eventually pursue such a course. Confirmation was supposed to be a time of resolve and declaration for Christ, but to avoid unpleasant confrontations Nietzsche had to leave the question outwardly in limbo. This must have been a source of anxiety for him. It seems that Fritz continued to discuss his inner conflicts with Uncle Edmund, for in November 1862 the latter, having himself recently been through a period of doubt before experiencing a re-awakening and consolidation of faith, wrote to his nephew enjoining a trust in ‘Jesus alone’: ‘My dear Fritz, I know from our conversations that you are a searching, struggling and fighting soul.’

Nietzsche’s musical compositions in 1861 show a gradual but distinct move away from Christian themes. In August he converted parts of his Christmas oratorio into a piano piece entitled, after a poem by Justinus Kerner, ‘Pain is the Fundamental Tone of Nature’.[99] His occupation during the first half of 1861 with the Norse-Icelandic Poetic Edda led him to produce an essay ‘Ermanarich, King of the Ostrogoths: An Historical Sketch’, which he read to a meeting of Germania in July.[100] Earlier in 1861 he discovered Liszt’s Dante Symphony (upon which, in September, he gave a lecture to Germania) as well as the same composer’s Hungaria. At the end of April he submitted to Germania ‘Six Serbian Folksongs: Translated into German Rhymes’. At first his comrades Gustav and Wilhelm were astonished that he should know this Slavic language but as Nietzsche indicates in a foreword added soon afterwards his ‘translations’, of five ‘lyrical poems’ and one ‘epic poem’, were re-workings from a German book published in 1826, Folksongs of the Serbs, translated with an historical introduction by Talvj (Therese von Jakob).[101]

By autumn 1861 Nietzsche had embarked on a ‘Ermanarich Symphony’, parts of which he presented to Germania in November. ‘It was in Michaelmas 1861’, he reports in a note from 1862, ‘when in a few days I began and brought to completion this fragment of the Ermanarich Symphony, written for two pianos on the model of the Dante Symphony with which I had become acquainted a little earlier. This was a time when the Ermanarich material moved me more strongly than ever. I was still too shaken for poetry and did not feel sufficiently distant to create an objective drama. In music however I successfully set forth the mood in which the Ermanarich saga was for me completely incarnated. Nevertheless I was undecided as to what I should call the product, whether “Ermanarich Symphony” or “Serbia”, since I had the plan, similarly to what Liszt had achieved in Hungaria, of conveying in a composition the emotional world of a Slavic people.’[102] Nietzsche continued to be occupied with the Ermanarich theme for the remainder of his time at Schulpforta and a little beyond. In 1862 he produced a poem ‘The Death of Ermanarich’ as both a school exercise (for which he received the top marks in his German class) and a contribution to Germania. Later in the year he sketched out ten pages towards a drama on the theme, while towards the end of 1863 he wrote a short treatise, also for his German class, entitled ‘The Formation of the Saga of the Ostrogoth King Ermanarich until the Twelfth Century’, this being Nietzsche’s first serious effort in source-criticism and much impressing his teacher Koberstein.[103] All this, whether Nordic-Germanic (and Nietzsche was also much interested at this time in the Nibelungenlied, upon which he wrote an essay for Germania in November 1862) or ‘Serbian’ (‘Slavic’) or ‘Hungarian’ (as with three musical pieces from February 1862 which he calls ‘Hungarian Sketches’), and whether musical, poetical, or historical-discursive, was far distant from the thought-world of Christianity. It was also distant from the atmosphere of modern Germany: ‘It is well-known’, he wrote in his 1861 ‘Historical Sketch’, ‘that the North draws everything into the realm of the terrible, the sublimely wild, and the mysterious, which in Germany remains in the region of light and humanity.’ He continued, speaking of the Edda: ‘That twilight of the gods (Götterdämmerung) where the suns darkens, the earth sinks into the sea, where the burning whirlpool uproots the all-nourishing world-tree and raging flames lick the heavens, is the grandest creation of human genius, unsurpassed in the literature of all ages’.[104]

In August 1861 Nietzsche experienced another loss with the death from typhus of his tutor Robert Buddensieg. Frau Nietzsche, who had often visited Buddensieg and his wife at Pforta, was also deeply grieved. As compensation Fritz’s new tutor, the recently arrived teacher Max Heinze (at that time in his mid-twenties) became a friend. It so happened that in the early 1870’s Heinze, as a professor of philosophy, would briefly be Nietzsche’s colleague at the University of Basel; then he moved to Leipzig where he made his reputation as an historian of philosophy. Heinze would remain in touch with Nietzsche and his mother right through to Nietzsche’s collapse, after which he helped Frau Nietzsche in any way he could; upon Franziska’s death in 1897 he became one of her insane son’s guardians.

One of Nietzsche’s most well-known literary productions from his Pforta years, dating from October 1861, was a school assignment for German in which the pupil was required to write a letter to a friend recommending his favourite poet. Nietzsche wrote on Friedrich Hölderlin, whom he had discovered, probably through Wilhelm Pinder, before coming to Pforta. The essay is significant because of the many echoes of Hölderlin in the mature Nietzsche. Among the books in Nietzsche’s library that Elisabeth listed in 1858-59 was an introductory work on Hölderlin by Wilhelm Neumann containing biographical information, selected writings, and critical material. After receiving his German assignment Nietzsche wrote to his sister in Naumburg asking her to urgently send this book to Pforta. For more than a century after Nietzsche’s essay was published in the Appendix to the first volume of Elisabeth’s biography of her brother, passages in it were quoted as testimony to the young Nietzsche’s precocious originality. Recent scholarship has revealed, however, that as regards this particular essay Nietzsche deserves less credit than he has received.[105] Had Elisabeth compared the essay to Neumann’s book she would have found that her brother had not only paraphrased Neumann but taken over without acknowledgment many passages word for word; such passages include those which have received most notice from Nietzsche scholars and biographers.

This discovery is a salutary corrective to overstated claims about the young Nietzsche’s originality but it by no means annuls the interest attaching to the essay. What remains significant is that Nietzsche chose Hölderlin as his favourite poet, the particular passages from Neumann he selected to paraphrase or ‘plagiarize’, and what he adds on his own account. At the beginning of the essay Nietzsche indignantly rejects the charge that Hölderlin’s productions stem from a half-mad broken spirit lashing out at Germany and Christianity. The schoolboy had been captivated by the person of Hölderlin, who like Nietzsche lost his father when a child, possessed a melancholy temperament, was expected by his mother to become a parson but turned away from conventional Christianity, loved Greek antiquity, loved poetry, and was a solitary brooder. With regard to the basic tendency of Hölderlin’s thought the most significant passage in the essay is where Nietzsche writes, half paraphrasing, half plagiarizing: ‘Noteworthy is a series of poems where he tells the Germans some bitter truths, unfortunately all too well-grounded. Also in Hyperion he slings sharp and cutting words against German “barbarism”. However, this aversion to the existing state of affairs is compatible with the greatest love for the fatherland, which Hölderlin truly possessed in the highest measure. What he hated in the German was the mere specialist, the philistine.’[106] When Nietzsche wrote this essay he had read some poetry of Hölderlin, from the Neumann extracts and from another collection of Hölderlin’s poems possessed by Pinder, but probably had not read the novel Hyperion. He was not yet able to independently arrive at the judgements he found in Neumann, but he could recognize in Hölderlin, partly through the help of Neumann’s commentary, a spirit related to his own. No doubt he took the German assignment as an opportunity to occupy his mind with someone widely frowned upon in the respectable literary world. Perhaps Nietzsche was testing the reaction of his teacher. In fact Koberstein gave the essay a good mark but not the highest, commenting ‘I would like to convey to the author the friendly advice to concern himself with a healthier, clearer, and more German poet’.

In December 1861, two months after his essay on Hölderlin, Nietzsche produced a lecture for Germania on his other favourite poet, Lord Byron. Nearly twenty-seven years later, in Ecce Homo, he declares that he ‘must be profoundly related’ to Byron’s character Manfred and was ‘ripe’ for Byron’s work Manfred at the age of thirteen.[107] Nietzsche turned thirteen in October 1857, but there is no evidence he was reading Byron before 1861. The cast of mind that was attracted to Hölderlin was drawn also to Byron, whose cult still flourished throughout continental Europe and whose works were available in a variety of German translations. The first reference to Byron anywhere in Nietzsche is in a letter to his mother and sister in April 1861, where he asks them to bring ‘my Don Juan’ to their next rendezvous, a request he repeats twice in October and once again in December. In the meantime he had access to other copies and editions of Byron, including the edition he used for his Germania lecture, the eight volume Collected Works translated by Adolf Böttger. Although before entering Pforta Nietzsche was probably aware of Byron from the Krug-Pinder house and grandfather Oehler (his copy of Don Juan came from David Oehler’s library), his interest seems to have been further stimulated by a teacher Diederich Volkmann, who came to Pforta in 1861. Volkmann, six years older than Nietzsche, was a classical philologist who also taught English in private lessons – outside the standard Pforta curriculum, for a fee. In a letter to Elisabeth at the end of November Nietzsche wrote that ‘in your position [she must have acquired some competence in the language] I would definitely read Byron in English’, indicating he intended joining Volkmann’s classes after Easter. Nietzsche became friendly with Volkmann and continued contact with him after leaving Pforta, but he does not seem to have attended, or at any rate benefited from, Volkmann’s English lessons.

The classic description of the Byronic hero was given by Thomas Macaulay in 1831: ‘proud, moody, cynical, with defiance on his brow, and misery in his heart, a scorner of his kind, implacable in revenge, yet capable of deep and strong affection’. Byron was another case of a boy who lost his father at an early age and was brought up without masculine authority. But it was the English poet’s temperament, and the fact that his poetry was an act of self-revelation or confession, that so attracted Nietzsche: he was drawn to Byron’s aristocratic free-spiritedness and rebellion, his pessimism and misanthropy combined with compassion, his uncompromising individualism, his fundamental honesty and love of truth, and his feeling of isolation or homelessness. Like Nietzsche’s essay on Hölderlin, the lecture on Byron draws from secondary sources, in this case mainly Böttger’s biographical introduction. But again, what is significant is not so much that Nietzsche took material from one or another scholarly work, but what he took, whether word for word, as paraphrase, or as stimulating his own comments. At this date Nietzsche seems familiar with nearly the full range of Byron’s writings but in the Germania lecture he refers mainly to a few short dramatic pieces, including the work which would remain his favourite, Manfred. Of this work he declares, at the beginning of the lecture: ‘As a drama it is a monster, one could even call it the monologue of a dying man, rummaging in the most profound questions and problems, stirring through the awesome elevation of this superman who rules over spirits, delighting through the magnificent wonderfully beautiful diction.’[108] This is Nietzsche’s first documented use of the noun ‘superman’ (Übermensch). He uses the adjective ‘superhuman’ (übermenschlich) several times later in the lecture, including in the following passage: ‘The most extraordinary product of Byron’s brain is in any case Manfred, which in every respect steps beyond the boundaries of the usual and could almost be called a superhuman work […] Actually there is no work richer in ideas, which in spite of its dramatic deficiencies, despite being really a heaping up of despairing thoughts, attracts the reader with a powerful magic and can put him in the condition of the deepest melancholy.’[109]

The word ‘Übermensch’, unusual but not previously unknown in German literature, would be employed in Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra and other later writings (albeit not with great frequency in the published works) and has become emblematic of his philosophy. ‘Übermenschlich’, fairly common in German, had been used before by Nietzsche, in his 1858 autobiography and in a diary entry for the twenty-fourth of August 1859 on his re-reading of Schiller’s The Robbers: ‘To me the characters are almost superhuman; one believes oneself to observe a struggle of the Titans against religion and virtue, whereby divine omnipotence wins an infinitely tragic victory.’[110] The context of the word, consonant with the Byron lecture, is telling. In 1871, speaking of the young Goethe’s ‘Prometheus’ poem, Nietzsche will write in The Birth of Tragedy: ‘Man, raising himself up into something Titanic, acquires his hard-won culture for himself, compelling the gods to unite with him […] But the most wonderful thing about that Prometheus poem, which in its fundamental idea is the authentic hymn of impiety, is the profoundly Aeschylean theme of justice.’ Already at Pforta Nietzsche saw the young Schiller and Byron (and probably Hölderlin) as Titans rising up against the gods on behalf of a new and superior (more ‘just’, admittedly, but not in the moral sense) type of human being, the ‘superman’. Byron, an admirer of ancient Greece, especially of Aeschylus and especially of Aeschylus’ Prometheus, composed his own ‘Prometheus’ poem. But it was Byron’s Promethean spirit which inspired Nietzsche at Schulpforta and thereafter. He continued sporadically to read Byron for many years. While still at Pforta Robert Schumann’s ‘Manfred Overture’ became one of his favourite musical works, and in Basel in 1872 Nietzsche produced his own ‘Manfred Meditation’ for piano. In a letter responding to the composer Hans von Bülow’s harsh criticism of this latter piece, he wrote ‘I am unable to regard the Byronic Manfred, which was almost my favourite poem as a boy, otherwise than as a mad-formless and monotonous absurdity.’[111] This did not stop him quoting Byron with approval in Human, All Too Human (1878), including a few ‘immortal lines’ (quoted in English, a rarity for Nietzsche) from the beginning of Manfred.[112] As late as Ecce Homo he confesses to a ‘profound relationship’ with the Byronic figure of Manfred, explaining that as a child he ‘found all these abysses in myself’.[113]

In July 1862, while holidaying with his Uncle Edmund in Gorenzen, Nietzsche sent a Pforta friend Raimund Granier the first chapter of an abandoned novel ‘Euphorion’ (after the Byronic character in Goethe’s Faust). In his accompanying letter Nietzsche tells Granier that he now finds the fragment ‘sickening’ and has discarded it ‘in disgust’. The piece is evidence, however, of his quasi-Byronic experimentation at this time, as in the following passage: ‘Opposite me lives a nun, whom I occasionally visit to enjoy her morality. I know her very precisely, from head to toe, better than I know myself. Earlier she was a skinny nun – I was a doctor and soon made her fat. She lives in marriage with her brother, who was too fat and flourishing for me, so I made him as thin as a corpse. Soon he will die – which pleases me – for I want to dissect him.’[114] Nietzsche signed this letter, to which he attached two recently composed songs, ‘FWvNietzky’. It seems Nietzsche was rather close to Granier at this time, at least in regard to matters of the intellect: in his letter he refers to Granier’s ‘deeply inward nature’, reports that in Gorenzen he has been occupied with ‘refutations of materialism’, and mentions that he has been reading Rousseau’s Emil. Although Nietzsche and Granier would not form an enduring friendship their post-Pforta exchange of letters (with Byronic tones and a quotation from Manfred on Nietzsche’s side) in September 1865 is a revealing episode in Nietzsche’s early correspondence.

It was in October 1862 that Nietzsche, just turning eighteen, wrote the two pieces for Germania which jointly amount to his first philosophical effort. ‘Fate and History: Thoughts’ and ‘Freedom of Will and Fate’ are rambling unfinished pieces but they anticipate to a remarkable degree the issues and tenor of his mature thinking.[115] Nietzsche has by this time abandoned any semblance of conventional Christian faith and poses the problem of religion squarely within the context of modern thought. It is significant, however, that while acknowledging the tendency of modern science to undermine all theology he does not unambiguously welcome this result: ‘To venture out into the sea of doubt without compass and guide is foolishness and ruin for undeveloped heads; most are destroyed by storms, only very few discover new lands […] Great revolutions lie ahead when the masses begin to understand that the whole of Christianity is built on assumptions – the existence of God, immortality, the authority of the Bible, and others – which will always remain problematic. I have tried to deny everything: oh, tearing down is easy, but building! […] From hour to hour the hand of the clock is moving forward to twelve, to begin its course anew: a new world-period is dawning […] If it became possible, by means of a strong will, to overthrow the entire past, we would be immediately transported into the realm of autonomous gods, and world-history would be for us nothing but a dreamy self-deception, the curtain would fall, and man would find himself like a child playing with worlds.’ When these youthful thoughts are set alongside Nietzsche’s declarations in 1882-88 (when he came to see himself as ushering in the new world-period) the impression of continuity is striking, even uncanny. It is not surprising that on the theme of human freedom (the essay-topic he suggested to Wilhelm Pinder in April 1859) he does not get beyond a preliminary statement of issues and difficulties. What is noteworthy, however, as far as his future development is concerned, is his belief in the power of the human being to in a certain manner cooperate with fate, such that, assuming the requisite self-understanding and strength of will, individuality and freedom can triumph.

At this stage Nietzsche had read very little philosophy. The only philosophical author with whom he seems reasonably familiar is Ralph Waldo Emerson. He began reading Emerson in 1861 or early 1862 and explicitly draws from him (especially Emerson’s ‘Fate’ essay) in both pieces.[116] Emerson remained a favourite of Nietzsche ever after. As for Nietzsche’s understanding of Christianity, apart from Emerson he may have been influenced by the liberal theologian Karl August von Hase, whose Life of Jesus (1829) and Church History (1834) he recommended to his sister in a November 1861 letter. From this letter it is evident that Nietzsche had not yet read these books by Hase, and nowhere else in his letters or works does he mention Hase, but it is significant that he was interested in this author – ‘the most intelligent representative of ideal rationalism’, he tells Elisabeth – whom he had heard praised by the Naumburg Pastor Wenkel. Elisabeth relates that her brother’s recommendation of the books by Hase occasioned a ‘storm of indignation’ from their mother and Aunt Rosalie; doubtless it was the erudite Rosalie rather than Franziska who was aware of Hase’s reputation.[117] It does not appear, incidentally, that while at Pforta, or possibly at any time, Nietzsche read the original version of David Friedrich Strauß’s Life of Jesus (1835-36), which in its sceptical attitude to Christian doctrine went far beyond Hase. However, during his first year at university Nietzsche did read Strauß’s new (1864) popular presentation of the same material.

The most revealing expression of Nietzsche’s view of Christianity around this time is in a letter to Krug and Pinder on the twenty-seventh of April 1862: ‘Only when we recognize that we are accountable for ourselves, that a reproach concerning an erroneous manner of living can only redound on ourselves and not on any higher powers, only then do the basic ideas of Christianity throw off their outer garb and get to the real issue. Christianity is essentially a matter of the heart; only when it has become embodied in us and taken possession of our soul does one become a true Christian. The main doctrines of Christianity express just the fundamental truths of the human heart; they are symbols, and even the highest must always be a symbol of something still higher. That faith makes one blessed means nothing else except the old truth that only the heart, and not knowledge, can make one happy. That God became man means only that human beings should not seek their blessedness in the infinite, but should build their heaven upon the earth; the illusion of a super-terrestrial world brought the human spirit into a false relation with the terrestrial world; it was the consequence of the childhood of peoples […] Through hard doubts and struggles humanity comes to manhood, recognizing in itself “the beginning, the middle, and the end of religion”.’ The end quotation is from Ludwig Feuerbach, whose The Essence of Christianity Nietzsche had recently been reading (this and another work by Feuerbach appear on a wish-list for his birthday the previous October).[118] More than twenty years later Nietzsche will put the exhortation ‘Stay faithful to the earth!’ into the mouth of his prophet Zarathustra.

While Gustav Krug and Wilhelm Pinder were Nietzsche’s best friends almost to the end of his Pforta years he did make new friends at the school, including two who would be important in later life. The first, Paul Deussen, arrived in Pforta in October 1859 and entered the same class as Nietzsche. A few months younger than Fritz, he too was the son of a Protestant pastor, in the small town of Oberdreis in northern Rhineland-Palatinate. Deussen was an extraordinarily serious and studious boy, outstripping Nietzsche in linguistic gifts and excelling him in school grades; already at Pforta he was called ‘Papa Deussen’, a nickname still applied to him by students when he was an elderly professor. Although Deussen lacked the creative spontaneity and musicality of Nietzsche, the two were drawn to each other by their common intellectual passion and sense of the seriousness of life. They left Pforta at the same time in September 1864 and spent two semesters together at the University of Bonn. After Nietzsche left Bonn in August 1865 they saw one another again just a few times but until the early 1870’s corresponded regularly. Thereafter, although contact became sporadic, each remained important for the other, especially Nietzsche for Deussen, who provides interesting recollections of his friend in Memories of Friedrich Nietzsche (1901) and the posthumously published My Life (1922). Deussen went on to attain international stature as an historian of philosophy and Indologist; for a short period in the late 1880’s he was more well-known as a philosopher than Nietzsche.

‘I am not sure what first brought us to one another’, wrote Deussen in 1901, ‘but I think it was our common love for Anakreon, for whose poems we enthused all the more readily because the easy Greek posed fewer difficulties for the understanding. We recited his verses on our walks together. We would often withdraw to the empty auditorium, where I would passionately declaim a poem (Schiller’s “Glocke” for example) with Nietzsche accompanying on the piano, always complaining that my recitation was too loud. Through this kind of quiet intercourse and our daily walks, we isolated ourselves from our comrades, who had little knowledge of the quiet inwardly-turned boy and often misjudged him. His indifference towards the trivial interests of our comrades, his lack of esprit de corps, was interpreted as lack of character. What would have happened to me if I had not had him I find difficult to imagine. A high estimation, perhaps overestimation, of everything great and beautiful, and a corresponding contempt for everything serving merely material interests, was certainly part of my nature; but by daily association with Nietzsche this smouldering spark was roused into a flame of total enthusiasm for everything ideal, a flame which never died down in me, also not after our ways parted. At that time, in Pforta, we understood one another totally. On our solitary walks we discussed every possible topic of religion, philosophy, poetry, visual arts and music; often our thoughts led into obscurity, and when words failed us we looked one another in the eye and said: “but we understand each other”. At heart Nietzsche was a deeply serious person for whom everything theatrical was utterly alien.’[119]

The second new friend, Carl von Gersdorff, also slightly younger than Nietzsche, came from a Prussian aristocratic family whose estate was located in Ostrichen, not far from Seidenberg in Silesia. A very different kind of personality to Deussen, he was not a born philosopher or outstanding intellectual but possessed an active and responsive mind. He had an easy self-confidence and noble bearing that reflected his background and attracted not only Nietzsche but in the 1870’s Richard and Cosima Wagner. Next to Erwin Rohde, whom Nietzsche met at university, Gersdorff was Nietzsche’s closest friend between 1866 and 1876, and although they were estranged for three years from late 1877 and never saw one another again after the summer of 1876, they reconciled by letter in 1881 and carried on a warm correspondence until Nietzsche’s mental collapse. In a letter written in September 1900, shortly after Nietzsche’s death, Gersdorff looked back on their Pforta days: ‘I was boarding with old Professor Koberstein, the eminent literary historian who gave instruction in German. Nietzsche had produced an independent critical-historical essay on the Ermanarich saga and handed it in to Koberstein, who was highly pleased with it, praising its scholarship, keen insight, soundness of reasoning and stylistic elegance. When Koberstein, usually rather silent at the dinner table, spoke about it to me so warmly, I took the opportunity of making Nietzsche’s acquaintance. I already felt, from the time I joined his class, that he was intellectually superior by a long way to all his fellow-pupils, and I had the sensation he would achieve something great. He attracted me by the free dignity of his behaviour wherein he immediately silenced any tone of vulgarity or foolish nonsense. Our association was not a little promoted by music; every evening between seven and seven-thirty we went together to the music room. I do not believe that Beethoven could have improvised more movingly than Nietzsche, for example when a storm stood threateningly in the sky.’[120]

Notable literary productions by Nietzsche during his final two years at Pforta include an essay on the female protagonist Kriemheld in the Nibelungenlied (November 1862), his long historical study of the Ermanarich saga (late 1863), various fragments on music and ‘moods’, a fragmentary essay on Greek tragedy (mid-1864), his valediction essay on Theognis (mid-1864), further autobiographical sketches, and, among numerous poems, especially the one which has become known under the title ‘To the Unknown God’ (September 1864).

Nietzsche had begun his study of the Nibelungenlied while at Naumburg Gymnasium. In December 1858, soon after entering Pforta, he requested as a Christmas present the recent translation by M. A. Niendorf. Perhaps he was already feeling the stimulation of Koberstein, an expert in Middle High German who treated the Nibelungenlied in the first volume of his history of German literature. Nietzsche retained an interest in the Nibelungenlied throughout his Pforta years, then at the University of Bonn he took a lecture-course (by Karl Simrock, who had produced his own translation) on Walther von der Vogelweide, one of its mooted authors. Following the rediscovery of the Nibelungenlied manuscripts in the mid-eighteenth century, the first half of the nineteenth century saw a tremendous upsurge of interest in this Teutonic epic not only in Germany but throughout Europe. In view of his interest in the Greek heroes it was logical that Nietzsche (like Wagner) should be fascinated by an authentically Germanic tradition of epic tragedy. But his essay on Kriemheld (a school assigment doubling as a submission to Germania) is significant mainly for the same reason as are his essays on Byron and Hölderlin, for evincing what is already a recognizably Nietzschean cast of mind. The essay opens combatively: ‘What is great and sublime is always the product of a deep and full heart. Small weak natures, whose actions are incapable of a grand forceful development, in their own limitedness typically mock or moralize at the vital fervour of passionate characters, and are easily frightened when they catch a glimpse of the daimonic power that rages through heaven and hell and through the abysses of love and hate.’[121] Intimations of the ‘superman’ appear at the end: ‘Only deep and full natures can dedicate themselves so completely to a terrible passion that they seem to step out beyond the human.’[122]

Nietzsche’s long essay from 1863-64, ‘The Forming of the Saga of the Ostrogothic King Ermanarich To the Twelfth Century’, was the culmination of several years’ interest in the Poetic Edda.[123] Together with his dissertation on Theognis from 1864 it is the most professional piece of writing Nietzsche produced at Pforta. No doubt his teacher Koberstein, who was greatly impressed by the finished work, gave scholarly guidance. It is conspicuous that unlike his earlier poetical and dramatical fragments on the same theme this is very much a scholarly effort by Nietzsche. He does not conceal how much he is stirred by the Edda, and he cannot help but give even this kind of writing a dramatic edge, but on the whole he is sober and methodical in his concern to identify the main features of the original legend and trace variations within different cultural traditions. At the time of this essay, looking ahead to his university studies, Nietzsche appears to have resolved on a ‘renunciation’ of his artistic passions in favour of ‘dry’ philology. However he concludes the piece on a confessional note: ‘I lay my pen down conscious that I have at least tried to give a connected account of a series of thoughts that have long occupied me, with the feeling of having gradually made the old saga vividly alive for myself so that now with a certain pain I take leave of it, and finally with the warmest thanks to those men, especially the Brothers Grimm, to whom in this area I owe everything, who have laid down an immortal monument in the heart of every German.’[124]

‘The Daimonic’ was a key element in Nietzsche’s imagination during his last years at Pforta, especially in connection with music. Through ‘moods’, he believed, the Daimonic ‘attunes’ individuals to music and other forms of art, providing access to what was intended by the artist. In a sketch from 1862-63 Nietzsche writes: ‘The artist himself can only testify to the effect that an indefinite Something has upon him, the Daimonic, the creative drive. It is the highest requirement in the understanding of art that this Daimonic is also felt by the audience. This is neither feeling nor knowing, but an obscure intimation of the divine.’[125] This provides an important clue to the way Nietzsche will always think, not only of music in the normal sense, but of the mousike of philosophy. In a jotting from September-October 1862 he states that, although one may be ‘floored’ by the ‘passionate waves’ of Tristan und Isolde, ‘feeling (Gefühl) is not a measure for music’; by ‘feeling’ here he means something non-cognitive that as such is unworthy of the status he accords to music.[126] Then in a fragment from 1864 entitled ‘On Moods’ he writes: ‘The soul encounters only what it wants […] The soul is made from the same or similar material as events, so it happens that an event which does not strike a related chord weighs heavily upon the soul […] Moods arise either from inner struggles or from external pressure on the inner world: here a civil war between two camps, there an oppression of the people by one class, a small minority. It often seems, when I eavesdrop on my own thoughts and feelings and quietly attend to myself, as if I hear the tumultuous battle of wild parties […] Struggle is the continual nourishment of the soul, which knows how to extract from it what is sweet and beautiful.’[127]

An important letter from Nietzsche’s last months at Pforta is to a recent fellow-pupil Rudolf Buddensieg concerning the effect and cognitive significance of music. Buddensieg, who had left Pforta at Easter to study theology at the University of Leipzig, had evidently been a musical friend of Nietzsche at school and a few days earlier had written to Nietzsche confessing that music often induced in him a near ecstatic state which he did not know how to interpret. Nietzsche replied: ‘As regards your thoughts on the effects of music, what you have experienced in yourself is more or less the experience of all musically organized people. But this excitation of the nerves, this shudder (Schauer), is the effect not just of music but of all the higher arts. Recall an analogous experience while reading the tragedies of Shakespeare […] But the physical effect is preceded by an intellectual intuition (geistige Intuition), which by reason of its uniqueness, grandeur and plenitude of insight makes an impression as of something miraculous. Do not think that the ground of this intuition resides in feeling or sensation; no, it is grounded in the highest and most delicate part of the knowing spirit (erkennenden Geistes). Do you not feel as if something comprehensive and unsuspected has been revealed? Is it not as if you look over into a new kingdom which is normally concealed from human beings? By means of this intellectual intuition the hearer comes as close to the composer as is possible. There is nothing higher in art than this effect; it is itself a creative power. Do you find the expression inappropriate that I used myself two years ago, when I wrote some sheets on the subject for my friends – I called the effect ‘daimonic’? If there are anywhere intimations of a higher world, they lie concealed here.’ Nietzsche is referring to a two-part essay ‘On the Daimonic in Music’, written for Germania between September 1862 and May 1863, but unfortunately lost.[128] His insistance on the cognitive content of music echoes his 1858 comment on poetry (in ‘From My Life’) that ‘in composing one must above all pay attention to the thoughts’.

In connection with Nietzsche’s future Wagnerianism a significant document is his 1864 commentary on the first chorus-song of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King. In this school essay Nietzsche investigates the origin of tragedy in ancient Greece, where, he says, musical elements take the lead, and contrasts this with German drama which he sees as developing from the epic tale.[129] In Greek tragedy, says Nietzsche: ‘The choir assumes by far the most important role, with the intermediate speeches often serving only to introduce new motifs altering the mood of the choir and conditioning the progress of feelings […] The Greeks thought of this tragic effect differently to us; for them it was achieved through the great scenes of pathos, the expansive flowing out of emotion, for the greatest part musically, whereby the action plays a small part and lyrical sensation is everything.’ With regard to modern opera, Nietzsche finds that ‘with the exception of the wonderful reform plans and deeds of Richard Wagner’, there is a ‘great mis-relation between music and text, between tone and sensation’. He continues: ‘The [Greek] tragedians had the special advantage that they were not only poets but also composers, in such a way that the one went hand in hand with the other. And when we add that according to ancient testimony they were also masters of dramatic form, orchestrics, stage scenery, and were themselves practiced actors […] so we see in their works what the most recent school of music sets up as the ideal of “the musical work of the future”, wherein the most sublime arts come together in harmonious unity and each art serves to allow the other to appear in its proper light, all working together to achieve a unitary artistic enjoyment.’[130] This is text-book Wagnerianism, and indeed it has been shown that in writing this essay Nietzsche drew upon (to the extent of sporadic plagiarism) the writings of a number of contemporary musicologists sympathetic to Wagner.[131] At this point Nietzsche was still four years away from his embrace of Wagnerianism, but the essay shows the extent of his preparation not only for Wagner’s art but for the philosophical view of The Birth of Tragedy.

In the summer of 1864 Nietzsche embarked for the first time on an extended philological essay treating a Greek author. This was Theognis of Megara, a sixth century B. C. philosopher-poet whose mentality – that of a disaffected aristocrat in an age where ‘the rabble’ were on the rise – bears comparison with the mature Nietzsche. In this Latin essay, however, which was a valediction dissertation for Schulpforta, Nietzsche is concerned not so much with Theognis’ ideas as with source-criticism, in particular the authenticity of the various fragments traditionally attributed to this poet. It is indicative of Nietzsche’s scholarly turn at this time that he remained occupied with these source-critical problems for two years after leaving Pforta. In January 1865 he presented a reworked version of his Theognis treatise to the Leipzig Philological Society. Shortly thereafter he showed it to the professor of philology, Friedrich Ritschl, who told him he had never seen such mature work from a student. This resulted in Nietzsche’s first publication, when in March 1867 his findings on Theognis appeared in the Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. It seems reasonable to say that Theognis ‘influenced’ the young Nietzsche just as did Emerson, Byron and Hölderlin; the pessimistic mood of the Greek poet, his occupation with death, the personal character of his poems, and his lofty disdain for the lower classes, all resonated in him.

In addition to his scholarly and philosophical pieces Nietzsche continued producing autobiographical fragments throughout his Pforta years. What is significant about these is not so much their narrative as their reflective dimension, that is their concern with autobiographical method, the motive of autobiography, and the course of an inward life. Thus in a fragment from September 1863 headed ‘My Life’ the eighteen year old writes: ‘If we wish to review and properly estimate a human life we must not be guided by accidental events, the gifts of chance, the changeable external fortune arising from intersecting external circumstances, though these are what initially meet the eye. It is precisely the small events and inner processes, which one overlooks, that in their totality show most clearly the individual character, for they grow organically from the nature of the person, while the others seem only inorganically connected with him.’[132] In another fragment of the same title dating from summer 1864, shortly before he left Pforta, Nietzsche sums up the course of his intellectual development after the death of his father: ‘Perhaps it was a misfortune that henceforth my development was not supervised by a masculine eye, but that curiosity and the drive to know led me with great disorder into the most diverse educational material, in a manner apt to confuse the spirit of a youngster […] When I came to Pforta I had looked into most of the sciences and arts and really felt interested in everything apart from the all too rational and to me boring mathematics. After a while I felt averse to this planless wandering in all domains of knowledge; I wanted to forcibly restrict myself, to penetrate into some particular area thoroughly and inwardly. I was able to realize this desire very pleasantly in a small scholarly society which I formed with two friends […] My inclination for classical studies also grew; I remember with great pleasure my first impressions of Sophocles, Aeschylus, of Plato especially in my favourite Symposium, then the Greek lyricists […] Now, as I am about to enter university, I hold it as a firm rule for my future scholarly life: to combat the inclination to superficial many-sided knowledge.’[133] Nietzsche felt the danger of falling into dilettantism, and already in Pforta had his eyes fixed on mastery of the philological craft; what was different about him, however, and this too is clear in his Pforta years, was his resistance to the complacent ‘specialization’ that is synonymous with spiritual death.

In 1863-64 Nietzsche had to curtail his extra-curricular literary and musical activities to prepare for final examinations. The question of his future studies, the what and the where, was looming by this time. On the twenty-seventh of April 1863, about sixteen months before he was due to leave Pforta, he wrote to his mother: ‘I am thinking more often than usual about my future; external and internal causes make it somewhat uncertain. Perhaps I could still study any discipline if I had the power to exclude all my other interests. Write to me your opinions about this […] If only I were not being asked by everyone about job training!’ Like most letters from Franziska Nietzsche to her son during his Pforta years her reply has not been preserved, so it is difficult to know if she was applying pressure for him to study theology and enter the church. Probably she was not exerting very much pressure, for this would be reflected in Nietzsche’s own letters; nevertheless, he could not have been in any doubt as to his mother’s hopes. On the second of May he wrote to her again: ‘As for my future, it is precisely the practical reservations that disturb me. The decision as to what to study will not come by itself. I must reflect and choose, and it is this choice which is causing me difficulties […] How easily one can allow oneself to be moved by a hankering for a venerable family tradition or by some special wish, so that the choice of a career seems a lottery where there are many entries but few winners. I am now in the particularly uncomfortable predicament of having a whole host of interests in a large number of different disciplines, whose overall satisfaction would make me a learned man but hardly into a professional animal. It is therefore clear that I must cast off some of these interests, likewise that I must acquire some new ones. But which are going to be the unhappy ones I throw overboard? Perhaps the children of my heart!’

Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav Krug, both of whom were due to leave the Cathedral Gymnasium in Naumburg at Easter of 1864, planned to study law at the University of Heidelberg. Carl von Gersdorff, who would not leave Pforta until Easter of 1865, was also planning legal studies, although, being under pressure from his father, it was with resignation rather than inclination. Paul Deussen, like Nietzsche, was expected by his family to study theology, the difference being that in Deussen’s case this was reinforced by living paternal authority. The fatherless Nietzsche felt more free than any of his friends to make an autonomous decision on his future, and was loath to take any step which would lock him into a life-path for which he felt no attraction. Without question the schoolboy Nietzsche had a sense of his own genius, and, as inseparable from this, of the awesome responsibility of his freedom. As his Pforta days drew to an end he was concerned not to make a premature decision; now, as always in later life, he wanted to be left to himself, to his own devices, to his inner life, to his own thoughts, to his own projects and passions. His inclination towards solitude, he would often say later, was an aspect of his fate and not at all a choice. But something else characteristic of Nietzsche at this early date – and for some time to come – is that he had no definite idea of the objects towards which he would direct his genius. While poetry and music had been the passions of his youth he was far from thinking that he would or could make a career as a poet or musician. He knew he would not become a pastor, although he had not yet stated this unequivocally to his mother and Rosalie. Not for a moment did he consider the legal profession. Only two possibilities remained for somebody in his position: schoolteaching or an academic career. By pursuing the right studies at university both options could be left open and a final decision deferred. If he could presently pursue his passions he did not want to think of future difficulties.

As he relates in the ‘My Life’ fragment from 1864, during his last few years at school Nietzsche pursued a more disciplined plan of study. In so doing he felt increasingly attracted to classical studies and for the first time became properly acquainted with Sophocles, Aeschylus, Plato, and the Greek lyric poets. In another autobiographical sketch, from 1868-69, he wrote: ‘From a vague dispersion into the many directions of my talent I was preserved by a philosophical seriousness which was never satisfied except in confronting the naked truth, undeterred by, indeed with a proclivity towards, hard and terrible consequences. A feeling of dissatisfaction with generalism drove me into the arms of rigorous scholarship and I yearned for the safe-harbour of objectivity as an escape from the rapidly changing feelings of my artistic inclinations […] Only in the final period of my life at Pforta did I abandon, through accurate self-knowledge, all artistic life-plans; from this point the vacant space was occupied by philology. What I wanted was a counterweight to my restless and changeable inclinations, a discipline that could be pursued with cool sobriety, logical coldness, regular steady work, without its results seizing my heart. At that time I thought to find all this in philology […] Fortunately I had excellent philological teachers whose personalities caused me to esteem the discipline.’[134]

At his final examinations at Pforta Nietzsche was graded excellent in German, Latin, Greek and religion, satisfactory in French, history and geography, and unsatisfactory in Hebrew and mathematics. In fact, so poor was his performance in mathematics that there was momentarily a question as to whether he would receive his Leaving Certificate. Strong words were needed at the masters’ synod from the Latin teacher Corssen, directed at the mathematics teacher Buchbinder, to bring Nietzsche through the crisis.[135] According to Elisabeth, Corssen called her brother ‘the most gifted pupil Pforta has had as long as I remember’ and was strongly supported by other teachers. Koberstein and the Greek teacher Steinhart (a Plato scholar) were likely among Nietzsche’s advocates. His conduct at Pforta, with the exception of one or two isolated incidents, had been exemplary, so it would have been a scandal to deny him. Still, the story of Nietzsche’s near-miss through mathematical weakness was passed down in the school and in 1872 was publicly recalled by his then opponent Ulrich von Wilamowitz, who had been a few years behind him at Pforta.

On his last day at Pforta, the seventh of September 1864, Nietzsche composed what is deservedly his most well-known poem. Although untitled in his notebook, it is usually called ‘To the Unknown God’:

Once more, before I move on

And send my glance forward

In loneliness do I lift up my hands

To you, to whom I flee,

To whom in the deepest depths of my heart

I have solemnly consecrated altars

So that for all time

Your voice may call me again

On these there glows, deeply inscribed

The word: To the Unknown God

I am his, may I have remained with the wicked gang

Even until this present hour:

I am his – and I feel the bonds

That pull me down in struggle

And, would I flee

Compel me to his service

I want to know you, Unknown One,

You who have reached deep into my soul,

Into my life like a raging storm,

You Incomprehensible One, Related One!

I want to know you, even serve you [136]

There is no documentary evidence relating to Nietzsche’s decision to study at the University of Bonn. In May 1864 Gustav and Wilhelm, settled in Heidelberg as law students, wrote long letters to Nietzsche detailing the attractions of the city and the university. They had arranged his accommodation in Heidelberg and were expecting his arrival in September or early October. In a letter to them jointly on the twelfth of June Nietzsche let them know he would not be coming, but declined to give reasons. Over the previous year there seems to have been a cooling in Nietzsche’s feelings towards these friends of his childhood. Ever since the decline and dissolution of Germania he had seen them and corresponded with them less regularly. His focus on his schoolwork in 1863-64 is part of the explanation. Another factor is that Deussen and Gersdorff at Pforta were becoming substitutes for his Naumburg friends. Nietzsche lacked empathy for the all-too-respectable ambitions of his Naumburg companions. For all the stimulation Pinder and Krug had provided him at a crucial time of his life, and for all the genuine warmth of their relationships, neither was the kind of ‘seeker’ he now looked for in a friend. Gersdorff, to be sure, was also going to study law, but unlike Pinder and Krug his heart was not in it; for the time being he was, like Nietzsche, an ‘idealist’. And Deussen, although he had not yet abandoned his plan of becoming a pastor, was a soul in search of truth, thirsty for knowledge, possessed of the same ‘life-seriousness’ as Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche and Deussen both decided for the University of Bonn and for the same course of study: principally philology, with theology and humanistic subjects on the side. There were good connections between the teachers at Schulpforta and the academic staff at Bonn. In all likelihood the boys were advised to go to Bonn; both left Pforta with personal letters of recommendation to Bonn professors.

The first two weeks after leaving Pforta Nietzsche spent with Deussen in Naumburg. During this time he must have had conversations about his future with Franziska and Aunt Rosalie, but it seems that, while having no intention of proceeding to a career in the church, he avoided provocative announcements. It is doubtful whether at this date Frau Nietzsche still harboured genuine hopes of her son becoming a pastor. Nietzsche knew that, to temporarily mollify his mother, he could enroll in theology at Bonn while also pursuing philology and other studies; he could then drop theology at an opportune time. The weight of familial expectations regarding his career plans and religious opinions must have been oppressive for Nietzsche at this point but for the time being he could evade the issue. The open breach would not come until Easter 1865.

From Naumburg the boys made their way to Deussen’s home in Oberdreis, where they stayed for another few weeks, celebrating the common birthday of Nietzsche and Deussen’s mother on the fifteenth of October. Nietzsche enjoyed the family atmosphere of the Deussen parsonage, Paul being one of nine children. He was particularly taken with his friend’s sixteen year old sister Marie, whom he describes in a letter to his mother and sister on the eighth of October: ‘Despite her youth Marie Deussen is a splendid, very intelligent girl, who occasionally reminds me of you, dear Elisabeth, for which reason, naturally, I cannot refuse her my particular favour.’ For Marie’s birthday in December Nietzsche sent her a bound collection of his songs.[137] ‘I find that very gallant of me’, he wrote to Naumburg on the ninth of December, ‘it is the best way I can demonstrate my appreciation’.

  1. 4 Nietzsche’s Medical History to 1864

The case of Pastor Carl Ludwig Nietzsche’s illness and death, itself unresolved, has a sequel in his son. But it is not just biographical curiosity which justifies the attention that has been given to Friedrich Nietzsche’s medical history. Even before Nietzsche retired on a sickness pension from the University of Basel in 1879 there were people, notably Richard and Cosima Wagner, who were saying that his recent thought showed signs of mental illness. Despite much attention to the subject including by medically qualified commentators there has never been a firm diagnosis of the condition which resulted in Nietzsche’s mental collapse. It is relevant, nonetheless, to set forth the known facts concerning his health through to his departure from Pforta.

Nietzsche’s state of health prior to the summer of 1856, when according to his 1858 autobiography he had to stay home from school because of ‘headaches’, is difficult to assess owing to lack of evidence. A letter from his mother to her brother Edmund in January 1853 reports her son suffering from a bout of ‘scarlet fever’ over which she was worried, it having claimed many victims in the district.[138] Records from the Cathedral Gymnasium indicate that Nietzsche had seventeen sick-days during the summer semester of 1856, a significant number. For the last two of Nietzsche’s six semesters at the Cathedral Gymnasium records are unfortunately lost. Eleven sick-days are indicated for his third-last semester (summer 1857), after they had fallen to two in the previous semester. During his first semester (winter 1855/56) only three sick-days are registered.[139] It is likely that most of these days lost from school were due to headaches and eye problems. According to Elisabeth, ‘as a result of the tiring winter of 1856-57, my brother for the first time showed signs of eye trouble, which at the start took the form of headaches […] My brother was obliged to prolong his summer holiday by a few weeks in order to recover from strain to his eyesight.’[140] This association of headaches and eye problems continued for many years, without a cause ever becoming clear. It is possible, however, that Nietzsche’s eye problems were independent (or relatively so) of the debilitating headaches from which he suffered throughout his life.

For the six years Nietzsche attended Schulpforta there is much more information on his health, from his many letters home and from the school’s medical records. At the beginning of December 1858, having been at Pforta for less than two months, he wrote to his mother that he had just consulted the school doctor, who wanted to see him regularly. The records indicate that he was in the school infirmary between the fifteenth and the twentieth of March 1859 (in his first semester) on account of ‘rheumatism’. In a letter to his mother on the twentieth of March he complained of headaches and asked if she had any remedies for this, also for coughs and colds. He was again in the infirmary for seven days in November, this time for ‘catarrh’. With regard to Nietzsche’s frequent periods in the Pforta infirmary it should be noted that the school did not believe in being soft or indulgent on the boys, being more inclined to the opposite (Spartan) policy that they should attend classes unless demonstrably unwell. In January 1860 Fritz was in the infirmary for twelve days because of ‘catarrh’, and in June of the same year for fifteen days because of ‘rheumatism’. A long bout of illness began in January 1861, involving nine days in the infirmary for a ‘cold’. He wrote to his mother (in mid-January): ‘I have constant headaches covering my whole head, my neck is painful every time I move and my throat is sore when I breathe. For two whole nights I have not slept at all but have been freezing and sweating by turns. I cannot get my mind clear. Everything around me is like a dream.’ Towards the end of January he reported to his mother that while his throat and neck had improved he was still suffering from frequent headaches, then on the thirtieth of January he told her: ‘The headaches are again so bad I cannot work. My neck aches and my throat is sore again. Owing to the pain I have not been able to sleep at night.’ Just a few days earlier he had been released from the infirmary (where he did not like staying, because he felt so isolated) but the school doctor advised him to return there. In the first half of February he stayed away from the infirmary and felt he was improving, although, as he wrote to his mother, he felt ‘extraordinarily exhausted’ and was beset by headaches at the least excitement. On the sixteenth of February, his condition having worsened, he wrote to Frau Nietzsche: ‘I am really fed up with these headaches; I am not improving and they just keep coming. The slightest activity of the head causes me pain. I am missing many lessons and am unable to catch up. Behind each ear I now have a poultice, but I don’t believe this will help. If only I could take long walks every day! Otherwise I don’t know how I am supposed to recover. I have been wondering whether it would be better for me to spend a few weeks in Naumburg and cure myself by walking.’ The doctor allowed him to go home. Back in Pforta at the end of the month, he felt a lot better; his headaches, so he wrote to his mother, had returned only a few times, and ‘it will be all right’.

In 1862 Nietzsche was confined to the infirmary on six occasions for a total of thirty-nine days. The causes are recorded as ‘congestion of the head’, ‘headaches’, ‘catarrh’, and ‘rheumatism’. On the twenty-fifth of August, after spending a week in the infirmary with ‘congestion’, he was again allowed to complete his recuperation in Naumburg. On this day he wrote to his mother, who at the time was staying with her brother Feodor in Merseburg: ‘The doctor has advised and permitted me to travel to Naumburg and there to undertake my water- and walking-cure. So today I am going to our house in Naumburg and there I shall live a quiet life without music or any other agitation. The doctor has given me the necessary dietary instructions. You do not need to worry and on no account should you return from Merseburg, where you are much needed [Feodor Oehler’s house had just burned down]. Perhaps living alone is the best life for me. So don’t worry, dear Mamma; if I avoid everything that can excite me the headaches will disappear.’ Over the next twenty-six years Nietzsche’s frequent sickness bulletins would be much the same as this. He would always be trying water-cures, he believed that incessant walking was a help, he would be preoccupied with his diet, and above all he would try to live a ‘quiet life’, which included dispensing with music. The only element missing from the quoted letter which looms large in his later quest for health is the climatic factor, but probably in 1862 he had not yet experienced a sufficient range of climates for this to occur to him.

When he sent Nietzsche home in August 1862 the doctor at Pforta, Carl August Zimmermann, made the following remarks in the school medical register: ‘He is a sturdy, thickset fellow with a noticeably fixed gaze, short-sighted and often plagued by recurring headaches. His father died young of softening of the brain and was conceived at an advanced age, the son [Fritz] at a time when the father was already sick. No serious signs are observable as yet but in view of his antecedents vigilance is necessary.’ Dr Zimmermann knew that Nietzsche’s father was already ill well before the alleged ‘fall’ of 1848. He did not have to be told this by Fritz or Frau Nietzsche, for he himself had been a pupil at Rossleben at the same time as Carl Ludwig, whose medical problems as a boy he was aware of. To be sure, there was not much that Dr Zimmermann could do other than counsel caution and apply received remedies for the symptoms Fritz displayed from time to time. These remedies included ‘cupping’ for the treatment of congestion, a mustard poultice for rheumatism, the application of oil for catarrh, water-cures, and dietary regimens. Another issue was Nietzsche’s eyes. Both Fritz and Elisabeth had inherited a weakness of the eyes, in particular short-sightedness, from their father. Elisabeth relates that in 1857 grandmother Oehler arranged for Fritz to consult a Jena eye-specialist, who made a connection between the boy’s eye problems and his headaches.[141] In the 1870’s and 1880’s Nietzsche’s medical advisors paid great attention to his eyes as a possible root cause of his illness, but it was never satisfactorily resolved whether his troublesome eyes were a cause, effect, or an independent but interconnecting condition. It is clear that already before Schulpforta Nietzsche not only suffered from short-sightedness but experienced aches around his eyes. His condition was probably exacerbated by the poor lighting by which he worked at night in Schulpforta, possibly too by the dark rooms he occupied when first in Naumburg. However, it appears that Dr Zimmermann paid no attention to the lighting at Pforta, even after being alerted to the issue by the Jena specialist.

Nietzsche had four stays in the school infirmary during 1863, for a total of thirty-five days. His conditions were ‘catarrh’ (twice), ‘inflammation of the ear’, and ‘diarrhea’. It appears that only one day intervened between the second and third of these stays and that his ear problem developed from his catarrh; except for this one day he was confined to the infirmary from the twenty-fourth of April to the twentieth of May. On the eleventh of May he wrote to his mother: ‘Behind the ear festering sores have formed. I especially suffer at night, and in general it is the most painful illness I have had.’ He wrote to her again on the seventeenth of May: ‘I have been feeling pretty miserable of late, since without seeing any change in my condition I have been tormented by pills and oil-rubs. Two nights ago I had the most dreadful coughing attack lasting two hours, with a cold and streaming eyes. Today my hoarseness has lessened, but the cold has returned.’ In 1864, his last year at school, Nietzsche spent only two short periods in the infirmary (‘catarrh’ and ‘congestion of the head’) for a total of six days. Except for one bad period in mid-1865 this seems to have been the beginning of nearly seven years of relatively good health which lasted until he contracted diphtheria and dysentery in France during his war-service in 1870. Thereafter he was chronically ill for the rest of his life, with brief periods of remission.

Clearly the extent of Nietzsche’s illness in childhood and adolescence was much greater than the average. It is noticeable, moreover, that most of his symptoms during this early period resemble those of his later years; gastric problems, and dry retching accompanying his headaches, are the main additions, especially after 1870, to the previously recorded symptoms. Headaches are the primary and most debilitating ongoing complaint. The consensus which emerged soon after Nietzsche’s collapse in 1889, and particularly after his death in 1900, that his primary illness must have been syphilis, was arrived at largely in ignorance of Nietzsche’s and his father’s early medical record. It is possible, no doubt, that syphilis was at some point overlaid on a pre-existing condition in Nietzsche. It is also possible that Nietzsche’s father suffered from syphilis and transmitted this disease to his son, but Carl Ludwig was himself chronically ill in his boyhood and youth, with symptoms in many respects similar to those of Fritz. Altogether, Nietzsche’s early medical history, and that of his father, would seem to tell against the diagnosis of syphilis, especially when taken in conjunction with other factors, including Nietzsche’s belief that he suffered from a hereditary condition and his lack of belief (so far as can be judged) that he suffered from syphilis.[142]

[1] KSA 9: 681; see also Nietzsche to Georg Brandes 10 April 1888.

[2] EH ‘Why I Am So Wise’ no. 3.

[3] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 5; Leben I, 12.

[4] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 5.

[5] Franziska Nietzsche to Adalbert Oehler c. October 1895, quoted in Benders and Oettermann, Chronik, 786.

[6] Franz Overbeck in Gilman, Begegnungen, 215-16.

[7] Müller, ‘Nietzsches Vorfahren’; Devreese, ‘Friedrich Nietzsches Ur-Urgrossvater Christoph Andreas Nitzsche’. The research of Devreese (published in 2012) seems the most comprehensive and reliable.

[8] Möbius, in his 1902 Nietzsche (17), reports that in the Leipzig Address Book for that year the name Nietzsch appears three times, Nietzsche five times, Nietzschke four, Nietzschmann eighteen, Nitsche fifteen, Nitzsche ninety-five, Nitzschke thirty-one.

[9] Nietzsche to Heinrich von Stein beginning of December 1882.

[10] KGW II 7/1: 533 lists nine publications of Nietzsche’s paternal grandfather between 1780 and 1820. Several are in Latin, but among the works in German are On Advantages, Burdens and Comfort in Old Age: For the Stimulation of Further Reflection and Judgement by the Thoughtful Elderly (published in 1789 when the author was thirty-three), Gamaliel, or the Eternally Enduring Truth of Christianity, for Instruction and Reassurance in the Current Ferment in the Theological World (1796) and Contributions Towards the Advancement of Rational Thought Concerning Religion, Education, Duties of Subjects, and Love of Man (1804). See Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 41-55, for a review of Friedrich August Nietzsche’s career and quotations from his writings.

[11] An extant letter from Erdmuthe to the Superintendent, responding to his preliminary inquiries about marriage and arranging for a discreet chaperoned meeting in Weißenfels, is a charming document of its time, reflecting a delicate balance of reserve and receptiveness: ‘Most honoured Herr Superintendent! Your kind letter, received through my brother a few days ago, has filled me with deep gratitude for your friendly feelings expressed in so lively and touching a manner. I cannot see it otherwise than as an act of God’s providence that you became aware of me, who I had believed to be unknown outside the circle of my close friends, and that you have become moved to a wish which presupposes an unconditional trust in me. In view of this conviction, and the respect I have for you, I accept with pleasure your suggestion for the continuation of our acquaintance, so that I may convey to you orally, which I would not be able to do so well in writing, my views, opinions, feelings and wishes. As to the place of our meeting, I am pleased that you have chosen somewhere outside of Naumburg. To me also Weißenfels seems the most suitable choice, because I at at any rate do not know anybody there. In response to your kind invitation my brother and his wife, as well as my sister, will accompany me there, which is a great comfort to me, for they have always taken a most tender concern for my welfare, and also in respect of this most important matter are supporting me in a brotherly and sisterly manner with their judgement and advice.” (in Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 61-62)

[12] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 33.

[13] Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 69-83.

[14] Oehler, Nietzsches Mutter, 2.

[15] Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 81.

[16] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 10.

[17] Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 35-36; Oehler, Nietzsches Mutter, 4.

[18] Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 86.

[19] Franziska Nietzsche’s autobiographical fragment ‘My Life’, written in 1895-96 just a year before her death, is printed in part in Adalbert Oehler, Nietzsches Mutter, 26-39, and more fully in Klaus Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 32-64.

[20] Franziska Nietzsche, ‘Mein Leben’, in Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 54.

[21] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 15.

[22] Carl Ludwig Nietzsche to Emil Julius Schenk 29 October 1844, quoted in Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 351.

[23] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 16-17 (with omissions).

[24] KGW I 1: 285.

[25] Förster-Nietzsche, Leben I, 19.

[26] Hödl, ‘Dichtung oder Wahrheit’, 297-98.

[27] e. g. Schlechta III: 15, following the BAW editors.

[28] KGW I 2: 259-60.

[29] KGW I 3: 191.

[30] Elisabeth Förster to Franziska Nietzsche 9 April 1889, quoted in Peters, Zarathustra’s Sister, 5.

[31] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 150-60.

[32] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 329.

[33] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 331.

[34] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 335-36.

[35] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 377-78.

[36] Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 378.

[37] Möbius, Nietzsche, 14; Möbius refers to his own conversations with Franziska Nietzsche’s physician in Naumburg Dr Gutjahr, the latter reporting testimony from Franziska.

[38] Friederike Dächsel to Bernhard Dächsel, quoted in Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 385.

[39] EH ‘Why I Am So Wise’ nos. 1 & 3.

[40] KGW I 1: 283-84.

[41] This (KGW I 1: 283) is the first occurrence in Nietzsche’s writings of the adjective ‘übermenschlich’ (superhuman).

[42] KGW I 1: 286.

[43] KGW I 1: 287.

[44] Oehler, Nietzsches Mutter, 46-47.

[45] Franziska’s diary entry for 9 August 1849 reads (in part): ‘My dearly beloved Ludwig, it is already eight days since we laid to rest your dear earthly remains! It has been very comforting to our deeply grieving hearts that you my dear blessed Ludwig have been honoured by so many signs of love and respect. But you deserved it, for I shall never forget your goodness in thought and deed, and I shall always try to be like you, my best husband and friend, and shall tell the children how you always wanted the best. O my good dear Ludwig! I thank you from my heart for your faithful love and for the fine image of yourself, my inwardly beloved Ludwig, which in spirit always hovers about me.’ (Klaus Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 150-51)

[46] Friedrich Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck 10 February 1883.

[47] Goch, Franziska Nietzsche, 363-64.

[48] Förster-Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche und die Frauen seiner Zeit, 22; Leben I, 27, 63-66.

[49] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 38.

[50] Nietzsche to C. A. Burckhardt July 1887 (draft); EH ‘Why I Am So Wise’ no. 3.

[51] Förster-Nietzsche, Leben I, 65.

[52] EH ‘Why I Am So Clever’ no. 1.

[53] Friedrich Nietzsche to Franziska Nietzsche 12 August 1887.

[54] Förster-Nietzsche, Leben I, 30-31.

[55] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 30.

[56] KGW I 1: 288.

[57] EH ‘Why I am so Clever’ no. 10.

[58] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 16; Goch, Nietzsches Vater, 357-58.

[59] KGW I 1: 306.

[60] KGW I 1: 298.

[61] KGW I 1: 297-98.

[62] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 29.

[63] KGW I 1: 300-301.

[64] Nietzsche to Franziska and Elisabeth Nietzsche 14 March 1885.

[65] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 41.

[66] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 40.

[67] KGW I 1: 294-95.

[68] KGW I 1: 307.

[69] Wilhelm Pinder in Janz, Biographie I, 60.

[70] KGW I 1: 317-18.

[71] KGW I 1: 309; Förster-Nietzsche, Leben I, 46. Thirty years later (11 November 1885) Nietzsche would sign himself ‘Prince Squirrel’ in a letter to his sister.

[72] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 52.

[73] KGW I 1: 6.

[74] KGW I 1: 272-73 (the middle stanza of this three-stanza poem has been omitted).

[75] KGW I 1: 126-29.

[76] KGW I 1: 175-76 (two stanzas omitted).

[77] Brobjer, ‘Nietzsche’s Education at the Naumburg Domgymnasium 1855-1858’, 314-15.

[78] Brobjer, ‘Why Did Nietzsche Receive a Scholarship to Study at Schulpforta?’, 327.

[79] See Appendix B in Brobjer, ‘Nietzsche’s Education at the Naumburg Domgymnasium 1855-1858’.

[80] KGW I 2: 263.

[81] KGW I 5: 52.

[82] The extant fragments of this project appear in KGW I 2: 36-51.

[83] KGW I 2: 47-48.

[84] KGW I 2: 104-05.

[85] GS no. 377.

[86] KGW I 2: 85 & 87.

[87] Otto Bendorf in Gilman, Begegnungen, 49.

[88] KGW I 2: 134-36.

[89] Nietzsche to Hans von Bülow (draft) 29 October 1872.

[90] The statutes of Germania are given in KGB I 4: 142-43.

[91] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 92.

[92] KGW I 2: 475-78.

[93] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 95.

[94] EH ‘Why I Am So Clever’ no. 6.

[95] KSA 11: 258.

[96] Nietzsche to Franziska and Elisabeth Nietzsche soon after 12 November 1865.

[97] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 97-98.

[98] KGW I 2: 480-81.

[99] ‘Schmerz ist der Grundton der Natur’ was submitted to Germania in August 1861 (KGW I 2: 482).

[100] KGW I 2: 274-84.

[101] KGW I 2: 244-52; KGB I 4: 297-98.

[102] KGW I 3: 4.

[103] KGW I 2: 370-75; KGW I 3: 54-65 & 239-69.

[104] KGW I 2: 281.

[105] Brobjer, ‘A Discussion and Source of Hölderlin’s Influence on Nietzsche’, 397-412.

[106] KGW I 2: 338-40.

[107] EH ‘Why I Am so Clever’ no. 4.

[108] KGW I 2: 345.

[109] KGW I 2: 349.

[110] KGW I 2: 119-20.

[111] Nietzsche to Hans von Bülow 29 October 1872.

[112] HAH no. 109.

[113] EH ‘Why I Am So Clever’ no. 4.

[114] KGW I 2: 447.

[115] KGW I 2: 431-40.

[116] Nietzsche read ‘Fate’ and other essays from Emerson’s The Conduct of Life (1860) in the 1862 German translation by E. S. von Mühlberg, Die Führung des Lebens: Gedanken und Studien. About the same time he read G. Fabricus’ 1858 translation, Versuche, of the first (1841) and second (1844) series of Emerson’s Essays. See Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 22-25, 117-22.

[117] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 89-90.

[118] Nietzsche’s ‘birthday note’ is given in KGW I 2, 307; the quoted words in Nietzsche’s letter come from Chapter 19 of Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity (see KGB I 4: 192).

[119] Paul Deussen in Gilman, Begegnungen, 40-46 (with omissions).

[120] Carl von Gersdorff to Heinrich Köselitz 14 September 1900 (with omissions), quoted in Janz, Biographie I, 96.

[121] KGW I 3: 33.

[122] KGW I 3: 38.

[123] KGW I 3: 239-69.

[124] KGW I 3: 269.

[125] KGW I 3: 81.

[126] KGW I 2: 474.

[127] KGW I 3: 372-73.

[128] KGB I 4: 259; a few associated fragments are printed in KGW I 2: 473-75.

[129] KGW I 3: 340

[130] KGW I 3: 342.

[131] Brobjer, ‘Sources and Influences on Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy’.

[132] KGW I 3: 189-90.

[133] KGW I 3: 418-19.

[134] KGW I 5: 42 & 53.

[135] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 116-17.

[136] KGW I 3: 391.

[137] The package of four songs was based on texts by Chamisso, Petöfi, and Pushkin (KGB I 4: 340).

[138] Benders and Oettermann, Chronik, 20.

[139] See Brobjer, ‘Nietzsche’s Education at the Naumburg Domgymnasium 1855-1858’.

[140] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 63-64.

[141] Förster-Nietzsche, The Young Nietzsche, 63-64.

[142] Nietzsche’s medical records from Schulpforta are given in Janz, Biographie I, 128-29. The most detailed treatment of Nietzsche’s medical history, with documents, is Volz, Nietzsche im Labyrinth seiner Krankheit.

Chapter Five Nietzsche’s Battle With Philosophy

Chapter 5

Nietzsche’s Battle With Philosophy

(created April 3 2016)

(copied to Nietzsche Revised Fragments October 2017)

It often seems, when I eavesdrop on my own thoughts and feelings and quietly attend to myself, as if I hear the tumultuous battle of wild parties. (Nietzsche, ‘On Moods’)

A philosopher: a man who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, dreams extraordinary things […] a fateful man around whom snarling, quarrelling, discord and uncanniness is always going on. A philosopher: alas, a creature which often runs away from itself, is often afraid of itself – but which is too inquisitive not to keep ‘coming to itself’ again.

(Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil)

We are making an experiment with the truth! Perhaps mankind will thereby be destroyed! So be it! (Nietzsche, 1884 notebook entry)

Philosophy and Faith

The prime obstacle to understanding Nietzsche as every other philosopher is failure to understand the nature of philosophy. A crude example is when people are taken as philosophers because, in addressing matters that seem of universal interest, they speak in convoluted jargon: a speech or a book is accepted as philosophy insofar as it is unintelligible. This often happens nowadays, especially in academia, where so much of the audience, following the mass expansion of universities, is ignorant and lacks mental training. The culture of modernity generally, which places a premium on first impressions, sensationalism, celebrities and public opinion, encourages this frivolous attitude to philosophy, which, however, maintains an affectation of seriousness. Then there are misunderstandings due to preconceived ideas of what philosophers must address and how they must address it – for instance that Nietzsche speaks so much of apparent ‘psychological’ issues and sets forth his thought mainly in aphorisms rather than in orderly treatises, has led some readers and potential readers to altogether miss his intentions. Rhetoricians and demagogues are taken as philosophers because they make rousing speeches. Or poets are taken as philosophers because of their power to move the imagination. Then again philosophy is dismissed as ‘impractical’. All these miscomprehensions of philosophy are discussed by Plato and Aristotle. Still, it has to be acknowledged that the nature of philosophy is no ‘settled fact’. From Plato’s time onwards it has been contested, and it is in the nature of philosophy that it should be contested. Hegel maintained that the highest result of philosophy is precisely the concept of philosophy. The majority of philosophers since Hegel have disagreed with his specific conception of philosophy, but they too, in the main, have made the nature of philosophy a leading concern. This includes Nietzsche.

There are people today, as there were in Plato’s time, who deny the possibility of philosophy. In this area, however, it is necessary to avoid mere semantic disputes and remain attentive to logical difficulties. In the early seventeenth century Francis Bacon rejected the whole of Classical Philosophy from Plato to late Scholasticism, but he kept the term ‘philosophy’ to apply to science. This meaning of ‘philosophy’ became common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such that the ‘Philosophical Transactions’ of the Royal Society was actually a scientific journal. The non-semantic issue is why previous philosophy is supposedly unacceptable and what should take its place. Assuredly Bacon’s adverse judgement on Classical Philosophy does not belong to any branch of modern science. In what sense, then, is this judgement itself philosophical? What is the basis of this judgement? These questions will be addressed at a later point of this chapter. It is noteworthy, however, just how difficult it is, even when wanting to break from the tradition, to dispense with the term ‘philosophy’. For his part, Nietzsche rejected the tradition, claimed to do so from insight, called himself a philosopher, and had contempt for the idea that philosophy could somehow reduce to science.

For all his hostility towards the classical tradition of philosophy, and all his doubts about the way classical philosophers claim to arrive at their knowledge, Nietzsche’s understanding of himself as a philosopher is inseparable from his belief that he has attained knowledge and is in search of truth. This applies to all stages of Nietzsche’s thought: ‘truth’, it would be fair to say, was his first word and his last. Nietzsche often speaks loosely, but only superficial readers could be misled. In The Birth of Tragedy he proposes that the ‘Socratic’ faith in plumbing the depths of reality through logical thinking, the faith that (in concert with Christianity) governed Western culture for two thousand years, has at last been revealed as unsustainable, so that now a new ‘tragic’ culture can rise up, inspired by the Greeks of the pre-philosophical ‘tragic age’ and by Richard Wagner in the present. This tragic culture, nonetheless, Nietzsche takes to rest on a vision which he does not hesitate to call ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’. At once artistic and mystical, this vision is in no sense intended by Nietzsche as subjective; on the contrary, he understands it as making contact with what is ultimate, most real and most true.

What then justifies Nietzsche’s claims on behalf of Dionysian philosophy. What validates his intuition? The short answer is that at this level there is no such thing as justification or validation. There must after all be an end somewhere to justification. Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy, like every other philosophy without exception, is unprovable by anything external to itself, that is, it is either accepted as self-proving or it is rejected. Admittedly this is a simplification, for the Dionysian philosophy has many aspects, but in exploring and assessing it one must rely on unprovable intuition. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche sees implicit or explicit refusal of Dionysianism, paradigmatically in Socratism, as symptomatic of weakness – indeed he regards weakness as more or less the counterpart, within Dionysian philosophy, of Judeo-Christian sinfulness. But if the acceptance of Dionysian philosophy is a test of strength this is not a matter, at least not primarily, of conscious assent. There is no doctrine in Dionysianism as there is in Christianity, although the Dionysian condition (state of mind, state of being) can certainly be described from within, as Nietzsche does. In this context Nietzsche tries to bring to light the conflicts between affirmative and negative attitudes to life, the battle between strength and weakness which, when strength wins out, he calls ‘self-overcoming’ – for the strong self, he believes, tests itself, seeing it as weakness to rest content in any ‘completed’ self. This struggle against weakness is at the same time a struggle against the Judeo-Christian and Platonic culture that, Nietzsche believes, valorizes weakness. Nietzsche considers himself, and more especially his idealized self Zarathustra, as an embodiment of the affirmative spirit of Dionysus: the justification of Dionysianism is simply the capacity to imitate Zarathustra-Nietzsche, which depends on the presence or absence of inner strength, the instinct for life, the force of indestructible life.

Dionysianism, then, is not in the first instance a view, not even a worldview. Neither are Christianity or Platonism or Hinduism or other religions at bottom worldviews. Each of these is a faith, which is indeed, at a secondary level, expressed in views. In a loose sense one can speak of a faith as a worldview but this is strictly inaccurate. A view is a picture; if one cuts part of it out and inserts something else it is a different picture. Neither religions nor philosophies are views or pictures; this is why they are not theories made up of assertions or propositions. This is not what they are, but they testify to themselves in words as also in visual images and music – Nietzsche thought his musical composition ‘Hymn to Life’ expressed his philosophy better than his books. Philosophies and religions are faiths rather than views. Faith is what makes understanding possible, for without faith there is nothing to understand. Nietzsche describes Socratic-Platonic philosophy as faith in the redemptive power of theoretical knowledge. As will be argued below, he is wrong on this. But what he says of the classical tradition does apply to modern philosophy in its main currents since 1600. Until modern times the principal business of philosophy was not taken to be the provision of views. This changed when in the seventeenth century modern science became the model of philosophy. People now came to think of ‘philosophies’ on the model of the Copernican world-system. The ancients, they came to believe, must have had inadequate views because they lacked knowledge, meaning validated views. This conception of philosophy is present to some extent in Nietzsche, but his innermost convictions were different; the chief reason he did not complete his planned trreatise ‘The Will to Power’ is that he could not make himself believe that his business was to produce theories or doctrines. The idea of philosophy as worldview, however, has become entrenched in modernity, because faith has become incomprehensible.[1] Faith itself is regarded as a view, such that various faiths are compared to one another as different views. 

 

A faith is not a view of any kind, in particular not (as a common misconception has it) a ‘dogmatic’ view. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra exhorts his disciples: ‘Remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak of superterrestrial hopes!’[2] It would be more than faintly absurd to take this as an exhortation to harden in a particular view, closing one’s mind to other views. ‘Remaining faithful’ is understood by Nietzsche as an orientation of the will, specifically of the will as determined by the instinct for life, of the will that remains courageous in the face of life, embracing life wholeheartedly without fears or doubts implanted by other-worldly religions. Faith in this sense takes over the whole person: one’s being is determined by this will to life.[3] Nietzsche is very clear that this (Dionysian-Zarathustrian) will to life is utterly different from the drive to self-preservation: Dionysians are prepared to sacrifice their individual lives for what they worship as the supreme value and reality, which is Life with a capital L – in fact the Dionysian spirit means losing oneself in this greater unity. In the chapter ‘Of Voluntary Death’ in Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche has his prophet declare: ‘I want to die myself, that you friends may love the earth more for my sake; and I want to become earth again, that I may have peace in her who bore me.’ In his works, fragments and letters Nietzsche frequently speaks of the possibility that his drive to philosophy will destroy him but is not distressed at this prospect. For Nietzsche, it is those who lack the Dionysian spirit who are afraid of death, even if on occasions they choose death as an escape from life. Nothing sets individual human beings apart more fundamentally than their strength (courage) or weakness (cowardice). Nothing is more contemptible than weakness. Nothing is more unworthy of Life than weakness.

 

Christianity too is a faith, not a view. As such it is an orientation of the will, in this case a will that loves God rather than affirms life. The fundamental orientation of the will of the Christian is to love God (an otherworldly God) with all one’s heart and all one’s strength and all one’s soul. Christianity distinguishes between strong and weak human beings, but strength or weakness in the face of God instead of in the face of Life. Nietzsche maintains that Christianity is ‘anti-life’, but most Christians, despite the Christian ascetical tradition, would not admit this; they would say that Life is not for them the Supreme Good that is God, but that nevertheless the love of God implies the love of Life. Here certain difficulties of the first importance arise the discussion of which must be deferred for the moment. The most cursory familiarity with Nietzsche is enough to show that his key ideas and arguments – meant to elucidate his faith, not to constitute it – revolve around the terms ‘life’, ‘world’, ‘affirm’, ‘deny’, ‘God’, ‘reality’, ‘truth’, ‘falsity’, ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘noble’, and a few others. It should also be clear that Nietzsche’s use of these terms (as is the case with any philosopher) should not be treated lightly, with their meanings accepted without further ado as this or that. Indeed Nietzsche’s arguments have such far-reaching ramifications that it is necessary to give the closest possible attention to his terms, including to ambiguities and shifts of meaning. In the above paragraph it was necessary to distinguish between ‘life’ and ‘Life’, the former applying to individuals, the latter to the all-encompassing ‘object’ of Dionysian worship. Whether or not this distinction is marked by a terminological device, to ignore it must result in a failure to understand Nietzsche. This often occurs when readers are eager to assimilate Nietzsche to a preconceived opinion or where commentators get carried away by their own jargon and ‘cause’. At present, the point is just to highlight that both Nietzsche’s Dionysianism and Christianity recognize an essential battle – a fight both of and for the respective faiths – between strength and weakness.

 

Classical Philosophy is for Nietzsche another ‘anti-life’ tradition. Socrates was afraid of life, and developed the ‘dialectic’ as an expedient for coping with life: instead of entering into life one theorized about it. Socrates, and then Plato, taught the weak how to look down on the strong. Together they founded a proto-Christian intellectual and ethical system which eventually merged with Christianity, achieving a reversal of ‘noble’ values; what in traditional aristocratic culture counted a good now counted as evil, what counted as wisdom was now foolishness. Nietzsche is not of course able to prove his claim that Christian-Platonic culture is a culture of weakness. But he relies on his rhetorical ability in depicting the alternative Dionysian-Zarathustrian values, and also, not to be underestimated, the already existing hostility, common in educated circles since the Renaissance, towards everything pre-modern. Nietzsche’s judgement on Christianity is not very different from Edward Gibbon’s. His impatience with Plato and Classical Philosophy generally is not very different from Francis Bacon’s. He is certainly more extreme than these authors, and his philosophical elucidations have a decidedly more radical intent. Bacon and Gibbon believed that pre-modern culture is a thing of the past, having given way to something much more satisfactory. Nietzsche is sure that modern culture is untenable due to the continuing but disguised rule of Christian-Platonic faith. Indeed he is sure that unless there occurs the most radical reorientation of faith in world history the human race is doomed.

 

Dionysianism and Christianity are faiths. So too, as Nietzsche says, is Socratism. But is the latter – which since Nietzsche takes it to determine the intellectual history of the West is better called Platonism – the kind of faith Nietzsche claims it to be? The Dionysian faith is oriented to Life, the Christian faith to the Judeo-Christian God. To what then is the faith of Platonism oriented? The answer is obvious: the faith not only of Platonism in the narrow sense of a particular school but of Classical Philosophy in general, is oriented to reason – not meaning rational theorizing so much as rational living. It is sometimes difficult for the modern secular mind to grasp what the Greek philosophers mean by reason. This is because, since about 1600, Western philosophy has for the most part operated with a truncated scientific conception of reason, as an instrument rather than an end. Francis Bacon said that the purpose of philosophy is ‘the relief of man’s estate’, by which he meant the material improvement of the human condition; reason, in his view, is the chief instrument to this purpose. Thomas Hobbes agreed, and the mainstream of modern philosophy down to the present has hardened in this view. Nietzsche himself declares that ‘reason is an instrument’.[4] Now since it would be absurd for a faith to be oriented to an instrument, however valuable, it must be, modern philosophers have concluded, that Classical Greek Philosophy misconceives the nature of reason, namely by superstitiously making it divine and worshipping it like a god. Indeed the Greek philosophers did view reason (logos) as divine, as God, as The Divine Principle; accordingly they saw the task of philosophy as bringing reason to rule in individual and society. Modern philosophers think this a superstitious idea, because reason neither is an end in itself nor can it determine ends. Nietzsche’s judgement on the faith of Classical Philosophy has this much in common with the mainstream: he believes it is oriented to something non-existent. He has the same view of the Christian faith. Of course he sees his own faith of Dionysianism differently, as oriented to a reality, the supreme reality he calls Life.

 

Nietzsche thinks that weakness in the face of Life is an obstacle to Dionysian faith, and that overcoming this obstacle is what Dionysianism is all about. Christians think in the same way about that weakness in the face of God they call sinfulness. It is the same with the faith of Classical Philosophy: weakness in the face of reason is the main obstacle to the philosophical faith. No theme is more prominent in the writings of the Greek philosophers than the ‘all too human’ resistance to reason: most people do not want to ‘be reasonable’ in the sense of making reason rule within them.[5] Now while Nietzsche is by no means fully consistent on this topic, the main thrust of his thought is to say that this resistance to reason, deplored by the Greek philosophers, is something positive, because what is resisted is an ‘anti-life’ ideology based on a fiction. Here Nietzsche recapitulates in his distinctive garb the sentiments of romanticism, particularly of Rousseau but also of many others in the great current of European romanticism from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, sentiments that have had a strong influence on Western culture through to the present. Nietzsche believes, exactly like Rousseau, that rationalistic culture has stifled the instincts, has held down, repressed and ‘slandered’ the real life-force of humans in favour of the fictional ideal of a higher life of reason. Like Rousseau, Nietzsche wants to see human beings who flow-out rather than hold-back. And he wants a culture that creates the flowing-out type of individual.

 

It is not difficult to see how Nietzsche’s Dionysian faith must look from the vantage points of Christian faith and (classical) philosophical faith. To a Christian it must look like an attempt to validate sinfulness, or simply as defiance, the ultimate blasphemy of calling on everyone to be their own god. The Platonist must see it as misology, that is hatred of reason motivated by love of the ego-self, the ‘lowest part of the soul’. These judgements, obviously, are not very different, which is why it was so easy for Christianity and Platonism to come together. What is important to notice, however, is that neither early Christianity nor Platonism looked with disfavour at the historical Dionysian cults as these existed through to the fourth century A. D. and beyond. The earliest literary source on these cults is The Bacchae of Euripides, written in the late fifth century B. C.; in this work it is traditional Greek conservatism that resists Dionysus. Plato did not take an oppositional attitude to Dionysus; there is no reason why he should have. In one major Dionysus myth, which Plato surely knew, Dionysus is the god who, after being killed and devoured by the wicked Titans and after Zeus in his rage (Dionysus was his son) reduced the Titans to the ashes from which the human race emerged, is the ‘divine fragment’ that remains in all human beings.[6] In fact Dionysus was more congenial to the Socratic-Platonic type of Greek philosopher than any other god, including in his persona as the god of exuberant life, ecstacy and madness.[7] So little did his affirmation of life disturb the ascetic Orphics that he was their leading deity. More than any other god he was associated with belief in an afterlife. The idea of a divine fragment or ‘spark’ in the human soul seems to have been taken from the Orphic Dionysus by the Pythagoreans and been passed, now understood as the faculty of reason, to Socrates and Plato, thence to Aristotle, the Stoics, Neoplatonists, and Neoplatonic Christianity. Naturally Christians cannot admit the divinity of Dionysus but in the early period and for most of the history of Christianity (puritan tendencies aside) they have been less offended by Dionysus than fascinated by him. Friedrich Hölderlin, the favourite poet of the young Nietzsche, in his late work associated Christ and Dionysus and on occasions identified them.[8] Richard Wagner was an enthusiast for Dionysus at the same time he was composing the text of his quasi-Christian Parsifal. His approval of Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy in The Birth of Tragedy did not stop Wagner’s drift towards Christianity.

 

Now strictly speaking there is no reason why Nietzsche should have been constrained by the character of the ancient Dionysian cults or the attitudes towards them of Greek philosophers and Christians. He is free to use the Dionysian symbolism in any way he wants, and to call his philosophy Dionysian without regard to the historical cults. The method of The Birth of Tragedy is typical of Nietzsche, for while he clearly thinks his ideas can be clarified by attending to the historical cults he does not discuss these in detail. He makes no use of historical sources, not even The Bacchae of Euripides. The point here is not one of scholarly rectitude but of the philosophical meaning of Dionysus. Euripides, recognized by Nietzsche as the most reflective of the Greek tragedians, believed the Dionysian cults to demonstrate something of importance in human life, but although The Bacchae would be a fitting context for exploring the meaning of life-affirmation, Nietzsche makes no use of this work, relying instead on his own polemical formulas. Other Greek sources, left undiscussed by Nietzsche, also bear on the issue. The most important is unquestionably Plato, from whom Nietzsche thinks to derive his picture of Socrates as an exemplary ‘life-denier’.

 

As mentioned, Plato is not hostile to Dionysus. But this does not go to the heart of the matter. In view of the fundamental antagonism Nietzsche posits between Dionysus and Socratic-Platonic philosophy it is worth noticing what Plato himself takes as his and Socrates’ chief adversary. This is plainly stated in practically all Plato’s works and can be taken as definitive for Greek philosophy as a whole (excepting of course the materialists): philosophy, considered as a way of life, is opposed to and by the life devoted to pleasure, money and honour; at a secondary level, considered as reflective wisdom, philosophy is opposed to and by sophistry, namely the pseudo-justification, in pseudo-wisdom, of the non-philosophical life. It is true, as Nietzsche says, that Plato makes lack of self-restraint, specifically inability and unwillingness to control impulses, a mark of the non-philosopher. However it does not seem right to identify this kind of ‘undisciplined’ person with the Dionysian type. Socrates was condemned by conventional respectable Athenians, just the same sort of people, to judge from Euripides, who were suspicious of Dionysus. Of the various anti-philosophical figures appearing in Plato’s dialogues the most striking is Callicles from the Gorgias, who, as has often been noted, rather resembles Nietzsche in claiming that philosophy is an expedient for the weak. The sphere in which Callicles lives, moves, and has his being, is the normal life of the city. His insistence that all mature competent people must be interested above all in power, money and pleasure, is not in the slightest suggestive of a Dionysian temper. Callicles is first of all a non-philosopher, thus he is worldly, but through his intellectual-sophistical defence of non-philosophy he is also an anti-philosopher. The worldliness of Callicles is world-affirmation, not life-affirmation in the Dionysian sense. The Dionysian individual, on the other hand, as revealed by the ancient sources and according to Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, is unworldly, not least because casting off individual identity for a mystical feeling of unity is the antithesis of what the worldly person desires.

 

It is a common error of romanticism to conflate the life of reason with civilized life, the person of reason with the fundamentally unimaginative philistine. Rousseau is the best example of this attitude but it is also found in Nietzsche. First as a student and then as a university professor Nietzsche developed a repugnance towards the common run of scholars who he believed had lost the spark of life in their orderly, methodical, laborious, scientific, ‘rational’ inquiry. There were exceptions, he admitted, like his friend Rohde and colleague Burckhardt, whose aesthetic sensibility proved they were more than scholars, but on the whole, he thought, contemporary European culture was crippled by theoreticism and intellectualism: the expansive emotional dimension of the mind was held down, because considered too dangerous to the safe predicable life recognized as civilization. Attacks on ‘lifeless’ scholars are frequent in Nietzsche’s writings and letters. His native suspicion and hostility to abstract intellectualism was reinforced when from 1865-66 he came under the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer. It would be unfair to say that Nietzsche confuses Socrates with the average nineteenth century German academic, but his sweeping condemnations of the rationalist tradition in philosophy as a protective shield for the weak do not distinguish an authentic from a corrupted life of reason. Nietzsche is not wrong to see the general culture of his day as moulded by the same type of rationalism that reigns in universities, but his constant insinuation that behind all this stands Socrates and Plato is remarkable. Probably, like many other moderns, Nietzsche fell into thinking of Classical Philosophy as partaking of the dogmatism of Christian theology and thus as supporting an intellectual culture of timid conformism. Doubtless the classical philosophers can be used in this way, as can any thinker, including Nietzsche. To stigmatize Socrates and Plato as lacking in ‘life’, however, is to stand the truth on its head, and is most readily intelligible as a rhetorical device for avoiding the issue. Nietzsche is quite right to represent ancient Dionysianism as an attack on ‘lifeless rationality’ but he seems not to realize that this kind of rationality can only be pseudo, which far from being promoted by Socrates and Plato is attacked by them.

 

A Dionysian society is difficult to imagine; likewise a steady Dionysian life-style. The ancient Greek cults existed to recognize and celebrate one side, the ‘irrational’ side, of human nature. In The Bacchae the chief issue is whether the divinity of Dionysus is going to be acknowledged by the city (Thebes); while the play certainly indicates that failure to do this must result in disaster, this is not the same as saying that man is at bottom irrational or that Socrates’ type of philosophy is invalid. Nietzsche makes Dionysianism mean more than it does in The Bacchae, and while he reads this embellished meaning back into the Greek cults this is not his primary interest. Above all it is the ‘tragic vision’ that Nietzsche sees as the philosophical heart of his Dionysianism. This vision reveals ‘the abyss’ that is ‘meaningless’ and ‘absurd’ but it also affords ‘the metaphysical consolation that life is at bottom, notwithstanding the constant flux of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable.’[9] The label ‘Dionysianism’ is shorthand; it is a clue to Nietzsche’s philosophical stance. Especially today does it seem difficult to find a non-arbitrary place from which to interpret and assess Nietzsche: the decay of recognized meaning and standards, of which Nietzsche spoke so much himself, seems to pull his own thought into the void, from which it can be rescued only by an act of will, intent on using Nietzsche in some way. Is there any alternative to conceding that Nietzsche, like every philosopher, belongs to whomever has the power to appropriate him? Is there any Archimedian standpoint from where one can look over and judge competing ‘worldviews’ and ‘philosophies’?

 

 

The Philosophy of Relativism

 

It must be admitted that there is indeed no ‘neutral’ point of view for interpreting and judging philosophers. However this admission is very likely to be misunderstood. The usual attitude in the present day is that there are many philosophies each of which is a point of view or perspective that can be judged from other points of view but not from a purportedly neutral ‘view from nowhere’, because such a thing cannot exist. To the question of whether this attitude is itself a point of view the normal response is to turn away in perplexity or impatience, but some recent Nietzscheans, notably Rorty, are prepared to say that while ‘perspectivism’ (to use this convenient term) is admittedly a point of view, they have no interest in justifying it and see no need to do so, but that they ‘affirm’ it politically; moreover Rorty and like-minded Nietzscheans see all their specific political causes as rooted in perspectivism and thus as themselves requiring no ‘justification’ beyond assent from those in the ‘perspectivist community’. Perhaps never before has a ‘philosophy’ (Rorty is not happy with this word for what he does) sealed itself in such protective armour as this. But although this position is certainly unassailable from a purportedly neutral (in fact non-neutral) ‘point of view’, it can be criticized by philosophy, namely by reason itself. Of course perspectivists would dismiss this suggestion, but at least on Rorty’s way of thinking it can only be politics that decides, not rational arguments. Philosophy, then, in the sense rejected by Rorty and other perspectivists, will itself reject perspectivism, including its politics, but will insist that this is not an essentially political rejection: it will reject perspectivism for being at odds with reason. This is what Plato and Aristotle did. But since in their treatment of this issue Plato and Aristotle assume the existence of and validity of reason, the perspectivists pay no attention to their arguments.

 

Although the problem of self-reference in relation to perspectivism quickly leads to bewildering complexities it is not intuitively difficult to comprehend. What requires ‘training’ of a particular sort is the conviction that it is not a real problem. At bottom, failure to admit the problem is just refusal to admit the authority of reason, a refusal not responsive to the counter-arguments of reason. Does Nietzsche, then, make this refusal? As observed above, he surely does, but in a sense quite different to that of the perspectivists. The difference is that the perspectivists refuse the authority of reason formally, by refusing authority itself, whereas Nietzsche refuses authority substantively, by refusing that which is held to be authoritative. To be sure, Nietzsche does deny the authoritative status of reason (thus of Classical Philosophy) as such. But when he inveighs against the metaphysical concepts of Being and Absolute Truth, when he speaks of the Death of God and the coming of nihilism, when he denounces the Platonic tradition as dogmatic, he is rejecting one particular type of authority. Speaking of the Christian god in The Antichrist, Nietzsche explains: ‘What sets us apart is not that we are unable to find God, either in history, or in nature, or behind nature, but that we regard what has been honoured as God, not as “godly” but as pitiable, as injurious; not as a mere error, but as a crime against life.’[10] Nietzsche’s self-confessed discipleship of the god Dionysus is enough to show that he does not reject authority as such; rather does Dionysianism as he understands it involve the divinization of ‘life’ such that refusal of its authority is the ultimate ‘crime’. Far from sharing the anti-authoritarian sentiment of the perspectivists (a larger group than the New Nietzscheans or Nietzscheans of any kind) Nietzsche is anti-anti-authoritarian; on many occasions he expresses contempt for anarchists, and in general for people who are incapable of or hate obedience.

 

The perspectivists (especially the New Nietzscheans) take authority itself, understood as an oppressive power with ‘the final word’, as the operative meaning of Classical Philosophy. In this way they gloss over the content of the tradition; they are always objecting to dogmatism (what they see as such) but pay scant attention to that which is dogmatically maintained. Derrida, for instance, in his criticism of Heidegger, has little or no interest in the actual content of Heidegger’s philosophy of Being but limits himself to castigating Heidegger’s ‘nostalgic’ search for a new ‘primary signified’. This is the rule with perspectivist commentators no matter what they discuss: once the presence of ‘essentialism’ (non-perspectivism) is exposed they see their work as done. Moreover since first-order critique gives way to meta-critique it is unnecessary to acquire knowledge of anything. This accounts for the sameness and airiness of this literature, with a small number of meta-critical points being constantly rehearsed in somewhat varying jargon; rounded interpretations of philosophers are not to be found, but meta-critical formulas are brought to bear at key pressure-points, resulting in ‘deconstructive’ dismissal.

 

It is not just the Christian god that Nietzsche finds ungodly, but the Platonic Good and more generally the morality affirmed in Classical Philosophy. Nietzsche’s objections, however, are substantive, revolving around the point that Christianity and Platonism cultivate weakness. This criticism would have very little meaning were it not for the authority that Nietzsche sees as residing in ‘life’, the divine authority of Dionysus. Nor can it be plausibly maintained (the expedient of perspectivist commentators) that ‘life’ in Nietzsche is synonymous with ‘diversity’, such that ‘weakness’ means ‘dogmatism’. Nietzsche thinks and says the opposite, namely that refusal of all authority (relativism) is the mark of the ‘weak personality’. Is it Nietzsche’s view, then, that the Platonist and the Christian, both of whom bow to authority, are weak in the same way as the modern relativist who denies all authority? This seems strange at first, but only until one realizes that for Nietzsche it is not authority as such that is pernicious, but the wrong authority (pseudo-authority). Nietzsche thinks substantively rather than formally, taking weakness as a primitive concept: the weak individual’s ‘recognition’ or ‘acceptance’ of authority is unreal, because it is merely a device, likewise is the relativist’s refusal of authority a device to mask weakness of will. As a matter of logic there can be no real acceptance of an authority that is not intrinsically authoritative. For Nietzsche, accordingly, since there is nothing authoritative except Dionysian ‘life’, the only true and real philosophy, the only authoritative philosophy, is Dionysianism (his own philosophy).

 

The term ‘perspectivism’ is usually applied to a tendency of post-1960’s academic philosophy and of Nietzsche-interpretation in particular; it was used by Nietzsche himself in his late period but with a meaning very different to the one that has become standard. In its normal usage nowadays, ‘perspectivism’ is a shamefaced and hesitant substitute for the word ‘relativism’. The issues around relativism and absolutism are very poorly understood in contemporary intellectual culture, because of failure to accept that these are exclusive alternatives: if one is not an absolutist one must be a relativist and vice-versa. The mainstream of modern philosophy, flowing from Bacon and Hobbes and including perspectivist Nietzscheans of all stripes, rejects absolutism and is therefore relativistic. This means, among other things, rejecting the idea of One True Philosophy, except for the Philosophy of Relativism (or Perspectivism) that says No to any purported absolutistic philosophy. Commentators on Nietzsche who adhere to this mainstream tendency (nearly all) should rule out Nietzsche’s Dionysianism as absolutistic, and many do, often with the claim that it is not the thought of the mature Nietzsche; or they acknowledge the Dionysian motif but take it to mean pluralism, in other words relativism or perspectivism.

 

Is the Philosophy of Relativism a faith? Surely it is, for like Christianity, Classical Philosophy, and Nietzsche’s Dionysianism, it is unprovable. Of course relativism is taught today in universities as if it were the conclusion of a long very complicated theorem proceeding from self-evident axioms; the clear intention of the ‘educators’ is that this theorem, discoverable from thousands of pages of abstruse ‘theory’, should confirm already existing intuitions of students who in most cases are one or two years out of secondary school. And it does confirm these intuitions, only, however, by students ‘believing’ the theorem rather than ‘following’ it, in particular believing the assurance that the theorem yields the indicated result. This is indeed a faith, albeit of a second-order kind. The primary faith, on the other hand, is expressed in the intuitions motivating educators and students alike: it is not a ‘view’ but an orientation of the will. Some relativists admit this, and are willing to dispense with the theorem, but the key question is what orientation of the will governs the faith of the Philosophy of Relativism. To this question different answers will be given by Classical Philosophy (that relativism signifies cowardly flight from Truth), Christianity (that relativism signifies cowardly flight from God), and Dionysianism (that relativism signifies cowardly flight from Life). What does the Philosophy of Relativism itself say about its faith? Just that it, not some other purportedly absolutistic-metaphysical philosophy, not even Dionysianism conceived absolutistically, is oriented to life – not to a fictitious Life spelled with a capital L, but to actual life in its ‘rich diversity’. By the same token, resistance to the Philosophy of Relativism is put down to ‘fear of diversity’.

 

If, then, there is no neutral way of discussing and assessing a philosopher or a type of philosophy, does this mean that the fundamentally different schools of philosophy can do nothing except recapituate, whether in self-explication or in critique of others, their respective faiths? Initially this seems to be the situation. Classical Philosophy declares that the Philosophy of Relativism is born from fear of Truth; in reply, the Philosophy of Relativism declares that Classical Philosophy is born from fear of diversity. But if this disagreement cannot be resolved from any neutral standpoint, this does not imply that one standpoint (or faith) is not superior to another or is even the authoritative standpoint. The Philosophy of Relativism, to be sure, is in an embarrassing situation, for while it insists upon itself it is not clear that it has the ‘right’ to do so. On the other hand Classical Philosophy, while also insisting on itself, and however much this insistence may be decried as dogmatic, is at least not contradicting itself in so doing. The same applies to the Christian faith and Nietzsche’s Dionysian faith: there does not seem to be in any logical difficulty when Christians insist on their Christianity, nor is it logically problematic when Nietzsche insists on his Dionysianism – not for everyone, admittedly, for he grants that many people are incapable of getting in touch with and ‘knowing’ Life, but for superior spirits, for the Masters and Supermen. Is any faith superior, however? If so which one? And how can one decide?

 

 

The Clash of Faiths

 

There are many writers and ‘thinkers’ today – latter day New Nietzscheans, post-New Nietzscheans, post-philosophers, post-Marxist theorists, post-poststructuralists, post-deconstructionists, radical cultural critics, anti-philosophers, media activists – who never stop attacking the ‘old’ philosophy. It is not just that this ‘old’ philosophy – Classical Philosophy essentially – obstructs their political objectives. Rather has the destruction of this ‘old’ philosophy itself bcome a prime political objective. To these people, even old-style leftist politics is offensive because of its reliance on the ‘old’ philosophy. A new kind of politics has arisen, which may be called  radical nihilism, or perhaps anti-philosophical radical nihilism as distinct from the conventional and almost staid nihilism of older days. By no means is all this a ‘passing fashion’; rather is it the latest and most extreme expression of the Philosophy of Relativism. It is true that not all who adhere to this philosophy gather at its sharp point, radical nihilism. There are ‘moderates’; there are those who, as Nietzsche put it, wish to be left alone in their ‘nook’. There are a large number of confused people who do not want to go ‘all the way’ to post-philosophy and who seek a middle position between ‘dogmatic metaphysics’ and the riot of nihilism; for a long time such people have been watching and waiting, but with every decade more of them are sucked into the riot. The direction of modern intellectuality today is seen with most relevance in such figures as Vattimo, Badiou and Slavoj Žižek: the all-consuming objective is ‘transgression’, to be pursued ever more resolutely, even when linking up with the Communist Party and looking sympathetically at Mao and Stalin.[11] As Nietzsche said of the anarchists of his own time, these are radical nihilists intoxicated with lust to destroy: theymust destroy, because what exists, all existence, all Being, outrages and provokes them’.[12] There is a logic to the present situation: the drive for total critique, to be expressed in total destruction, crystallizes around an attack on philosophy in its classical meaning, an attack precisely on Truth and Being. The problem of authority crystallizes around the problem of philosophy.

 

The reigning image of Nietzsche today is as the spiritual father of this movement of total critique and destruction. This image is as valid, however, as the Philosophy of Relativism that manufactures it. A different conception of the nature of philosophy will yield a different image of Nietzsche. There is of course no point in denying that Nietzsche’s thought is implicated in the Philosophy of Relativism; this is because he never quite frees himself from the scientific worldview. Nietzsche’s Dionysianism, however, which is absolutistic, is much more central to his thought than his celebrated ‘perspectivism’. And there are other features of his thought that cannot be reconciled with the Philosophy of Relativism. Walter Kaufmann, no friend to either Christianity or Platonism and ultimately an advocate for ‘diversity’, declared that Nietzsche ‘was a fanatical seeker after truth and recognized no virtue above intellectual integrity’.[13] It is not uncommon for those promoting a ‘perspectivist’ Nietzsche to acknowledge that at least his language often suggests support for classical philosophical values, indeed even for religious values unacceptable to the Philosophy of Relativism. Sometimes this is put down to the sheer psychological difficulty of overcoming all at once two thousand years of prejudice – Nietzsche is still ‘all too human’ and not a Superman. Or, following Kaufmann, ‘respect’ for ‘Socratic’ and Christian values is made to fit a Nietzschean ethic of ‘sublimated’ impulses.[14]

 

Perhaps, however, the presence in Nietzsche’s writings of apparently positive feelings towards Classical Philosophy does not have to be explained away but can be admitted as indicative of his real philosophical drive. Of course this is not something that the Philosophy of Relativism (to which Kaufmann too belongs) can acknowledge. Since Nietzsche speaks so much against Classical Philosophy, since his ‘experiment with the truth’ is obviously moved by hostility towards Classical Philosophy, and since the Philosophy of Relativism in any case dominates the modern mind, few commentators have been inclined to align Nietzsche with Plato and Aristotle or even Socrates; the assumption, rather, is that dubious tendencies in Nietzsche, which seem contrary to the Philosophy of Relativism, must be somehow accommodated to the main line of his thought or must be set aside as anomalies. If on the other hand Nietzsche is seen from the point of view of Classical Philosophy, and these dubious tendencies affirmed as authentic, it will nevertheless be impossible to deny that he also rejects Classical Philosophy. How then will Nietzsche be understood? Is it not necessary, after all, to in some way eliminate or sideline one pole of the contradiction? How can Nietzsche be said to offer a ‘teaching’ if his ideas are contradictory?

 

In addressing these questions one must avoid being confused by the popular (in New Nietzscheanism) sophistical solution that says contradictions do not matter in a transgressive thinker like Nietzsche. Secondary doctrinal and verbal contradictions, to be sure, are usually not problematic, or may be of positive value for indicating complexities and qualifications which an author has not tidied up. Nietzsche is right to say that preoccupation with external system and consistency is a mark of superficial thinkers.[15] There are, however, contradictions in Nietzsche that go to the heart of his conception of philosophy insofar as they pertain to the faith governing his thought. Sometimes it seems that Nietzsche’s Dionysian faith in life (Life) is what moves him; for the most part he seems to think this himself. On other occasions it looks as if he is moved by the classical philosophical faith in the divinity of truth (Truth). Then again, and this is what relativistic philosophers take as Nietzsche’s creative side, he often appears to have faith only in the abyss or in this together with his own self-asserting self. If these are not secondary superficial contradictions they should not be treated, after the manner of Kaufmann and many others, as obstacles to be dealt with in order to pass on to a coherent account of ‘Nietzsche’s teachings’, but must be recognized as belonging to and defining the substance of his thought.

 

Especially in The Birth of Tragedy does Nietzsche come across as expressing a faith rather than setting forth a teaching. Thus Spake Zarathustra is similar in this respect, but is marred by Nietzsche’s delusion that he has a ‘secret teaching’ to communicate, namely the eternal recurrence of the same. The Birth of Tragedy has nothing to teach except life itself – the work’s ‘aesthetic doctrines’ are secondary and of little interest in themselves, for which reason Nietzsche rarely mentions them in his later writings. When he was composing this book Nietzsche felt confirmed in the same faith as his newfound inspirational friend Richard Wagner – an artist. Yet Nietzsche never understood his Wagnerianism in an ‘aesthetic sense’. For a while he believed – he later came to think he was wrong in this – that he and Wagner shared something hardly communicable in words, namely the Dionysian faith in ‘indestructible life’, more particularly in the redemptive significance of affirming life despite its pitiless indifference to the individual. When Nietzsche turned away from Wagner, this was not due to a loss of faith on Nietzsche’s part, but because Nietzsche thought Wagner had lost his faith, or had never had it in the first place. Coming to this view was for Nietzsche a highly traumatic experience, and it made him suspicious also of himself, even of his own Dionysian faith. The term ‘Dionysian’ vanished from his vocabulary for a decade, while in Human, All Too Human, written while in the process of cutting himself adrift from Wagner, he lauched an attack on ‘superstitious’ metaphysics and religion with apparent application to his own recent self. But in fact Nietzsche never abandoned his Dionysian faith, returning to it implicitly in Thus Spake Zarathustra before re-adopting the vocabulary in his final productive years (1886-88). Until the end, nevertheless, Nietzsche felt conflicted about his Dionysianism, particularly about whether he was ‘deifying after the old manner this monster of an unknown world’.[16] He was conflicted, but his intuitions in favour of Dionysus won out, and he stepped over into insanity declaiming ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified One’.

 

Until three months before his mental collapse Nietzsche was still hoping to complete a treatise ‘The Will to Power’ which would set forth his ‘teachings’ in a systematic way. He finally gave up the idea, but his interest in this project says something about his confusion as to whether he needed to ‘ground’ his philosophy. In fact his worries on this score go back to the time he was working on The Birth of Tragedy, and are reflected in that book by his appeals to Kant and Schopenhauer. They are worries that are not peculiar to Nietzsche. Prior to his collapse he had few readers, but many of these were looking and waiting for ‘proofs’ of a sort. Even today many commentators on Nietzsche believe that ‘proofs’ and ‘arguments’ are to be found in his works. They are right, however, only in respect of secondary matters. There can be no proof of Nietzsche’s fundamental philosophical position, because it amounts to a faith. There can be no proof of Dionysianism, no more than of Platonism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, or the Philosophy of Relativism. But Nietzsche wavered in his faith. At all costs, and despite his contempt for the culture around him, he was intent on being a modern thinker. As a trained philologist he believed in rigorous scientific method, but it was the scientific worldview that made a claim on his intellectual conscience he could not ignore. In Human, All Too Human he replaced Dionysian faith with faith in science. Or almost did so, for he continued to waver. On the one hand he felt that the scientific worldview required an unequivocal rejection of metaphysics and religion, while on the other hand – as he repeatedly confessed in Human, All Too Human – he felt that the forfeiture of metaphysics and religion could only damage what was ‘best’ in human beings. This conflict, or tension in fundamental orientation, Nietzsche never resolved or even thematized in his writings; he evidently felt he could not resolve it, and so he pressed on, guided by his intuitions, relying always on ad hoc measures to keep his philosophy in one piece.  

 

From his school years onwards Nietzsche’s powerful artistic drive and philosophical reflectiveness co-existed with an austere scientific conscience. Even within the ‘dry’ discipline of classical philology which he made his profession, he chose, already as a student, limited and technical inquiries, priding himself on rigorous method. Indeed he admits, in an early fragment, that he gave himself so seriously to philology because it was ‘a counterweight to my restless and changeable inclinations, a discipline that could be pursued with cool sobriety, logical coldness, regular steady work, without its results seizing my heart’.[17] A major influence on the young Nietzsche was Friedrich Albert Lange’s History of Materialism, which he discovered as a student in 1866. The positivist Lange had a negative view of metaphysics and religion, but he allowed that these could serve an edifying or elevating function somewhat as poetry. Nietzsche, who had recently become a devotee of Schopenhauer, especially of his ascetic ethical vision, was seeking a way of defending the latter in the face of scientific scepticism. He thought he had found it in Lange’s idea of poetizing edification, and in a letter to his friend Paul Deussen in April 1868 he sums up the point of view he had now made his own: ‘The realm of metaphysics, thus the province of “absolute truth”, has definitely been assigned a status alongside poetry and religion. Whoever wants to know something must now be content with a conscious relativity of knowledge – just like all respectable researchers into nature. For some, metaphysics belongs in the realm of emotional needs, essentially as edification. Or it is art, namely as the poetry of concepts. What is certain is that metaphysics, whether as religion or art, has nothing to do with so-called “true beings in themselves”.’ This is Nietzsche’s earliest allusion to the ‘relativity of knowledge’, and defines pretty accurately the position he will hold until the end. But everything depends on what is meant by ‘knowledge’. In The Birth of Tragedy he speaks of how the Dionysian state of mind, that is to say a state of mind very different to that of ‘all respectable researchers into nature’, attains ‘true knowledge, an insight into the terrible truth’.[18] This is not an attitude Lange, or any other mainstream positivist (anti-metaphysician) could possibly endorse. Nor, as was shown in Chapter One above, is it a position just of the ‘early Nietzsche’: rather do his positivism and his ‘metaphysics’ – if this is the right term for a Dionysianism that achieves ‘true knowledge’ – co-exist in Nietzsche’s thought in tension.

 

Positivism and the Philosophy of Relativism are at bottom the same thing. Sometimes this is not understood, because positivism is too closely associated with its early exponents such as Comte and John Stuart Mill. The idea of a scientific worldview is also too narrowly conceived, as if it were determined by the natural sciences alone. In Comte it is sociology that becomes the successor discipline to metaphysics, providing a theory of the sciences and their social function. Comte, who was more a synthesizer than a creative thinker, has been called the founder of modern sociology, but has an equal claim to the title of founder of the modern Philosophy of Relativism. Nietzsche is obviously different from Comte in many respects, especially by his lack of belief in a ‘religion of humanity’ guided by science.[19] And there is no reason to think Nietzsche was directly influenced by Comte’s writings. Nevertheless there is a side to Nietzsche very much akin to the spirit of Comte and of modern positivism generally. In the first place Nietzsche rejects (and had done since his schooldays) any kind of transcendental religion or metaphysics: precisely this is the fundamental meaning of his ‘materialism’ and scientific worldview, Lange having convinced him that old-style metaphysical materialism (Democritus, even Hobbes) is a doctrine without scientific import (thus an empty doctrine). Secondly, like Comte and mainstream positivism to the present day, Nietzsche puts historical, sociological and psychological inquiry in place of Classical Philosophy, notably in the field of ethics. It is a very common misconception to see in this positivist side of Nietzsche his chief significance as a philosopher, for instance by his ‘explanation’ of morality in terms of ‘will to power’ rather than by theological or metaphysical postulates. This is a misunderstanding into which Nietzsche falls himself when he becomes frightened by the spectre of his own ‘metaphysical’ Dionysianism, but especially have many of his commentators taken him this way, putting him next to Darwin, Marx and Freud as a ‘master of suspicion’ who ‘deflates’ the religio-metaphysical picture of man.

 

Darwin, Marx and Freud, however, do not and cannot ‘deflate’ the traditional picture of man by their specialized scientific research in biology, economics and psychology respectively. On the contrary, it is only by extrapolating from their special scientific domains that they have anything to say on philosophical topics, more particularly on morality. There is no inconsistency between either religion or metaphysics on the one hand and the scientific content of Darwinism or Marxism or Freudianism on the other hand. But the extrapolation is often made, not just from these but from many branches of science, to the effect that religion and metaphysics are untenable ‘views’. What does it mean, then, when Nietzsche’s ‘view’ of morality in Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals is taken as a demystifying ‘explanation’ and contrasted with the ‘views’ of religion and metaphysics? It is not difficult to see that Nietzsche begins by assuming the untenability of transcendental religion and metaphysics. Is he not offering, then, another materialist-secularist ‘theory of morality’ of the same general type as those of his despised British moralists, with the difference that he denies the essential ‘kindliness’ of human nature? And if this is what he is doing, what can decide on the ‘tenability’ or otherwise of Nietzsche’s ‘view’? Is it ‘objective science’ that Nietzsche is trying to put in place of religion and metaphysics? Can his ‘findings’ be assessed according to rigorous methodological norms as in physics, chemistry and biology? If this is not the case why is Nietzsche’s ‘view’ compelling? Moreover why do many recent proponents of the Philosophy of Relativism favour Nietzsche’s ‘view’ of morality above all others?

 

Nietzsche’s ‘view’ on morality is found compelling when it is understood to confirm a pre-existing faith, meaning reinforcing rather than validating that faith. But what faith is this? For Nietzsche himself, notwithstanding his hesitations and worries about falling into ‘metaphysics’, it is his Dionysian faith in ‘indestructible life’ that is expressed and confirmed in his statements on morality. Not all Nietzsche’s admirers and commentators understand him in this way however. Walter Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche should be understood as an empirical scientist, who from his ‘observations’ ‘discovered’ the will to power as the ‘force which underlies all human activities’.[20] In the end this amounts to relativism: Nietzsche’s ideal is supposedly a willing of free-thinking, which willing, determined by the will to power, has superior value by being a ‘higher level’ of power. Contrary to Kaufmann’s assertion, the will to power does not overcome relativism by providing a standard for moral value: in the first place it is an indeterminate concept that can be used to produce any result one wants – Hitler and Napoleon are weak, Goethe is strong – while in the second place it cannot be a standard for morality anyway, because a ‘force’ is not something ‘willed’, and only an object of will can be a moral ideal.[21] The guiding thread in all Kaufmann’s writings is his hostility to transcendental religion and metaphysics, but in trying to ‘overcome’ these he makes do with exceptionally weak arguments: he takes it as more or less established that the ‘will to power’ is the ruling force of human psychological life, and then, following a few declarations by Nietzsche, he is prepared to generalize this ill-defined doctrine in hyper-speculative fashion to the universe. He notices signs in Nietzsche of faith in the classical ideal of reason, such that reason clashes with naturalistic ‘power’, but insists that this pertains to his early writings, and that by the time of Zarathustra Nietzsche is on the way to resolving ‘dualism’ through a ‘monism’ of ‘will to power’ in which there are no longer opposing principles but rather different ‘levels’ of power. As for Nietzsche’s Dionysian faith, Kaufmann sees this simply as a psychological state: it is not a faith in any reality but the ‘power’ to say Yes to whatever life brings.[22] But while Kaufmann offers words on Nietzsche rather than thoughts, the point is that his words serve a cause, namely the faith underlying the Philosophy of Relativism: the faith in diversity as the prime and even the only value in a meaningless world.[23]

 

An interesting – albeit flawed – attempt to reconcile relativism and the Dionysianism of Nietzsche is by Raoul Richter in his 1902-03 lectures at the University of Leipzig. Unlike Kaufmann, Richter puts free willing rather than determined willing (by the will to power as ‘force’) at the centre of Nietzsche’s faith in life. The profound insight behind Nietzsche’s philosophy, according to Richter, is that values are not objective facts but are created, that is to say willed, which ‘discovery’ gives Nietzsche a license for his posture as a rhetorician, poet and prophet.[24] As inevitably occurs, however, when avowed relativists try to take seriously any kind of moral willing, Richter is caught in a practical contradiction: there is no transcendental imperative, he says, to say Yes to life (the essence of Nietzsche’s moral willing), yet to do anything else is to turn one’s back on reality. In what sense, then, is there no imperative here? Surely the relativity of reality is not proved by anybody failing to acknowledge reality or look it in the face. And if Nietzsche’s moral willing is simply – as Nietzsche himself says – the willing of reality, is the value of this willing, as opposed to turning one’s back on reality and dreaming of another world, created by Nietzsche or by whomever so wills? In Christianity, the supreme value of love of God is not created in the actual loving of God but belongs to the recognition (knowledge) of God in the first place: one knows God only in the love of God. The same logic holds in the Dionysianism of Nietzsche (and also apparently in ancient Dionysianism): one knows ‘indestructible life’ only in the willing of it, that is in the loving of it. Of course Nietzsche does not think that somebody who turns away from life has absolutely no awareness of life, an obvious absurdity. For Nietzsche, life simply is: it is reality itself. Only by facing it, however, and in so doing loving it, does one genuinely know it. The parallels with the Christian love of God are clear and it is logical that they should be, for Nietzsche sees Dionysianism as a substitute for Christianity.  

 

Richter is right to stress that for Nietzsche Dionysian morality is not for everybody. Indeed Nietzsche does not want it to be a ‘universal faith’. The majority of human beings, according to Nietzsche, are incapable of facing life in the Dionysian spirit, which circumstance is even beneficial for the superior few who are served by those of servile spirit – the ‘slaves’ adhering to ‘slave morality’. There are admittedly some complexities in Nietzsche’s ideas on slave and master morality: it is not good for the masters when the slaves rebel, and it is disastrous when slave morality comes to infect the master class, as Nietzsche says has happened in Western culture. It remains true that Nietzsche’s prime aim, which is the elevation of the human race, can in his view come about solely through the strengthening of an elite whose Dionysian willing is the willing of reality as opposed to the willing of a fictitious other world (the flight from reality). Clearly this is very different to the affirmation of ‘diversity’ in the sense of egalitarian relativism. The last resort of the Nietzschean champions of ‘diversity’, which is to make ‘strength’ synonymous with ‘affirmation of diversity’ and even with Dionysianism as such, is actually the antithesis of Nietzsche’s attitude: it is the weak, he says, who invert the values of strength and weakness and celebrate the inability to judge as the highest wisdom.[25]

 

The opposition between Nietzsche’s Dionysianism and Christianity is a clash of faiths between which no reconciliation is possible. It would for instance be no use offering Nietzsche evidence that Christianity does in fact ‘affirm life’. He could not admit it, for the vision upon which his Dionysianism is based is of the meaningless ‘abyss’. Nietzsche’s many descriptions and explanations of Christian ‘life-denial’ flow out of his original decision; by no means are they ‘neutral’ sociological, psychological, or historical observations that support his judgement on Christianity. By the same token there is an irreconcilable clash between Nietzsche’s Dionysianism and the Philosophy of Relativism: what for Nietzsche is the vision can for the Philosophy of Relativism be nothing except a different vision, one among many. How can it be, however, that where Nietzsche sees Dionysian life the Philosophers of Relativism see Nothingness, and that where Nietzsche feels an all-powerful exhilarating surge the Philosophers of Relativism feel a vacant space to be filled by arbitrary ‘diverse’ values? And why has the Philosophy of Relativism taken over Nietzsche-reception?

 

 

Nietzsche’s Battle With Philosophy Classically Conceived

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


[1] To be sure, there are some schools of modern philosophy that do not believe its business is to produce views (knowledge on the model of the sciences) – for instance, in the twentieth century, the so-called ‘logical empiricists’ and the ‘ordinary language’ movement inspired by Wittgenstein. In these cases, however, the intention is a deflation of philosophy vis-à-vis science: philosophy is to assist science, or  remove obstacles to reliable knowledge. The Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy (following the later Wittgenstein) is that, correctly understood, philosophy ‘leaves everything as it is’. There are also those who say that philosophy is oriented to action rather than theory. On close examination, however, all this means is that theory should be put to use, or that practical problems should determine how one theorizes; in Marxism, neo-Marxism, and other ideologies on the left and right, philosophy becomes the intellectual handmaid of politics.

[2] Z ‘Prologue’ no. 3.

[3] TI ‘Expeditions of an Untimely Man’ no. 49 (speaking of Goethe, who normally, however, Nietzsche does not call a Dionysian spirit): ‘Such an emancipated spirit stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that in the totality all is redeemed and affirmed – he no longer negates. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptised it with the name of Dionysus.’

[4] BGE no. 191.

[5] E. g. Aristotle, Politics 1319b 30: ‘Most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner’ (Jowett translation).

[6] Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 14-15.

[7] ‘Dionysiac worship was emphatically one of several influences which assisted some of the best minds in fifth- and fourth-century Greece towards a new conception of the human soul in which its immortality played an essential part’ (W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods, 180).

[8] Baeumer, ‘Dionysos und das Dionysiche bei Hölderlin’, 103; Baeumer, ‘Das Moderne Phänomen des Dionysichen’, 137.

[9] BT no. 7.

[10] AC no. 47. In quoting this passage Walter Kaufmann, an atheist highly favourable towards Nietzsche, writes (Nietzsche, 80): ‘Nietzsche is in revolt against the Christian God and the state of mind and the moral attitude which seem to him inseparably connected with the Christian faith.’

[11] Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 264.

[12] GS no. 370.

[13] Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 15.

[14] Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 200-201.

[15] Of course this point should not be itself taken simplistically and mechanically, to mean, for instance, that Immanuel Kant must be a superficial thinker because of his concern with the ‘architechtonic’ of his system of critical philosophy. Kant’s philosophical achievement is so great that it is impossible to say that his ‘system’ got in the way of substantive thought;  many secondary contradictions exist in his works, most of which are helpful in understanding him.

[16] GS no. 374 (see Chapter One above).

[17] KGW I 5: 42 & 53. (CHECK THIS)

[18] BT no. 7

[19] In some aphorisms of Human, All Too Human, however, Nietzsche comes close to Comte

[20] Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 157, 158, 165 (and Chapter 6 as a whole).

[21] Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 172.

[22] Kaufmann, Nietzsche, 247, 281.

[23] Kaufmann ends his 1959 essay ‘The Faith of a Heretic’ on the following note (162-63): ‘I do not believe in any afterlife any more than the prophets did, but I don’t mind living in a world in which people have different beliefs. Diversity helps to prevent stagnation and smugness; and a teacher should acquaint his students with diversity and prize careful criticism far above agreement. His noblest duty is to lead others to think for themselves.’

[24] Richter, Friedrich Nietzsche, 209.

[25] See especially the way Nietzsche links relativism and the ‘weak personality’ in HL.

SCENE: THE BREAKFAST TABLE AT FRAU SCHOPENHAUER’S HOUSE, WEIMAR

SCENE: THE BREAKFAST TABLE AT FRAU SCHOPENHAUER’S HOUSE, WEIMAR

conversation between Schopenhauer and his mother

 

Schopenhauer (calm):

You’ll be glad to know, mother, that I have booked on the Friday coach for Berlin. That’s only another three days for us to put up with each other. I assure you I won’t be back in a hurry.

 

Mother (mild annoyance):

That’s for the best Arthur. You know that I will always make you welcome, but you’re very trying. I really think you should show me a bit more consideration. Sometimes I think you’re quite mad, but then I know your behaviour is deliberate. You just want to spoil things for me. I wish you could just keep your opinions to yourself a bit more and not interfere in my life.

 

Schopenhauer (calm):

I don’t want to interfer with you, mother. I have not done anything to interfere. If you mean the events of last night …

 

Mother (buts in, annoyed):

Of course I mean last night. Your behaviour was outrageous, you put everybody out of sorts. And I had planned that dinner for a month. You should feel honoured to be in such company, Arthur, but instead you feel quite entitled to badger and reproach everyone. Who do you think you are?

 

Schopenhauer (defensive):

You take everything personally, mother, that’s typical. Nobody was offended last night. At least nobody should have been offended.

 

Mother (annoyed):

Rubbish. That’s what you would like to think. Why did they leave early? Didn’t you see that Goethe was upset. And quite understandably, when you spend half an hour insulting a good friend of his.

 

Schopenhauer (stern, serious):

You know quite well mother, how much I respect Goethe. And he respects me. We have spent many hours conversing about important things, not about nonsense. It is only out of respect to Goethe that I said what I did about that charlatan Hegel.

 

Mother (excited):

You call him a charlatan! The most respected professor of philosophy in Germany! You know Goethe admires him. You know that he has dined at Goethe’s and that they correspond. You were just uncouth! I suspect you are just envious of Hegel, as you are of me.

 

Schopenhauer (annoyed):

That’s typical of you, mother. With you everything comes back to petty vanities, you don’t understand anything else.

 

Mother (superior tone):

Oh here you go with your superior tone again. I don’t believe that you are quite so free of vanity as you make out. You were quite put out by your failure against Professor Hegel in Berlin, were you not? What presumption it was scheduling your lectures against his! You with three students, Hegel with two hundred! It serves you right for your arrogance. You have never forgiven him for that.

 

Schopenhauer (confident):

The mob always perfers charlatans to the real thing – that did not upset me at all. The day will come when I’ll put Hegel and his ilk in the shade. By the way, I’m doing it again this coming winter, I’m running my lectures at the same hour as his. That’s just to show that I don’t care at all.

 

Mother (emotional):

You! You are not even a professor! You only get tuition fees. You get above yourself Arthur. You make a fool of yourself and you are an embarrassment to me. How am I to put things right with Goethe? Tell me that.

 

Schopenhauer (confident):

There’s nothing to put right. Why don’t you just think about what I was saying last night and not about etiquette all the time? But then you’re not capable of serious thought are you? With all that rubbish you write you quite expose your shallowness. It is me who is embarrassed to have such a scribbler as my mother.

 

Mother (superior tone):

It’s just envy, I know it Arthur. I sell twenty times as many of my books as you do of yours! And it brings me a nice income if I may say so. You couldn’t even exist if it was not for your inheritance! You are quite incapable of making money.

 

Schopenhauer (annoyed):

I wouldn’t mention the inheritance if I were you, mother. You got most of it yourself, totally without deserving it. Father slaved away for twenty-five years for you, and what were you doing all the time? On the social circuit , that’s where you were. And now you’re just wasting what he left you. I have put my inheritance to good use – in the service of philosophy. But you and everything you write will be forgotten fifty years from now.

 

Mother (self-justifying):

And you won’t be I suppose! Look Arthur, why don’t you just content yourself with an ordinary life, instead of chasing fantasies. There’s plenty of scope for happiness in the kind of life I lead, or my friends here in Weimar. Why we have such pleasant dinners – except when you are present – and wonderful excursions, and we’re always at the theatre. What a privilege it is to be at the centre of German culture, and to have Goethe in my house!

 

Schopenhauer (confident & annoyed):

You call it happiness, but actually it’s misery. You’re just deluded mother. You’re chasing a mirage. Look, you can’t bear to be alone for just one day, you’re always running off to some tea party or trying to get yourself invited to Goethe’s. And your constant card-playing! That just proves your emptiness! Can’t you give some time to reflection? The most you do is your wretched scribbling. My mother an author of cheap romance novels! If only father could see what has become of you! Really your only happiness is thinking about what your next novel will bring in. And it’s never enough, not with your lifestyle.

 

Mother (stern):

People have a right to happiness, Arthur. You just can’t accept that. You’re just depressed and negative. Don’t talk to me of your philosophical pessimism! Hegel is a philosopher and he’s not a pessimist!

 

Schopenhauer (confident):

Because he’s just a charlatan, a fraud and nothing more. He plays up to the public and fools them with his incomprehensible language. As for happiness, mother, you don’t continue to live because you are happy. The will to live is within you as an inborn drive; you just make up reasons afterwards to convince yourself that the whole thing is worth it. If you were to take a balance of happiness or suffering in your life, it would come out the wrong way. You cannot help but live, and that’s all the worse for you.

 

Mother (emotional):

Oh yes, I know all that, I’ve heard it all before! “It would be better not to be!”. What a philosophy! And you think to become immortal through that teaching! If people followed your advice, they would all go out and hang themselves. The human race hangs itself and thus triumphs the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Your father would turn in his grave! Or he would die again laughing!

 

 

 

Schopenhauer (confident):

I only say my philosophy is true, mother, not that it is pleasant, especially for ears like yours. Besides, I don’t say that everyone should hang themselves – that’s unnatural. Most people would be better off dead, that’s what I say, or they would be better off if they had never been born, that’s more to the point. But happiness is possible, only not in the way you think. Do you want proof? Well just look at yourself. You’ve tried your way for more than fifty years and you’re still miserable!

 

Mother (angry):

No I’m not! How dare you Arthur, to tell me whether I’m happy! The main thing that makes me unhappy is you. But at least you will be out of my way on Friday.

 

Schopenhauer (serious):

People don’t know whether or not they’re happy. That’s the will to life. What would become of life if people were able to objectively decide on whether they were happy, and then act accordingly? Most people would hang themselves. But life has given people little delusions, little hopes and mirages and little stupidities, just so they don’t throw in the game. What a miserable thing hope is! How many people have been kept going by hope, only to see everthing come to naught. Hope must be the gift of the devil, certainly not of God!

 

Mother (disbelieving, shaking head):

And God’s gift is the hangman’s noose I suppose. Praise the Lord, for he is the good hangman! What rubbish Arthur! Not so long ago you would have ended up on the scaffold yourself for that kind of talk!

 

Schopenhauer (confident):

There is another way out mother, besides the hangman’s noose. We can kill off our egos instead of our bodily selves. You know what I say about that – it’s the same as the old wisdom of India. But then you can’t understand any of that can you? And that’s because you’re pure ego. To give up all your vanities would be equivalent to death for you.

 

Mother (worn out):

You call everything vanity, Arthur. For my part I don’t relish a life sitting cross legged and staring at my navel. What rubbish! What does it prove if you walk over hot coals? Or spend thirty years without uttering a word to anyone. That’s just madness.

 

Schopenhauer (frustrated):

You’re distorting what I say, mother, and you are insulting the sages of the East. You are not qualified to comment, you’re just an ignoramus. It’s not a matter of cross leggedness and hot coals, but of contemplation and meditation. It’s a matter of detachment. It’s a matter of killing off the hungry ego with all its desires. You don’t have to be an Indian to do this. And you don’t have to do it in an Indian way. Plato achieved something like this. You can achieve this kind of state by philosophical contemplation, and also by the contemplation of beauty. It’s all about not being a slave to the passions and desires.

 

Mother (jumping in):

Ha! Passions and desires! I remind you Arthur of the maidservant at your prior Berlin lodgings. If I were you I would not get on a high horse about such things. I don’t like to dwell on that unsavoury affair, but you force me.

 

Schopenhauer (angry):

Enough of that mother! Have you no shame? I am not a character in one of your rubbishy romances.  I admit to an occasional weakness. What of it? It’s besides the point.

 

Mother (smugly):

Yes let’s not speak of it Arthur. It makes you look too ridiculous I agree. But the thing is, you like good food and wine too, isn’t that so? And you hardly live in a hovel. You take lunch at the English Club every day. You go to the theatre. So I say you’re a bit of a hypocrite.

 

 

Schopenhauer (irritated):

You miss the point mother. That comes from too much time immersed in romance novels and similar trash. I don’t live for food or drink. It doesn’t matter if you don’t live like an Indian ascetic. That’s not the point. All those things – food, drink, and if you insist the other thing as well – are just means, not ends, just necessaries for life. I live for philosophy and that’s why in the end what I do is worth something and will be worth something to coming generations. But you just cater to people’s lower instincts with your romances and your parties and gossip and card-playing, and so you will not be anything in future times.

 

Mother (persistent):

Oh Arthur, you talk about lower instincts as if you didn’t have any! What about your temper! You’re still paying that other woman off, aren’t you? Because of your temper tantrum. Really – throwing her down the stairs like that! Well at least its costing you.

 

Schopenhauer (fed up):

What are you getting at mother? You know that’s all a fraud. Or you should know, if you trusted your son more than those scheming lawyers in Berlin. Why only the other day that terrible woman was seen scurrying around the central markets. She is fit enough for athletics, I’ll tell you that! And then she turns up hobbling to her doctors and lawyers. I never pushed her down any stairs; there are no witnesses to say I did. The court just took her word for it and its all because of those wretched lawyers. She set the whole thing up when she found out I had money. To think that I have to pay her compensation for so many years! It’s outrageous. But at least it confirms my philosophy, which says that most people are mean and dishonest.

 

Mother (after short hesitation, breathes out):

I just want you to apologize to Goethe. Really you should apologize to them all. I hardly think it is good behaviour, Arthur, to lecture my dinner guests about how life is not worth living and how they are all so miserable. Just go to Goethe’s and apologize. Be sure to do it before you leave for Berlin.

 

Schopenhauer (exasperated):

Really, mother, what are you worried about? Are you afraid Goethe won’t come next time you invite him? I must say I can’t understand why he bothers to come at all. But he’s too serious to have taken offense at what I said. Actually I’m seeing him tomorrow, but we won’t be discussing your little worries. He has agreed to talk over some points of my philosophy.

 

Mother (somewhat reassured):

Well let’s hope you get through that meeting without insulting him or his friends, that’s all I can say. You might mention I am having a card evening next Sunday, gentlemen are invited, I’m also reopening our billiards room. The magistrate has already promised to come with his wife. And the parson too, he’s broadminded enough for cards. He has such an elegant wife. She was educated in France, you know.

 

Schopenhauer (stubborn):

Don’t involve me in all that. Send one of the servants around with the invitation. We’re discussing serious things.

 

Mother (tired, exasperated):

Someone like you, Arthur, will never make good. When people know what you’re like they don’t want to read your books.

 

Schopenhauer (proudly):

They will read me when I am dead. I’m one of those posthumous people, who only come to life when they are dead.

 

Mother (dismissive):

Well let posterity judge that. I’m sure nobody will have heard of you, in, say, the year 2000. But people will still be reading my novels then ….

 

(suddenly, starting up, hearing noise outside the house, getting up)

Oh I hear the carriage outside – that must be the ladies, we have an excursion today

 

Schopenhauer (smugly):

Enjoy yourself mother, if you can!

 

 

 

End

 

 

 

 

 

The Idea of Philosophy I

The Idea of Philosophy I

(Fragments)

(taken from EHS on Philosophy Document)

Ted Sadler

 

 

 

 

  1. Age of Faith and Age of Reason. Standard accounts of the history of philosophy report that in the seventeenth century a transition was made from the ‘age of faith’ to the ‘age of reason’. Undoubtedly this was the propaganda of the time. There was much talk of beginning anew, of breaking the shackles of theological authority and reaching for the first time in human history a genuinely autonomous intellectual stance. Great hopes were held out for reason, not just in the advancement of science but in society and politics generally. Instead of ecclesiastical dogma there would be reason, instead of a society founded on irrational custom and arbitrary political authority there would be a society based on reason, that is on genuine knowledge – scientific knowledge – of the nature of man as a social and political animal. In all this talk of reason, however, it was never made clear how reason was supposed to apply outside that single context – science – where it had proved its credentials. The age of science it certainly was. Certainly the sciences were advancing and in important respects were changing the picture of the world. But there was a naïve belief that the steady accumulation of scientific knowledge could itself justify belief in a new ‘age of reason’. Francis Bacon had not been so carried away; he had wanted both faith and reason (science) because he saw that science itself could not provide ‘wisdom’. When subsequent thinkers wanted to do away with faith altogether, when they saw no room for faith in the age of reason, they were confronted with the problem of the values reason was supposed to serve. To this question reason itself gave no answer.

 

  1. Philosophy, Wisdom, Science. The campaign against philosophy, more precisely against the old conception of philosophy which had reigned for two thousand years, began in earnest four hundred years ago. At that time Francis Bacon made a radical proposal for altering the meaning of ‘philosophy’. What Bacon proposed was that this Greek word ‘philosophy’, which literally means ‘love of wisdom’, should no longer be understood as having anything to do with wisdom. Instead, philosophy should henceforth mean a system of learning, especially scientific learning. As for wisdom, Bacon maintained that this belonged not in philosophy but in religion. In other words, Bacon’s thought was that wisdom was not capable of intellectual support, not capable of support through reason, nor was wisdom reason itself. Wisdom was simply faith, which for Bacon meant the Christian faith, in fact the Protestant Christian faith which was based on the Bible. In the seventeenth century people doing straightforward scientific work came to think of themselves as and were called ‘philosophers’. Galileo and Newton were ‘philosophers’. The Royal Society published its scientific papers in a periodical called ‘Philosophical Transactions’. There were some difficulties in this usage however. For while the spirit of the time very much approved of people giving up on the old philosophy and turning to science, there was nothing in science itself which sanctioned this attitude. There was, evidently, still a need for philosophy of a kind, namely for a philosophy which would license the rejection of the ‘old’ philosophy. The fact that science came suddenly on the scene and made such rapid strides in diverse areas was not itself enough to banish old ideas. Some people were under the impression that you could embrace the new sciences of the day while still clinging to the old philosophy. They did not see that the two were incompatible. So that this could be seen, John Locke, at the end of the seventeenth century, wrote his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This book attempted to demonstrate that apart from what is known in science there is nothing else to know. This was so, according to Locke, because all knowledge comes from the senses, and it is science and nothing but science that has competence in dealing with sensory materials. Philosophy henceforth would be the ‘underlabourer of science’, content to clear away the obstructions to understanding which would otherwise inhibit the development of science. With Locke philosophy became the ‘theory of knowledge’, ‘knowledge’ being understood exclusively as scientific knowledge. Philosophy as a discipline became the study of why the previous tradition of philosophy was no longer credible.

 

  1. Philosophy in Collapse. In contemporary Western culture philosophy is in a state of collapse. This does not mean that philosophy has altogether died and is incapable of resuscitation. If that were so, if philosophy were truly a thing of the past and had no future, then it would have been a mistake all along. At best philosophy would have had a faulty conception of itself by failing to understand that, in the end, it must be abolished, or must abolish itself, or must slowly fade from all relevance. To say that philosophy is in collapse today is to record a cultural fact, the fact that philosophy has been rejected. Philosophy is no longer a living force in culture. In modern and especially in postmodern culture the dominant attitude towards philosophy is one of incredulity. What philosophy historically maintained and what it ostensibly stood for is regarded as incredible, as impossible to believe and as impossible to enact. This is the way philosophy is regarded. But – and this is the point that so many contemporary critics fail to grasp – the rejection of philosophy is not the same thing as its refutation. Philosophy has been rejected but it has not been refuted.

 

  1. What Does ‘Philosophy’ Mean? It will be objected that philosophy cannot possibly have been rejected when there are today so many academic philosophers in existence, so many intellectuals who are called philosophers, and so many books on philosophy. Yet if one has any experience of contemporary academic philosophy and intellectual culture one knows that the philosophers that now exist, and the books they write, almost uniformly argue against a ‘previous conception’ of philosophy which is none other than the classical idea of philosophy deriving from Plato. It is now widely accepted that this idea of philosophy is no longer viable, that it is necessary to abandon this idea. This process of abandonment has been under way for some four hundred years. In the early seventeenth century the classical idea of philosophy was abandoned by Francis Bacon and Descartes, in the middle of the same century by Hobbes, thereafter by the British empiricists Locke and Hume followed by the French philosophes of the Enlightenment, followed in turn by the utilitarians, positivists, and pragmatists, then in the twentieth century by the Marxists and postmodernists. The most influential thinkers and intellectual currents of the past four centuries have all been abandoning the classical conception of philosophy as out-dated, incredible, and undesirable. Yet these people still want something called ‘philosophy’. It is necessary to ask them why. How can it be that the thing they want is rightly called ‘philosophy’? Why have they not simply given up on philosophy and passed on to something else, as they have moved on from theology, astrology, and alchemy? What is the justification for the continuation of the word ‘philosophy’?

 

  1. What Philosophers Do. If one looks at the positive work that philosophers do these days one finds a bewildering variety of things. Some of these people look like scientists, others like literary critics, others like political commentators and still others like historians. Often it seems that in order to qualify as a philosopher one need only speak at a sufficiently high level of abstraction and abstruseness – it hardly matters on what subject, if indeed a ‘subject’ is discernible at all in a tangled web of self-referential discourse. There is no clear positive definition of what philosophy is supposed to be these days, at least no generally agreed definition. Various schools and tendencies do what they do, and they may call what they do ‘philosophy’, but despite superficial polemics the attitude which prevails is one of live-and-let-live. It is only through its negative views that contemporary philosophy gains its identity. And all these negative views, all the No-saying of those who call themselves and are called ‘philosophers’, are focused on one point and one issue, which is the classical idea of philosophy. In contemporary culture the philosopher has become someone who contradicts, discredits, unmasks and undermines what philosophy formerly was. This is the all-pervasive message, the one matter of general agreement. Anybody outside this orbit of thinking is considered an oddity and part of the problem.

 

  1. Dwelling on ‘Old Errors’. It is strange that after four hundred years it is still necessary to be contradicting an old line of thought; stranger still that a whole profession is necessary which agrees on nothing else except this contradiction. Contemporary philosophers admit that it is difficult to completely expunge the traces of an age-old tradition. But notwithstanding the worthy work of their predecessors from Francis Bacon to Wittgenstein and Heidegger, philosophers in the present day still find much expunging to do. Nothing, it seems, must be left to chance. It is not enough to simply state the errors of the classical idea of philosophy and pass on to something else. It is necessary to dwell on these errors in all their variations and to point out how they surreptitiously survive in modern-looking thought. Since the big names of the classical tradition will not go away, it is necessary to demonstrate, over and over again, that the admitted virtues of these authors are overlaid by and intermingled with characteristic pre-modern errors, above all that their idea of philosophy is unacceptable.

 

  1. New Ideas of Philosophy? What new idea of philosophy is to be put in place of the old one? This is the question which not only remains unanswered but apparently needs no answer. Indeed it seems that to even attempt an answer here would be to fall back into an old discredited way of thinking. Modernity does not want to answer this question, and even less so does postmodernity. Instead of affirming a new concept of philosophy, the rejection of the old conception has become the hallmark of philosophical thinking. And despite appearances to the contrary, despite all stealthy ambiguity, it is the rejection that counts, and by no means the refutation. The world has moved on, culture has moved on, interests and enthusiasms have changed. It is sufficient to point to the fact that the old idea of philosophy no longer has currency; it is enough to endorse the predisposition to reject the old philosophy. To look for refutations, to attempt to prove the case, to offer reasons and arguments – all this is taken as itself a symptom of an out-dated philosophical state of mind. Philosophy in its old conception believed that it could prove things, but nowadays we are enlightened as to the impossibility of all proof, particularly (as it is said) any ‘final proof’. People are asked to look at the old idea of philosophy and to see whether it appeals to them. If they need assistance to make a judgement the professional philosopher will come forward. The classical idea of philosophy stood for proof, for truth, for the authority of reason, for a strict system of morality, for an ‘absolute’ standard of justice, for a ‘total’ view of the nature of reality, for a ‘universal’ definition of human nature. All this, it will be pointed out, is at variance with the spirit of the age. To revert to the old philosophy would be to make an exit from contemporary culture, to render oneself irrelevant, to stigmatize oneself as a fossil intellectually and morally. And if someone looking at the old philosophy were to still ask for proof, were to ask for a refutation rather than a mere rejection, this will be taken as a refutation of that person. For look, it will be said – cannot you see that the old philosophy believes in these absolute standards, these final judgements, this overarching authority of reason? Seeing this, can you really give any credibility to this old tradition?

 

  1. Postmodernity and Philosophy. In the West we now live not just in modern but in what is called ‘postmodern’ culture. There is no point in protesting against this term, which has now become entrenched. The important thing to realize, however, is that postmodernity is not at all a negation or supersession of modernity. Postmodernity is just a late stage of modernity, its final or terminal stage. It is modernity taken to its conclusion, modernity that has become florid with its convictions, but it is also modernity in desperate throes of self-defence. Postmodernity is that stage of Western culture where the destructive implications of modernity become so evident that they can no longer be brushed aside with optimistic gestures towards the future, where instead one must make a decision for or against this destructiveness. As a style of thought postmodernism represents an acceptance, even a celebration, of the destructiveness of modernity. It differs from ‘modern’ thought in that it no longer pretends and hopes and half-believes that somehow, in some as yet unforseen way, the destructive effects of modernity can be avoided, that somehow modernity can be something positive and can provide something to believe in. Postmodernity does not believe in anything except its own disbelief. But it does not want to languish passively in disbelief. On the contrary, it asserts this disbelief with vehemence, proclaiming that, if only one can come to active belief in disbelief, to celebrating disbelief, to living disbelief, one will find that the destructiveness of modernity is not at all onerous but an ‘empowering’ condition. And so it is with philosophy. Postmodernism disbelieves in philosophy and this is precisely its ‘philosophical belief’. It disbelieves in truth, in reality, in justice, in morality, in meaning, and in reason So in this the postmodern age philosophy has collapsed.

 

  1. Modesty and Arrogance in Philosophy. What a strange combination of modesty and arrogance does this our modern culture exhibit. We are modest, it seems, in no longer seeking to magnify ourselves through theology. We are modest in recognizing that we humans are not at the centre of the universe and that the earth does not exist for our benefit. We have turned away from everything grandiose and overblown. We have come of age, we humans, in modern secular culture, and as adults we have learned to stand on our own feet without the comforting delusions of childhood. We have come to terms with the world as it is and with ourselves as we are in fact. We no longer build for eternity, because we know that we are temporal and not eternal creatures. We no longer strive for saintliness, because we know that we are flesh and blood from top to bottom. And in all this knowing we also know how much we do not know. As we have become more knowledgeable so we have become sceptics about how far our knowledge can extend. We no longer believe the old philosophers who dreamed of ‘absolute knowledge’, for we no longer believe there is anything ‘absolute’ to know. We are thus modestly content with relative knowledge. We are also modestly content with relative values, for we realize that, by reaching out to heaven, we shall inevitably miss the mark – for there is nothing there – and so shall neglect our own finite selves. In modern culture we humans have gathered up the courage to face our finitude. This, the modesty of finitude acknowledged and celebrated, is held up as our dignity, a dignity represented by the new philosophy from Francis Bacon through to the present day. Yet behind all this modesty there is an unmistakable arrogance. For we who are tolerant, we moderns who nowadays give all cultures and past ages their due, we who acknowledge the integrity of every point of view and are constantly criticizing the arrogance of all pretensions to absolutism –  we do this precisely as all-knowers who have risen above all traditional perspectives. We already have the answers because we are aware of the unavailability of any ‘final’ answers; indeed this awareness is our answer of answers. From this standpoint we affect an openness towards everything, even towards the old tradition of philosophy, because we are convinced that nothing we meet up with can challenge us in any fundamental way. We are curious about all ages and cultures, we pile up ever more historical information, we display everything in museums for our enjoyment, we revive defeated cultures and extinct languages, and we take pride in the fact that it is we moderns who do all this and can do it on account of our liberated intellect. Our finitude, it is said, is admittedly a ‘lack’ ­– the lack of infinitude or godliness – but at least now, having recognized what we essentially are, we are in a position to ‘affirm the lack’. The old philosophy could not do this, for it dreamed of infinitude; so did Christianity, and so in one way or another did all previous culture. But now, modestly reconciled to finitude, we can take the world in hand; we can even, through the instrument of modern science, conquer the world. We, the most modest humans that the sun has ever seen, are now lording it over the earth. Have we really become too modest for the old philosophy? Or are we, on the contrary, too arrogant for it?

 

  1. What Can Philosophy Be? What can philosophy be today? What can philosophy be in this our modern culture after four hundred years of science and enlightenment and secularization? Someone of a genuinely modern mentality may be forgiven for thinking that philosophy is by now revealed as a lost cause which will go the same way as theology. For who believes in theology nowadays? And was not philosophy, from the beginning of its history in the Greeks, ultimately a kind of theology? Was this not the reason that Christian theology found Greek philosophy so congenial? Do not theology and philosophy have in common the superseded idea of transcendental reality? Was it not necessary, for the human mind to come of age, to renounce this idea, thus breaking the shackles of both philosophy and theology? Was this not already achieved in the seventeenth century, by such eminent thinkers as Bacon and Galileo and Descartes and Hobbes? Must not the impossibility of philosophy be, henceforth, the presupposition of all serious intellectual endeavour?

 

  1. Philosophy and Modern Culture. This culture of ours, this culture which is now so needy of philosophy, is something we ourselves have created. And the way we have created it, the way we have created ourselves as cultural beings, is such that we now find ourselves with a deficit of philosophy. We have created a non-philosophical culture and have become beings of this culture. And yet, if this is so, what is it in us that calls out for philosophy? Is it something that has escaped the processes of cultural formation? If so, can it be the origin of a genuine need? Can we in modern culture possibly admit that modern culture is not itself the criterion of everything genuine?

 

  1. Finishing With Philosophy. Philosophy’s strongest tendency in our own time is the tendency to have finished with philosophy. But that which wishes to have finished and thinks itself actually to have finished with philosophy also wishes to call itself philosophy and understands itself as such. This has been the situation for the best part of four hundred years. And if there is such a thing as the new philosophy, and if this has in some sense superseded the old philosophy, we are entitled to ask what the underlying meaning of philosophy is that the two have in common. It is one thing to maintain that, in the modern period, philosophy has been replaced by something else, say by science, quite another to assert that philosophy continues in a new form. In this regard one may compare philosophy and theology. For it is the uniform opinion of the new philosophers that whatever novel forms theology has taken on in since about 1600 these still remain tainted by irreducibly ‘theological’ assumptions; these new philosophers, therefore, will not countenance any kind of theology, old or new. Why is this not the situation also in respect of philosophy? Especially given that the old philosophy, from its beginnings in Pythagoreanism and Platonism, was irreducibly ‘theological’, why has the concept of philosophy not been altogether given up?

 

  1. Uncovering Philosophy. Philosophy is covered up; it is therefore a matter of uncovering it. To get to philosophy we must first remove and clear away the covers. Philosophy, especially in the present age, is buried down deep; there are many obstacles, many layers of rubble that obstruct our access to it, much dead weight that has been laid down on top of it. That this does not necessarily seem to be the situation, that philosophy can seem to be readily open to view and easily accessible, is the effect and purpose of the covering. Something is most effectively covered up when it appears not to be; this is the present situation in regard to philosophy. Something else, something that is not philosophy, currently covers for philosophy, such that it is mostly not even suspected that the real thing can only be found underneath. Why should one dig when the thing lies handily on the surface? Why should one dig, especially when there is inscribed on the coverings of philosophy the directive not to dig? What currently covers for philosophy and mostly seems to be philosophy recognizes nothing except surfaces; philosophy is covered up all the more effectively by a cover-philosophy that teaches that ‘all things are covers’. But philosophy can be uncovered, for the reason that the digging instinct – the desire for depth, which is the truly philosophical instinct of human beings – cannot be eradicated, not by cover-philosophies, nor by anything else.

 

  1. Digging for Philosophy. Let us therefore start digging, aware, of course, that what we shall first encounter are the covers and not the thing itself we want to discover. Indeed let us initially forbear saying anything too precise about what this thing is we are searching for. It is, to be sure, philosophy itself that is our goal, and we must have some general idea of it before going to the trouble of digging it out. Since any account of philosophy must inevitably start from what philosophy seems to be, we must begin with the covers and work our way downwards. There is a difficulty here that is irremovable, that only after we have arrived at our goal, only after we have dug right down and discovered the nature of philosophy, can we properly identify the covers as covers. All we can do to begin with is describe the covers, in such a way that they may be removed at least provisionally, and our descent made possible.
  2. Philosophy Must Be Dug Out. But it is not the case that philosophy is covered up only by cover-philosophies; these latter are not at all primary but are strictly speaking effects. The reason that philosophy gets covered up has to do, at bottom, with the nature of philosophy itself. It is not an accident of history that philosophy is covered up today. Philosophy has been covered up in varying degrees throughout all the ages of history. In the age of Plato philosophy was covered up; Plato’s greatest exertions were directed precisely towards uncovering it. Philosophy never lies on the surface but must always be dug up and dug out; this is because of what philosophy is. For us in modern Western culture philosophy is especially difficult of access. This is because we live in a culture of surfaces and appearances. Modern culture does not validate the desire for depth but proclaims it to be an error. All the major schools of contemporary academic philosophy hold that the idea of depth belongs to a superseded tradition; they all teach that ‘there is no depth’, and provide, by way of compensation, ever greater complexity on the surface. This means that the latent instinct for depth is always disappointed, something academic philosophers have to deal with in respect of their students. The outstanding contemporary example of this campaign against depth occurs in postmodernism. But the campaign itself is not a recent phenomenon; modern philosophy as a whole has been campaigning against depth for about four hundred years, from the time of Francis Bacon. The spirit of modern philosophy is the spirit of the surface; it takes the desire for depth to be an objection. There is a distinct moral tone in contemporary warning away from the depths: to dig leads one away from the surface and thus away from our common dwelling place, away from our fellows, away from practical concerns, away from everything that gives sustenance and support to surface-dwellers. If one digs for too long one may become invisible; one may entirely disappear under the surface and become irrelevant. Especially when one takes into account that the digger is after some kind of treasure, a treasure that cannot be brought up and out but that can be enjoyed only down there in the depths, especially then can the digger seem offensive, a standing insult to those who prefer to live, as they say, in the light of day.
  3. Why Philosophy is Covered Up. Philosophy is covered up because of what lies down there in the depths. The thing down there, this thing which is a challenge on human beings, is desired and also not desired. It is distinctive of modern culture and of the cover-philosophies which represent it that just one side of this ambivalence gets validated. Unreceptiveness to philosophy receives confirmation on a grand scale, by culture at large and then – how unremitting it is – by the profession of academic philosophy. By the same token the desire for philosophy gets ‘treated’. It is admitted that the desire is there, but then it is thought that by suitable adjustments it can be redirected to the surface. This is what a university education in philosophy generally means nowadays: an immunization against philosophy. Hardly anyone is less challenged by philosophy, hardly anyone is more cured of the digging instinct, than those who have been through an academic education in philosophy, the academics themselves most of all. This has to do with the content of the cover-philosophies that form, at the institutional level of university philosophy, the most external covering of philosophy. The campaign against depth, the denial of depth and affirmation of the surface, just is the common content of these cover-philosophies.. This disbelief in depth, however, although it wears the mantle of philosophy, is in truth an expression of the ‘repulsive’ power of philosophy; it is not so much ‘disbelief’ in depth as a defensive stance towards depth.
  4. Philosophical Masquerade. Many academic disciplines are nowadays involved in philosophical masquerade. Especially in the social sciences is the philosophical masquerade running wild. Already in Comte ‘sociology’ was the crown of philosophy, the proper successor to the old philosophy. It is not necessary, however, for a discipline to objectively masquerade as philosophy, that it should subjectively intend to do so. As long as it implicitly takes itself (together, perhaps, with other disciplines) to occupy the place formerly assumed by philosophy, the masquerade is the objective effect. This is the general situation today. Philosophy is covered up because it is assumed that it is present in and represented by the whole complex of disciplines that belong to modern ‘learning’.
  5. The Old and the New Philosophy. For Francis Bacon in the early seventeenth century the day was dawning when Western civilization could start seriously attending to the ‘relief of man’s estate’, meaning the betterment of man’s material and social circumstances. The old philosophy, he considered, had not properly sighted this task, or to the degree that it had, employed faulty instruments for the purpose, it had, for example, been captive to fallacious pre-scientific models of knowledge. There had not been any tangible progress in the old philosophy, which had become instead a field for abstract hair-splitting and contentiousness. After the initial breakthroughs in physics and astronomy, by the middle of the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes was trying to demonstrate that the same advances in knowledge could also occur in human studies. Physical science was the model, and it was a matter of discovering the principles which had led to such startling advances in this area. The relief of man’s estate would be secured through the progressive extension of scientific principles into all domains, so that the traditional idea of philosophy as universal knowledge, the idea that had been merely a pious wish within the old philosophy, would be vindicated. But there were many aspects of the old philosophy which could no longer, on this way of thinking, be given any credibility at all. Foremost among these was the idea that philosophy studied ‘supersensible’ reality and could even make contact with a higher sphere of ‘divine’ truth. This belief, so the new philosophy considered, was the result of a failure to understand the nature and limits of human knowledge: in essence it was a superstition. After two thousand years of the old tradition, it could not be expected that its ideas would die out overnight. But an unequivocal rejection of lingering associations from the past would henceforth be the index of a truly modern understanding of philosophy.

 

  1. The New Philosophy and the Sciences. The ‘new philosophy’ took its lead and inspiration from the new sciences of the seventeenth century, as these sciences developed into increasingly specialized disciplines it became clear that no single one of them, nor all of them together, could really be identified with philosophy. What philosophy was left with was the method, the universal method as it was taken to be, of these sciences. At the end of the seventeenth century the matter was famously put by John Locke when he said that philosophy must forget its former speculative dreams and content itself with being the ‘underlabourer of science’. However, even this modest assignment for philosophy was not convincing, for as soon as any one of the sciences reached a moderately advanced state of development it invariably declared itself willing to dispense with the services of an outside underlabourer; it was, evidently, better able to do such work itself. Having disconnected itself from the old tradition by affirming the superiority of modern science, the new philosophy found itself without any distinct domain of investigation to call its own. It could limp along behind the new sciences and describe their methods, but such post-facto analysis by non-specialists was of little use to the sciences themselves. What remained was not so much the job of underlabourer as that of representative or standard-bearer. The new philosophy was to ride on the back of the sciences, analyse their methods after the event, and hold high the standard of science. But is it not incredible that such a miserable undertaking could establish itself as the proper work of philosophy?
  2. Bitterness of the New Philosophy. The one thing that all variants of the new philosophy have in common is their opposition to the old philosophy. Why are they so bitter? It is because the old philosophy, both on its own account and in its alliance with Christianity, held out such grandiose promises for humanity. Instead of the realizable goal of bettering material circumstances, the old philosophy, absurdly and pretentiously, promised participation in the divine, eternal absolute truth, and salvation of the soul. Such arrogance, such presumption – so the new philosophy feels – is an insult to modern culture and a dangerous distraction from the real tasks of today.
  3. The Rearguard Campaign. Rearguard campaigns are conducted in order to advance or consolidate on another front. What then, in the case of the new philosophy, is this other front? As stated, it is the front of the sciences, of all the sciences together, of the physical and chemical and biological and social and political and economic sciences as they have developed since the time of Francis Bacon. But the new philosophy does not so much carry out positive scientific work as ‘represent’ the spirit of science within modern intellectual culture. Since such representation mainly takes the form of a rearguard campaign the charter of the new philosophy is in essence negative: its job is to keep the old philosophy at bay, to limit its opportunities, to suppress the instinct for it and to discredit it. That this is the situation, that the new philosophy has taken it upon itself to be the policeman of modern intellectuality, is shown by the fact that it has no results to call its own: it is the sciences themselves that produce results. Ask the new philosophers what, after all this time – it has been four hundred years –  they themselves have come up with, and you will be told that they have demonstrated more definitively, more comprehensively, more incontrovertibly, that the old philosophy is untenable.

 

  1. The New Philosophy as Endless ‘Refuting’. If the classical conception of philosophy is judged to be flawed, then there are two alternatives: either one can declare the very idea of philosophy to be a mistake (like astrology or alchemy), or one can attempt to justify a new conception of philosophy. But after four hundred years a new concept of philosophy has not been forthcoming. Instead, entitlement to the term ‘philosophy’ has continued to depend on the critique of the classical tradition, as if to be a ‘philosopher’ in the modern period is to be occupied, seemingly without end, with the refutation of previous errors. All the mainstream tendencies of modern philosophy, for a period of about four hundred years, have been tending toward the dissolution of philosophy. This sounds paradoxical, that a discipline would focus so much on its own negation, and of course the matter gets described in other ways. It is said, for example, that only a previous conception of philosophy is negated, and that, as a matter of fact, it is only in the modern period that a genuine idea of philosophy comes to displace the pseudo-philosophies of former ages. It is said that we in the modern world are simply ‘incredulous’ about any pre-modern concept of philosophy. It is said that ‘God is dead’ and that the untenability of previous philosophy, in particular what may be called the ‘classical’ tradition of philosophy deriving from Plato and lasting through all the centuries of Christendom to the Renaissance, follows from this fact. The problem, however, is that those who seek to build a philosophy on the death of God, just because of their vehement rejection of so many defining features of classical philosophy, have great trouble justifying their use of the term ‘philosophy’. Indeed a fair degree of embarrassment on this issue can be observed among contemporary academic philosophers, many of whom prefer other labels to ‘philosopher’ or who at least use this latter term is a loose non-binding sense, as more or less equivalent to ‘theorist’. Entitlement to the term ‘philosophy’ has continued to depend on the critique of the classical tradition, as if to be a ‘philosopher’ in the modern period is to be occupied, seemingly without end, with the refutation of previous errors. In their positive work, modern philosophers may be called scientists, theorists, intellectuals, historians, sociologists (it hardly matters what), but it is precisely in their negative work, in their critique of the tradition, that they gain their identity as philosophers. So it has come about that modern philosophy is in an essential sense an anti-philosophy.
  2. Modern Philosophy as Anti-Philosophy. In their positive work, modern philosophers may be called scientists, theorists, intellectuals, historians, sociologists (it hardly matters what), but it is precisely in their negative work, in their critique of the tradition, that they gain their identity as philosophers. So it has come about that modern philosophy is in essence anti-philosophy.
  3. Science Masquerading as Philosophy. A thing is what it is and not another thing. Science is what it is and not another thing, in particular it is not philosophy. Now science does not as such claim to be philosophy or even to substitute for philosophy; these are the claims of the new philosophers. It is frequently insinuated by the new philosophers, sometimes even by scientists themselves, that the old philosophy is in some way at odds with science. This cannot be the situation, for the two inhabit altogether different realms with different objects and objectives. What philosophy is at odds with is not science as such but science masquerading as philosophy. Quite naturally, philosophy is against anything that masquerades as philosophy, but what it is against is precisely the masquerading and not the thing itself minus the masquerade. If the masquerade becomes part of the thing, an essential aspect of the thing, even the main purpose of the thing, then philosophy will be at odds with it; this is why philosophy must be at odds with positivism and postmodernism.
  4. The Campaign Against ‘Nostalgia’. As for when enlightenment on this particular matter was properly attained, there are different opinions. The general tendency has been for each successive philosophical tendency to claim that only with its own distinctive insights has the genuine breakthrough and ‘breakout’ from traditional philosophy occurred. Rival schools contend with one another about whether old prejudices have really been overcome, about how much from the tradition must be jettisoned and about what precisely (if anything at all) is worth salvaging. Philosophy is continually being put on a new footing by an ever more ‘critical’ searching out of ‘nostalgic’ residues and an ever more ‘resolute’ facing up to the ‘genuine challenges’ of today.
  5. Philosophy in Dissolution. The widespread disavowal of ‘previous philosophy’, together with the vehement rejection of all pretentions to ‘first philosophy’, has left academic philosophers with no clear field of inquiry to call their own. At the same time as academic philosophers have striven to establish their professional credentials and as philosophy itself has become increasingly a field of specialization worthy of representation alongside other specialized studies, the identity of philosophy has become ever more doubtful. In this sense the ‘current state of philosophy’ is a state of disintegration, a state of floundering ad hoc defensiveness, where academics attempt to shore up a discipline they are unable to define, with a history they are unwilling to defend.
  6. Philosophy in an Unphilosophical Age. What I have been maintaining is that all the mainstream tendencies of philosophy during the modern period, the most influential tendencies which reflect and represent the ‘spirit of the age’, have turned right away from the original Greek conception of the discipline of philosophy as this had survived intact until the late Renaissance, albeit for a millennium in the guise of ‘handmaiden of theology’. And I have also maintained that this turning away is not at all what it is made out to be by the mainstream tendencies themselves – namely the rejection of an obsolete tradition in favour of genuine philosophy  –  but is on the contrary the abrogation of genuine philosophy is favour of a pseudo-philosophy oriented to the ‘relief of man’s estate’ and governed by a truncated (scientific) concept of reason. All this does not amount to the eclipse of philosophy itself. For firstly, philosophy is primarily a practice whose locus is the individual soul and as such it remains a permanent possibility. The cultural validation of materialistic values and of the ‘relief of man’s estate’ as the grand project for humanity into which philosophy is absorbed, does not prevent individual human beings from actualizing their ‘love of wisdom’ and ‘caring for the soul’. Philosophy does not cease to exist in the modern age but continues as ‘philosophy in the unphilosophical age’. This is the situation on the whole. It is even the overwhelmingly dominant tendency. In this the unphilosophical age, philosophy is for the most part misunderstood and unrecognized, while that which is not philosophy, that which is pseudo-philosophy and in a certain sense even anti-philosophy, is baptized ‘philosophy’ and presented to the public as such.  That this is so does not reflect any kind of conspiracy. What it reflects is the culture of modernity, which is founded on the rejection of philosophical values. Modern culture suffers from this rejection. In particular do individuals, the souls of individuals, suffer from the suppression of philosophy. But modern culture, convinced as it is of its evaluative choices, especially of its rejection of any transcendent reference point which could provide an alternative foundation for values, looks anywhere but to philosophy to cure its woes. Instead, it looks to more of itself.
  7. Philosophy and Pseudo-Philosophy. This much stated, let me now add that this modern philosophy which I have called pseudo-philosophy does contain much that genuine philosophy has an obligation to ponder. Philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is insatiable in its desire to learn and in its eagerness to identify something worth learning. The modern sciences for example, are not philosophy, and yet they give much for philosophy to understand, much that can contribute to philosophy’s self-understanding. And even when these sciences are misunderstood and misrepresented as philosophy itself, even in scientific philosophy (a type of pseudo-philosophy) there is much grist for the mill of philosophy. For philosophy learns from everywhere, not indiscriminately of course, but guided by its mission to ‘know thyself’, meaning knowing reason ever more profoundly and comprehensively. Philosophy is not insular; it does not want to ‘avoid the world’. Philosophy is the most open of all human activities. But this does not change the fact that philosophy wants above all itself, and is very strict in evaluating everything from this point of view. In modern times, due to the collapse of the concept of philosophy, things are approached differently. Everybody acknowledges and appreciates the ‘contributions’ of everybody else in this or that area, but nobody asks any searching questions about what all these add up to. Genuine philosophy is very strict in insisting on just these searching questions. It is not content to register that X (perhaps a so-called ‘philosopher’) has produced a ‘valuable study’ of Y, but wants to establish whether the work of X serves philosophy. Contemporary taste finds this an arrogant attitude, but then, seriousness has always been misunderstood in this way. Socrates, we might remember, was put to death for his ‘arrogance’.
  8. Incredulity Towards ‘Meta-Narratives’. An influential contemporary author, Jean-François Lyotard, has defined the present postmodern era in terms of ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’. Philosophy in its Platonic conception is for Lyotard the exemplary ‘meta-narrative’. Human beings in all ages and cultures have told stories to themselves, but philosophy wants to be the story of stories. We can no longer believe in such a glorified story. Instead, we wish to retain many and diverse stories, we are ‘incredulous’ at the suggestion that any single story should be authoritative. It is not just postmodernism in the narrow sense that takes this attitude. Rather, postmodernism is just the outcome of four centuries during which, often under the name of philosophy, the very possibility of philosophy has been indignantly denied. Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century we have been becoming progressively more ‘incredulous’ towards philosophy.
  9. Incredulity Towards Philosophy. What then is the reason for this contemporary ‘incredulity’ towards philosophy? In addressing this question the first thing to be noted is the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’. Does it mean ‘cause’, or does it refer to intellectual grounds? What are the arguments here? What are the insights? What discoveries took place early in the seventeenth century which showed that philosophy was untenable? What intellectual advances have since occurred to confirm this view? We must ask these questions, for when all is said and done, incredulity alone just means non-acceptance, unwillingness to accept, resistance to acceptance. But we are asking about the reasons and grounds for non-acceptance. What does modern and postmodern philosophy have to say on this score?
  10. What the ‘Incredulous’ Ones Say. Just here, however, right at the beginning of our questioning, we encounter a peculiar obstacle. For in asking about reasons and grounds we are appealing, so we are told by the ‘incredulous’ ones, to the very ‘meta-narrative’ that is in dispute. Incredulity towards philosophy includes incredulity towards final reasons and grounds. We may of course ask for opinions as to why philosophy is unacceptable today, but to weigh these opinions according to philosophical standards of reason is to impose an authority where none can be recognized. Any call for reasons and grounds, for explanation of arguments and discoveries and insights, meets with no response. We are presented instead with facts. In the seventeenth century, Bacon and Hobbes put forward the fact of modern science, which fact became, and remains to the present day, the foundation of every version of positivism. Postmodernism presents different facts, for example the interests of sundry social groups. Incredulity towards philosophy is founded on attachment to these facts. Bacon asserted that modern science existed for ‘the relief of man’s estate’ and that this was a purpose to which traditional (Platonic) philosophy could make no conceivable contribution. He therefore redefined philosophy to mean modern science. Postmodernism asserts that ‘theory’ exists for the advancement for socio-political interests and that traditional philosophy is useless in this area; it therefore redefines philosophy to mean ‘theory’. But more than this, both the positivists (proceeding faithfully from Bacon) and the postmodernists claim that philosophy in its traditional form actually inhibits their goals, that it is ‘the greatest danger’. Thus the mainstream tendencies of modern ‘philosophy’, while positively pursuing their programs, while energetically building up scientific knowledge or fervently advancing political causes, also have to fight on a defensive front, constantly having to fend off and discredit the ‘vestiges’ of a now ‘superseded’ philosophy. And in truth, it often seems that this defensive front is even the main area of campaign.
  11. Reasons and Grounds for Philosophy. Of course, the opponents of philosophy can easily turn the tables, demanding that philosophy itself give reasons and grounds for turning human life upside down. One thing is sure, however, which is that any reasons proffered will not be acceptable to those who are ‘incredulous’ to begin with. At this point, strangely enough, our positivists and postmodernists suddenly become very ‘rigorous’, pointing out that philosophy is incapable of doing anything else except restating its own convictions. And in the end, philosophy must admit it. For how is it possible to give grounds and reasons for insisting on grounds and reasons? Further, how is it possible to give reasons for the value philosophy places on truth, justice, and goodness? Philosophy must admit that it cannot justify itself except through itself, that it cannot tolerate anything external to philosophy being brought forward either to defend philosophy or to criticize it. But philosophy will not acknowledge any foundational weakness on that account. If philosophy wishes to turn human life upside down, if it does in reality turn human life upside down, this is not because, from some other perspective, such a thing is advantageous. On the contrary, such an overturning, such a reversal of magnetic polarities, is not ‘advantageous’ at all for those who are outside of philosophy and will always be seen by the likes of Lyotard as an ‘incredible’ idea. About twenty-two hundred years after Socrates, another philosopher would speak in similar language. Philosophy, said the Platonist Hegel, is an ‘inverted world’, where the south pole becomes the north pole and vice-versa. The two poles, self-interest and justice, exert equal and opposite magnetic attractions on the individual human being. Outside of philosophy, the pointer of the soul is directed with iron necessity towards the pole of self-interest, while within philosophy it is the pole of justice which exerts an irresistible force. It is no good, of course, trying to persuade a magnetic needle around to its opposite pole, for its abhors nothing so much as this single point. Only through a magnetic reversal can the pointer of the soul turn right around to its opposite pole, an unnatural happening we might suppose, even a ‘supernatural’ and thus impossible happening.
  12. The Fuss About Philosophy. It is a strange thing, but when one asserts that a particular discipline, or a particular school of thought, or a particular theorist, is not doing philosophy, the reply is most commonly that they are nevertheless doing something worthy and beneficial. There is a miscomprehension here that is indicative of the low level of philosophical consciousness in modern culture. People do not know what all the fuss is about. They are producing theories, they are building up knowledge, they are producing useful instruments for diverse purposes, they are ‘advancing the discussion’ of various problems. But all this is not the issue. The question is whether they are doing philosophy or something else, a question that can only seem irrelevant once the real meaning of philosophy has sunk out of sight.
  13. The Call for Philosophy. On the one hand, then, we have this call for philosophy coming from somewhere within contemporary culture, a call made for the most part by people unacquainted with professional academic philosophy. On the other hand we have the institutional edifice of philosophy that replies with assurances that philosophy does indeed exist, that those making the call may familiarize themselves with this philosophy at least in its popular presentations, and that beyond this, if the callers remain unsatisfied, they should perhaps more rigorously examine why they are this, to see if they are wanting something belonging to the past. It would seem that the callers, the dissatisfied ones, are presumptuous, for they are ignorant not only of professional philosophy as it exists today, but, we may assume, of the whole history of philosophy. The professionals are well informed, can anticipate what the uneducated callers will say on all relevant matters and have at hand numerous remedies to quieten the call. How could it be suggested that the callers are in the right when they say that philosophy is lacking and that the professionals are in the wrong when they point to their own imposing institution of learning? How could the ignorant be right and the learned wrong? But such is in fact the case. From a philosophical point of view the inarticulate call for philosophy is in the right and the assurances coming down from on high are in the wrong.
  14. The Call for Reasons and Grounds. Let us look a little more closely at this call for philosophy. It is not a call made by the learned and so does not express itself in learned terminology; precisely for this reason is it so easily ‘refuted’ by professional philosophers. The call for philosophy is invariably a call for guidance on questions fundamental to human existence. That these questions are felt, irrespective of the precise manner of their articulation, to be primary questions, is what occasions the call. It is not idle curiosity that prompts these questions. They are questions of practical life and may be summed up in Socrates’ question ‘How should I live?’. The lives of human beings, in a way not true of non-human animals, depend on decisions; at both an individual and collective level humans are constantly confronted by valuational choices. The call for philosophy comes from the feeling that these choices should not be arbitrary but must in some way be grounded. To where can one turn for guidance on these choices, so asks the caller, other than to philosophy?
  15. Deflecting the Call for Philosophy. Now it may be suggested that these questions concerning value and meaning are religious questions, and that anyone calling on philosophy for guidance in this area is really asking philosophy to perform the function of religion. This kind of response is characteristic of a certain type of professional philosopher. But religion is for many people today no longer a possible resource for answering the questions that most deeply concern them, which is why they call for philosophy instead. The professional philosopher may make this very point, taking it to prove that there is something wrong with the typical questions about value and meaning. That such questions are really religious in character, he may say, just goes to prove that they are superseded. If religion has been discredited, then surely philosophy should not be lumbered with its misconceptions and false promises. Does this mean that the professional philosopher will just reject the call for guidance, saying that no such thing is to be had in religion, philosophy, or anywhere else? This, admittedly, is not exactly what happens. The professional will likely say that questions of value and meaning must be reformulated, that the expectation of ‘absolute’ answers must be overcome, and that, provided that the necessary reorientation towards such questions is achieved, the inquirer, the caller for philosophy, will indeed find many useful resources in contemporary academic theory. That there can be no ‘ultimate’ answers only indicates that, after considering all the available resources, individuals will have to make their own personal decisions. This does not mean, our professional will add, that philosophy is now something less than it used to be. After all, to cast off pretensions is not to be diminished. Philosophy, he will say, now promises less but by way of compensation can achieve more. For is not a little of reality worth more than a lot of illusion?
  16. Common Meaning of ‘Philosophy’. Our caller for philosophy, we are assuming, is asking for guidance about fundamental questions of value and meaning. He does not wish, let us further assume, to turn to religion for guidance. Why does he think that philosophy can help? What leads him to put his questions and problems and doubts precisely to philosophy, perhaps with all the ‘unreal expectations’ regretted by contemporary professional philosophers? What does the layman, unacquainted with academic philosophy as it exists today, understand by the word ‘philosophy’? To be sure, this word has somewhat vague connotations in everyday speech. Perhaps its most common occurrence is in such expressions as ‘he reacted philosophically’, meaning that he took bad news with composure and self-control. Political parties speak of their ‘philosophies’, alluding to the system of ‘values’ they represent. The layman will be hard put to define the concept of philosophy, but will understand that, traditionally, philosophy is associated with questions of fundamental import for human life, questions which are not resolvable in a straightforward or technical way. This is the reason that the layman calls for philosophy rather than for something else. He knows that the questions that disturb him most fundamentally are unlike the various mundane questions of life. Further, the layman knows the difference between the questions he brings to philosophy, the questions for which he seeks some guidance from philosophy, and other questions whose answers he may seek in the sciences or in some other area of specialized expertise. He knows all this merely from his own experience and from the everyday meaning of ‘philosophy’. And he knows this despite the fact that philosophy as it presently exists in academic institutions would prefer not to admit the genuineness of his questions, would prefer to fob him off in fact, would prefer to explain in a long-winded way that he has unreal expectations of philosophy and that he would be better to adjust his questions to the ‘current state of philosophy’.
  17. Nullifying the Call for Philosophy. From the perspective of contemporary academic philosophy the layman’s call for philosophy is an error. Of course, it would be nice to have the layman calling for what one is already doing and what one can readily provide. But no one, the academic philosopher least of all, is under any misapprehension that the layman is calling for academic philosophy. It already exists: there is no need to ‘call for’ it. The layman is complaining about a lack of philosophy but there is no lack of academic philosophy. For the professional philosopher, then, the layman must be in error. But we said that the layman calls for philosophy because of the ordinary connotations of the word ‘philosophy’ and because he understands that philosophy has traditionally dealt with just those questions about which he seeks guidance. If the layman’s call falls on deaf ears within the academy, this must be because academic philosophy recognizes neither the authority of these linguistic connotations nor the authority of the historical tradition of philosophy. Academic philosophy cannot cater to the layman’s call for philosophy but can only attempt to nullify it. Instead of the questions the layman has in mind, academic philosophy will put forth other questions, attempting to refocus the layman’s attention on these. For there are many intriguing questions in life, are there not? Let the layman leave his unenlightened questions behind and become a student of academic philosophy. Then he will be in a position to explain to laymen that their call for philosophy is a misunderstanding.
  18. Philosophy in the University. Ever since their formation in the twelfth and thirteen centuries the universities have consisted of a number of special faculties or departments. Originally there were three faculties: theology, medicine, and law. Philosophy was absent as a discipline in its own right and remained so until the eighteenth century; in fact it was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that philosophy gained widespread recognition as a university subject. Back in the days of the three faculties philosophy was regarded as a ‘handmaiden’, especially to theology. Only after the hegemony of theology in the medieval universities was broken as a result of the new sciences and the attendant cultural secularization of the seventeenth century did philosophy begin to emerge as a distinct academic discipline, but its progress was slow.. The curious thing is that by the time chairs in philosophy began to proliferate nobody knew what philosophy as a special discipline was supposed to be. As conceived by Christian Wolff, who founded German academic philosophy from the University of Halle in the early eighteenth century, philosophy was the system of all human knowledge whatsoever, crowned by theology but also consisting of mathematics, ethics, jurisprudence, and all the natural sciences. On this view, philosophy was a regal discipline, always threatening to step on the toes of other disciplines within the university. Wolff himself overstepped the mark with respect to theology and was promptly expelled. Other professors might be more circumspect, but the underlying problem was that this idea of philosophy as ‘universal knowledge’ was in the end difficult to gainsay; indeed it had been, more or less, the conception of Aristotle himself. Either philosophy is a universal discipline, in which case how can it be realistically situated alongside other university subjects? Or it is, like medicine and law and everything else, a special discipline, in which case its particular subject matter should be specifiable. But specifiable it was not, neither in Wolff’s time nor in the time of Kant (who received a letter from the King of Prussia warning him off theological territory) nor in the succeeding centuries. Nobody was able to say what particular region of reality philosophy had to do with, yet everyone agreed that philosophy must be represented in universities. The solution adopted was perforce an administrative one: philosophy was simply placed alongside other university disciplines, with the problems posed by disciplinary boundaries being left for ad hoc resolution. This is the way things have stood for some three centuries now.
  19. Philosophy as a University Discipline. Whether philosophy should be a university discipline is an open question. Some philosophers have thought it should not – Arthur Schopenhauer for example, who considered that philosophy of all subjects must not be institutionalized. But one can agree with Schopenhauer’s general sentiments without coming to his conclusion. In regard to the health or otherwise of philosophy it is not so much a question of whether philosophy is represented as a distinct discipline at university as of whether its administratively imposed status is mistaken for its natural or genuine status. It is one thing to say that philosophy can be a university discipline, another thing to say that it is in essence such. The latter is the position that academic philosophers themselves tend to take, implicitly and notwithstanding their vagueness about the actual subject matter of philosophy. Institutions take on a life of their own; so it is with regard to philosophy in academia. Edifices of theory grow up which are spread around the world and count as the ‘current state of philosophy’. The language of these theories is for the most part recondite and inaccessible to outsiders. Academic philosophers come to think of themselves and be seen as experts similar in kind to those in other disciplines; an education in philosophy comes to be understood as a matter of acquiring expertise just as one does in other departments of knowledge. Again I am not suggesting that the concepts of expert and expertise have no place in philosophy; only that, when identified with a region of special expertise, philosophy forfeits its authentic function and its genuinely universal character, becoming something other than true philosophy, becoming in fact what I have called cover-philosophy.
  20. How the Rearguard Campaign Works. If the supersession of the old philosophy is the main doctrine presently taught to university students of philosophy in the Western world, it is noticeable that students do not appear to have fully imbibed this message prior to their encounter with the academy. From the connotations of ‘philosophy’ in everyday speech, connotations which reflect the old tradition, their teachers often find a hankering after something rather more ‘grandiose’ than what philosophy currently is, that is to say the new philosophy. In their first lectures students will begin to be disabused of the ‘inflated’ conception of philosophy which belongs to the past. It will be explained that philosophy was formerly connected with religion but that this is no longer the case; instead there is at best ‘philosophy of religion’, where people who happen to be ‘interested in religion’ can look at it from the point of view of the new philosophy. Students will be told that the claim of the old philosophy to possess some ‘privileged’ vantage point on human existence and the world as a whole, some kind of authoritative truth which would judge all claims to knowledge, has not stood the test of time and is now uniformly rejected by modern thinkers. As their studies progress, students will encounter this same lesson over and over again in ever more complicated forms. They will be introduced to a series of new philosophers who are exemplary critics of the typical errors made by the old philosophy. Mixed in with this will be a little social science, which will demonstrate how it is possible to proceed once one has overcome the old philosophy. Students will be instructed as to the existence of reactive tendencies in culture which would like to roll back the advances made by the new philosophy; they will be trained to spot the characteristic marks of the reactive mind and will be equipped with techniques for discrediting reactive arguments. All this will be the foundation of their education in philosophy. Upon graduating, they will go out into the world as ‘carriers’ of this attitude, or will proceed further along a professional path, to take their places among the full-time discreditors and demystifiers.
  21. Academic Philosophy Losing its Identity. At the present time there is an unmistakable tendency for philosophy to lose its identity as a distinct academic discipline, dissolving into one another of the social sciences, or into all of them together under such general rubrics as ‘cultural studies’ and ‘critical studies’. But it has also turned out that all the branches of the humanities are in need of reformation through the new philosophy, so that the rearguard action, the defensive campaign against the old philosophy, can now be found in all of them. For is it not obvious that, until modern times, literature and art and historiography and much else besides, were under the spell of the old philosophy? Must not every cultural artefact from the past be in some degree under suspicion on this score? Must not historians and art critics and literary critics, as well as their colleagues in the newer branches of social science, also in part be philosophers? Do they not at least require the guidance and advice of philosophers? But then, who precisely is to be called a ‘philosopher’ rather than, for example, a ‘critical theorist’ or ‘cultural critic’? At first the new philosophy, having renounced the ambition of the old philosophy to be queen of the sciences, became just one academic field among many. But so pervasive has the spirit of the new philosophy become in modern intellectual culture that academic philosophy now has trouble distinguishing itself from the other disciplines. This indeed is the logical outcome of whole tendency of the new philosophy, namely to disappear into the multifarious enterprises oriented to the relief of man’s estate. Was it not, perhaps, originally a mistake to call the new philosophy ‘philosophy’?

 Within the academic mainstream today, the term ‘philosophy’ has no clear meaning. It is true, of course, that the concept of philosophy is inherently contentious. For the most part, however, the lack of clarity about what philosophy is does not reflect this contentiousness. Instead, it reflects the absence of contending, the tacit decision not to contend, the decision to let things ride and ‘tolerate’ conflicting conceptions of philosophy, whatever they may happen to be, as long as they are at variance with the old philosophy. The concept of philosophy is unclear not because it is a live and contentious issue, but because, implicitly, decisions have already been made about what philosophy can, but especially about what it cannot, be. The will to question the nature of philosophy is lacking. This lack of will to philosophy, this unwantedness of philosophy, is a fundamental feature of contemporary Western culture.